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Abstract 
This thesis disentangles the impact of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies, fo-
cusing on the intentionality, consequences, and responsibility that underline cur-
rent peacebuilding practices. An examination of the consequences of peacebuild-
ing has largely been ignored by peacebuilding organizations and is insufficiently 
explored by peace and conflict scholars. The overall argument of this thesis is 
that liberal peacebuilding is not fit for purpose. Peacebuilding organizations do 
not engage sufficiently with the spectrum of consequences that their actions pro-
duce. They are not capable of reaching intended goals, anticipating and prevent-
ing the consequences of their actions, and taking responsibility for their conse-
quences. This makes peacebuilding a camouflaging enterprise. Peacebuilding or-
ganizations are pre-occupied with immediate impact, are motivated by self-
interest, and operate with short-sightedness. However, the very ignorance of the 
long-term impact and consequences of peacebuilding conditions the failure of 
peacebuilding efforts in the short term, thereby delaying the consolidation of 
peace at the expense of prolonging human insecurity and local inertia into struc-
tural disadvantages and uncertainty. Accordingly, this thesis highlights an un-
derexplored aspect of peacebuilding practice, and opens up space for peacebuild-
ing critiques to explore new frontiers. It argues that local agency in its institu-
tional, public and everyday forms counts and plays a crucial role in shaping, ne-
gotiating, and determining the prospects of peacebuilding. In this regard, the the-
sis shows that peace is also shaped by dislocated and dissociated events and in-
teractions within and beyond peace infrastructure, as well as being determined 
by local agents directly and indirectly involved in peacebuilding endeavours.   
 
In undertaking this complex task, this thesis develops a new integrated typologi-
cal framework, which examines the following aspects of peacebuilding: the de-
clared intentions; critical turning points; the spectrum of unintended, unantici-
pated, and unprevented consequences; and responsibility in the form of attribut-
ability, answerability and accountability. To facilitate this process, this thesis in-
troduces „critical practice tracing‟ as a new qualitative mixed method to guide the 
identification, examination, and evaluation of peacebuilding intentionality, con-
sequences and responsibility in post-conflict situations. The typological frame-
work is utilized to examine the unintended consequences of police reform in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the unprevented consequences of the emergence of 
Serb parallel structures in Kosovo, and the unanticipated consequences of securi-
ty sector reform in Timor-Leste. To cope with complexity, uncertainty, and to re-
duce and avoid the potentially negative consequences of peacebuilding, acting 
and knowing about peacebuilding should create space for emancipatory, reflec-
tive, and precautionary peacebuilding. Accordingly, the main contribution of this 
thesis is to promote a critical local perspective on peacebuilding, problematize 
the ethos and agency of peacebuilding and expand critical epistemologies to cap-
ture the complexity of contemporary peacebuilding in post-conflict societies.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction  
 
 
„… there is no being without doing and  
no doing without consequences.‟ 
 
(Margaret Archer, 1995)1 
 
 
 
This thesis takes an analytical and critical explanatory approach in order to disen-
tangle and assess the impact of peacebuilding actualities in three post-conflict so-
cieties: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste. To disentangle the 
impact of peacebuilding, this thesis explores the three aspects: the intentionality, 
consequences and responsibility of peacebuilding. This thesis constructs a cri-
tique of peacebuilding around the presence or absence of peacebuilding potential 
and its ability to reach intended goals, to anticipate and prevent creating negative 
consequences. In doing this, the thesis reveals the power of local critical agency 
in shaping peace and the limits of liberal peacebuilding. The thesis explores the 
processual pathways that illustrate how the interconnection between complex 
intentionality and an uncertain choice of actions produces a spectrum of conse-
quences, which were not intended, anticipated, or prevented. In order to ensure 
the ethical conduct of peacebuilding and to reduce harmful effects, it is of para-
mount importance to assign responsibility for such consequences.  
 
The international responses to most violent conflicts that occurred during the 
past twenty years have involved a combination of statebuilding and peacebuild-
ing instruments. While the ultimate goal of statebuilding is to establish self-
sustaining, legitimate and effective state institutions, peacebuilding concerns 
primarily the establishment of self-sustaining peace through eradicating struc-
tural factors that trigger violence in the first place. These two parallel and inter-
meshed agendas are defined as liberal peacebuilding, where the goal of the inter-
national military and civilian presence is to build a sustainable peace through es-
                                                        
1
 Margaret S. Archer, Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1995, p. 259. 
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tablishing democratic institutions, rights, and civil society, and to install a neolib-
eral and market-oriented economy.2 From Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to 
Kosovo and Timor-Leste, the liberal peacebuilding framework was executed 
through the international administration of post-conflict societies. These new in-
ternational administrations exercised full sovereignty over these societies for a 
transitional period of time in order to restore peace and order, rebuild political 
institutions, reconstruct the economy and create conditions for durable peace.3 
 
Although the number of ethnic conflicts and civil wars has fallen in the past dec-
ade, the recent phenomenon of extensive UN administrations gave rise to sub-
stantial debates on the paths, strategies, and implications of reconstructing post-
conflict states.4 The record of contemporary liberal peacebuilding praxis so far 
indicates a mixture of success and failure.5 In terms of success, liberal peacebuild-
ing has contributed to initiating post-conflict political, economic and social re-
covery processes, such as establishing new constitutional and institutional 
frameworks, developing electoral choice, and setting up basic public services.6 
However, in several aspects liberal peacebuilding has fallen short in establishing 
conditions for sustainable peace. The most disturbing aspect is the fact that most 
of the post-conflict societies that have experienced international administration 
and liberal peacebuilding continue to suffer from weak democracy, fragile peace, 
and contested and fragmented sovereignty. Although liberal peacebuilding has 
envisaged building institutions based on consensual and wide representation 
politics, ruled by law, and promoting good governance, the state of peace in the-
se countries reflects slow progress, where these war-torn societies continue to 
suffer from ethnic tensions and dysfunctional power-sharing institutions, the ab-
sence of social cohesion and trust, poverty and social inequality, the absence of 
ethnic reconciliation and deviated transitional justice.7 
 
                                                        
2
 See: Edward Newman, et al. (eds.), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, Tokyo: UN University 
Press, 2009. 
3
 Richard Caplan, The International Administration of War-torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
4
 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds.), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradic-
tions of Postwar Peace Operations, London: Routledge, 2009. 
5
 Susanna Campbell, et al. (eds.), A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding, Lon-
don: Zed Books, 2011. See also: Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails, New York: Palgrave, 1999. 
6
 Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, Evaluating Peace Operations, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Pub., 2010. 
7
 Oliver P. Richmond (ed.), Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approach-
es, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
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Deriving from these anomalies of liberal peacebuilding, one of the most im-
portant challenges remains the assessment and evaluation of the long-term im-
pact and effectiveness of peacebuilding praxis. However, questions on how to 
measure the impact of peace in the long-term, what counts as sustainable peace, 
and the reliability of existing assessments of peacebuilding impact, remain at the 
heart of peacebuilding problematique. So far, the measurement of wider impact 
remains elusive and is inadequate for capturing and tracing long-term conse-
quences. Driven by a western logic of measurement, liberal indicators are unable 
to register cultural differences and the complex local process where most of the 
consequences could be embedded. They mainly register inputs and outputs of 
peacebuilding enterprise and do not measure appropriately the impact of peace-
building. Impact assessment is not widely practiced by peacebuilding organiza-
tions because it is a costly, uneasy, and inconvenient exercise, which often reveals 
the limitations and consequences of any type of social action.8 In particular, 
mainstream indicators of liberal peace that rely on a technocratic and routine log-
ic of performance and impact assessment are unsuitable for measuring sensitive 
and complex questions related to dislocated and hidden consequences.9 Often 
driven by conformist bias, the internal and external evaluations of peace opera-
tions have a tendency to seek out evidence that is supportive of the tools and 
strategies invoked by the intervening parties - focusing on intended effects and 
systematically chasing positive and desired impacts - while no attempt is made to 
examine other types of consequences. 
 
Arising from this self-fulfilling liberal prophecy, the external, long-term, and un-
intended impact and consequences have been ignored and overshadowed. A 
broad spectrum of consequences and omissions, which could be of a negative na-
ture with long-term consequences and collateral implications often remain unex-
plored. This raises a number of puzzling questions. Why it is important to ex-
plore peacebuilding consequences? What drives the absence of thinking and 
planning for the unintended consequences of peacebuilding? Do international 
peacebuilders have a clear understanding of the potential long-term unintended 
and unforeseen consequences of their decisions and actions? It remains puzzling 
why peacebuilding consequences are rarely studied, if not entirely ignored, be-
                                                        
8
 Marie Gaarder and Jeannie Annan, Impact Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Inter-
ventions, WBPR Working Paper No. 6496, Washington D.C.: World Bank, June 2013. 
9
 Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Indicators +: A proposal for everyday peace indicators’, Evaluation and Program 
Planning, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2013, pp. 56-63. See also: Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Routine peace: Technocracy and 
peacebuilding’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2012, pp. 287-308. 
4 
 
cause they reveal the limits of policy planning, anticipation, and implementation, 
which in turn reduce the agency, capacity and ability of peacebuilders to accom-
plish desired outcomes.10 It is also necessary to question how peacebuilding or-
ganizations cope with a mismatch between intentions and outcomes, an inability 
to anticipate and prevent unintended consequences, as well as the discontent be-
tween authority and unwillingness to take responsibility. These are some of the 
key questions that this thesis seeks answers for, while enhancing the analytical 
and empirical understanding of the long-term impact and consequences of 
peacebuilding in post-conflict societies.  
 
Thesis argument  
 
This thesis makes a multi-layered argument. The overall argument is that liberal 
peacebuilding is not fit for purpose. Peacebuilding organizations do not engage 
sufficiently with the spectrum of consequences that their actions produce. They 
are not capable of reaching intended goals, anticipating and preventing the con-
sequences of their actions, and take responsibility for their consequences. Peace-
building organizations are pre-occupied with immediate impact, motivated by 
self-interest, and operate in short sight. Thus, liberal peacebuilding is not capable 
of building sustainable peace and deal with its consequences due to normative 
and organizational inconsistencies, imposing, linear, and universalist repertories 
of toolkits and rulebooks, undemocratic and unaccountable practices, a problem-
solving and externally driven orientation, and detachment from local needs, cul-
ture, and knowledge. This makes peacebuilding a camouflaging enterprise. Often 
liberal peace is prone to delaying peace, where liberal intentions are not translat-
ed in liberal actions and outcomes.  
 
Hence, the very ignorance of the long-term impact and consequences of peace-
building conditions the failure of peacebuilding efforts in the short-run, thereby 
delaying the consolidation of peace at the expense of prolonging the human inse-
curity and local inertia into structural disadvantages and uncertainty. In turn, lo-
cal agency in its institutional, public and everyday forms counts and plays a cru-
cial role in shaping, negotiating, and determining the success of peacebuilding. 
                                                        
10
 See for example: Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning & Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Unintended consequences 
of peacekeeping operations, Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007; Ulrich Schneckener, ‘Unintended 
consequences of international statebuilding’, in Christopher Daase and Cornelius Friesendorf (eds.), 
Rethinking Security Governance: The problem of unintended consequences, London & New York: 
Routledge 2010. 
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This thesis argues that peace is shaped in general by dislocated and dissociated 
non-events and unintentional interactions within and beyond peace infrastruc-
ture, as well as being determined by local agents directly and indirectly involved 
in peacebuilding endeavours. Accordingly, prospects for peace undergo an unin-
tentional, unanticipated and unprevented pathway, which is a product of com-
plex interactions that occur within a context of everyday interactions of power, 
agency and structures spread across post-conflict habitus and societal fields. 
 
This argument poses challenges for disentangling the figuration of peacebuilding 
consequences. Hence, the second argumentative strand of this thesis is of an epis-
temological nature. It is argued that to be able to capture peacebuilding impact it 
is necessary to go back and trace the declared intentions and key actions that 
have triggered and influenced the particular consequences and then assign ap-
propriate forms of responsibility. Once these three aspects are elaborated, it be-
comes necessary to assign different types of special responsibilities for the spec-
trum of consequences. Through this complex process of inquiry, certain frag-
ments of the mess created by peacebuilding in post-conflict societies can be regis-
tered. Hence, to operationalize this argument, this thesis introduces an integrated 
typological framework that seeks to advance the analytical and conceptual clarity 
of the intentionality, consequences and responsibility of peacebuilding, as well as 
to facilitate the methodological and pedagogical procedure for assessing the 
lifecycle of peacebuilding impact in post-conflict societies. This typological ar-
gument will be applied to three in-depth post-conflict cases: Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste. 
 
The typological framework consists of four key components: declared intentions; 
critical turning points, spectrum of consequences; and variety of responsibilities. 
Declared intentions constitute the bedrock of liberal peacebuilding ideology and 
represent the reference point against which the construction of reality in post-
conflict societies is investigated. Exploring the intentionality of peacebuilding is 
important as it reflects collective intentions, which contain implicitly self-interest 
as well as strategic, secret, and hidden intentions of different peacebuilding or-
ganizations, thereby creating a complex web of incompatibilities, contradictions, 
and chaos. The central aspect of this thesis is the examination of peacebuilding 
consequences, because most of the outcomes of peacebuilding are unintended, 
unanticipated, and unprevented consequences of purposive actions taken at ini-
tial and later stage of peacebuilding. Hence, examining the spectrum of peace-
6 
 
building consequences helps to explore the cascading logic and non-linearity of 
peacebuilding processes as well as exploring the presence of path dependence 
evident with the complex sequences, embedded influence of early decisions and 
actions, and their imposition on later developments and outcomes.   
  
While positive consequences are often highlighted in literature, it remains puz-
zling that other, more negative, consequences were produced but remain unac-
counted for. It is this most ignored dimension of consequences that this thesis 
takes on and examines in order to explore the extent to which the consequences 
of their doings and non-doings remain externalized, hidden, and unaccounted 
for by peacebuilding actors and organizations. It is only in the act of examining 
consequences that the meaning of good intentions (normativity of peace) can be 
identified, particularly if it is used by decision-makers as a euphemism to justify 
their intervention, neutralize any negative consequences, and thereby evade re-
sponsibility. In response to this gap, the concept of unintended consequences will 
be unpacked to differentiate it from unanticipated consequences as well as what 
will be referred to in this thesis as „unprevented‟ consequences. The pluralisation 
and differentiation of consequences and the totality of these three forms of con-
sequences will be referred to as the spectrum of consequences. This differentia-
tion is necessary because many of the effects that are described as unintended 
were in fact unanticipated or unprevented as a result of internal and external fac-
tors. Hence, putting an emphasis on the intentionality, anticipation, and prevent-
ability provides a better understanding of the agential capacity and responsibility 
in post-conflict societies, and their interaction with various social structures.  
 
The last component of typology is of normative and ethical nature, which seeks 
to bring to the forefront the question of responsibility for each action and deci-
sions taken whether they are intended or unintended, anticipated or unanticipat-
ed, prevented or unprevented consequences. Peacebuilding organizations do not 
take the responsibility for the negative consequences of their purposive actions. 
Hence, it is important to pursue new frontiers of thinking and to question wheth-
er the legitimacy and authority of the UN and regional organizations should be 
conditional on their willingness to accept responsibility for the spectrum of con-
sequences that their actions produce. In responding to the difficult yet necessary 
question of responsibility for peacebuilding consequences, this thesis argues that 
the assignment of responsibility for the spectrum of consequences requires a dif-
ferentiated account of responsibility. Drawing from moral philosophy this thesis 
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will examine three graduation of responsibility: a) attributability, b) answerabil-
ity, and c) accountability.11 Allocation of responsibility for peacebuilding conse-
quences is crucial to problematize the normative entitlements and reshapes the 
legitimacy of international peacebuilders, as well as downgrading illusive expec-
tations for their functioning in accordance with democratic standards. According-
ly, this thesis makes the case to assign attributability and answerability to re-
sponsible agents (individual and collective) in all the cases when unintended, 
unanticipated, and unprevented consequences of purposive actions emerge. In 
the case of unprevented consequences, a solid case is suitable to assign political 
accountability for those who have not prevented the emergence of the conse-
quences when they have authority, resources, and capabilities in place. 
 
Methodology and case studies  
 
The examination of the intentionality, consequences, and responsibility related to 
peacebuilding requires appropriate methodological tools. Driven by the research 
question of this thesis – which is the disentanglement of peacebuilding impact – 
there is a need to utilize existing methods while adding innovative combinations 
and advancements. In other words, a new epistemological inquiry as outlined in 
the typological framework requires the adaptation of adequate methodological 
tools. Accordingly, this thesis has developed a new derivative and integrated 
mixed method called „Critical Practice Tracing‟ (CPT), which combines elements 
of critical discourse analysis with practice analysis, and qualitative process-
tracing applied through case study research. CPT is a critical complementary ap-
proach that seeks to conciliate the existing level of academic knowledge about the 
theoretical and analytical conjectures and the impact of peacebuilding in practice, 
with a close examination of policy narratives, documents, and direct interactions 
in the field with the key actors and recipients of peacebuilding efforts in the 
countries under examination in this thesis. 
 
The compatibility of three constitutive methodologies of critical practice tracing 
is illustrated by the support they provide when examining the research question 
of this thesis. First, critical discourse analysis is an appropriate epistemological 
                                                        
11
 For a broader discussion of these aspects of responsibility in moral philosophy see: David Shoemak-
er, ‘Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility’, 
Ethics, Vol. 121, No. 3, 2011, pp. 602-632; Angela M. Smith, ‘Attributability, Answerability, and Ac-
countability: In Defense of a Unified Account’, Ethics, Vol. 122, No. 3, 2012, pp. 575-589. 
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approach as it enables disentangling the application of declared intentions into 
practical actions and decisions through analysing textually the social construction 
of meaning, and then exploring the spectrum of consequences by delving into 
multiple observable and documentary sources of social practices to be able then 
to localize normative assertion of relational responsibility to a particular agent.12 
Second, parallel to the textual analysis, discursive practices, are essential to verify 
to what extent international and local actors are aware of the spectrum of conse-
quences of their actions, to ascertain the level of their contextual knowledge, and 
to examine their routinized understanding of their expectations, their subjective 
articulation of achievements and successes, and technologies for neutralizing and 
diluting responsibility.13 Practice-based inquiry provides the opportunity to look 
at a wide range of social practices and phenomena, to assemble their attributes to 
verify the connection between an inability to fulfil the declared intentions and the 
outcomes, and then to determine their fitness for one of the types of consequenc-
es, if applicable. Third, process-tracing helps to examine the critical turning 
points that have played a significant and observable impact on subsequent events 
and outcomes.14 Critical practice tracing will not be used as a means for causal 
ascription and causal inferences, but rather to identify and illustrate the emer-
gence of different consequences and the preventable, missed opportunities 
around critical and decisive moments, and the complexity of agent interactions. 
 
This thesis applies the typological framework to three post-conflict countries and 
in each case it examines in more details one type of consequences. In the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the unintended consequences of police reform are ex-
amined illustrating inadequacies of peacemaking and peacebuilding after the war 
of Bosnia after 1996, which have unintentionally led to the creation of multiple 
decentralized, ineffective, and politicized police structures; breeding of informal 
policing and police support for criminality; police forces in service of protecting 
war criminals and obstructing inter-ethnic reconciliation; and breeding chronic 
human insecurity. In Kosovo, the emergence and development of Serb parallel 
structures is examined to illustrate the unprevented consequences of internation-
al peacebuilding in Kosovo. These parallel Serb institutions in Kosovo provided 
                                                        
12
 See: Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992; Teun A. Von 
Dijk, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in Deborah Schiffrin, et al. (eds.), The Handbook of Discourse Analy-
sis, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. 
13
 For a theoretical understanding of discursive practices see: Andreas Reckwitz, ‘Towards a Theory of 
Social Practices’, European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 243-263. 
14
 See: Aleksander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, MA, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. 
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security, governance, and development services to Serb population in enclaves in 
defiance of international peacebuilding and statebuilding process in Kosovo. The 
failure to prevent the emergence and development of Serb parallel structures 
during 1999 and 2001 led to the creation of a frozen conflict in the north, delayed 
the establishment of effective and functional institutions, hindered the establish-
ment of civic peace and ethnic reconciliation, and undermined socio-economic 
development. In the case of Timor-Leste, the development and reform of the se-
curity sector is examined to explore the emergence of unanticipated consequenc-
es, which had collateral damage for peace, democratic governance, and devel-
opment of the country. 
 
In undertaking this type of critical assessment of peacebuilding impact, field re-
search is conducted in each of the three countries studies through around twenty 
interviews in each country with national government officers of relevant ranks, 
international officials, as well as local and international civil society activists. 
Field research has strengthened the confidence of the explanatory power of the 
key critical turning points identified in each chapter, and the accuracy of the 
identification and examination of the spectrum of consequences. Hence, critical 
practice tracing invoked to the three in-depth cases provides solid empirical sub-
stance for conceptual validity, fertile grounds for contingent generalizations, and 
an explanatory space for handling the complexity and multiplicity of social ac-
tors, processes, and structures.  
 
Structure of thesis 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. After this introduction, the next two chapters 
explore the theoretical and methodological aspects of the thesis. The rest of the 
thesis consists of three chapters, which examine in details three types of conse-
quences that have emerged from peacebuilding engagement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste. The concluding chapter draws some 
cross case comparisons and cumulative contingent generalizations. Chapter 2 
provides a contextualized discussion of the key theoretical caveats that underpin 
peacebuilding debates and its impact in post-conflict societies. The first part of 
the chapter examines the emergence, development and implications of liberal 
peacebuilding as the mainstream theoretical framework for explaining and un-
derstanding dominant peacebuilding praxis. It also explores the emergence of 
alternative theoretical frameworks, mainly related to critical approaches to 
10 
 
peacebuilding. The second part of the chapter examines the inadequacies and 
politics of impact assessment to reveal how the external, long-term, and unin-
tended impact is often overlooked, and instead a convenient logic of evaluation is 
invoked by focusing on intended effects and systematically searching for positive 
impacts. The third part of the chapter deconstructs the invocation of the dis-
course of consequences in peacebuilding debates, both by the propagators of lib-
eral peace and its opponents. It identifies the ambiguous invocation of the notion 
of unintended consequences, reveals the reductionist understanding of conse-
quences, and the prevalence of paradigmatic contempt for peacebuilding re-
search on consequences. 
 
Chapter 3 sets out the conceptual and methodological aspects of this thesis. The 
first part of the chapter introduces a new typological framework consisting of 
four components: declared intentions, critical turning points, consequences, and 
responsibility. Based on the method of differentiation, the typological framework 
expands the spectrum of consequences to include „unintended‟, „unanticipated‟, 
and „unprevented‟ consequences. With regard to responsibility, the following as-
pects are elaborated: attributability, answerability, and accountability. These con-
ceptual notions will form the analytical bedrock for guiding the case study re-
search. The third part of this chapter elaborates the epistemological and method-
ological aspects of this thesis, including the introduction of a new conciliatory 
and mixed method „critical practice tracing‟, case selection, and other sources of 
knowledge assemblage through field-based and empirical research.  
 
Congruent with the theoretical framework developed in this thesis, Chapter 4 
examines the spectrum of unintended consequences that have emerged as part of 
police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The police reform process in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was one of the most complex, protracted, and difficult post-
conflict projects undertaken by the international community in the post-Cold 
War world. Police reform in Bosnia has undergone two major phases. The first 
phase took place from 1996 to 2002 led by the UN and IPTF, and the second 
phase took place from 2003 to 2012 led by the European Union. The failure to 
pursue a more centralist structure for police forces during the first critical turning 
point led to the unintended consequences of police becoming politicized, in-
volved in organized crimes and protecting war criminals, and impeding the re-
turn of minorities and inter-ethnic reconciliation. During the second phase, the 
main challenge of police reform after 2003 when the United Nations handed over 
11 
 
responsibility to the European Union was how to make the police forces work 
with each other, free them from political control, make police more accountable, 
and increase coordination and effectiveness. The entire police reform experienced 
different levels of incompatibility and disagreement, which led to the unintended 
consequences the nurturing of political confrontation and exclusionary politics, 
strengthening of nationalist factions and suppressed political moderation, as well 
as discouraging cooperation and promoting obstruction. 
 
Chapter 5 assesses the spectrum of unprevented consequences that occurred in 
Kosovo relating to the parallel structures in Serb enclaves. This chapter explores 
how the declared intentions of establishing the stable peace and the rule of law, 
effective governance and ethnic reconciliation have been delayed in Kosovo and 
focuses on two critical turning points. The first critical turning point examines the 
failure of the UN and NATO to prevent the formation and development of Serb 
parallel and illegal structures in Kosovo after June 1999. The second critical turn-
ing point for dismantling of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo and preventing 
the spectrum of consequences that this institutional parallelism was creating in 
Kosovo arose during the process of negotiating Kosovo‟s final status and the sub-
sequent implementation of the Ahtisaari proposal, which took place between 
2006 and 2008. The chapter illustrates that both NATO and UNMIK were well 
aware of the emergence and development, and challenges posed by the illegal 
operation of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo. However, no adequate and deci-
sive measures were taken to dismantle these structures when the opportunity 
arose at different stages during a thirteen years period. Consequently, the failure 
to prevent these structures resulted in adverse effects for peacebuilding in Koso-
vo including: operational challenges for international authority, constraints for 
Kosovo's institutions and sovereignty, obstruction for the integration of the Serb 
community within Kosovo society, and the development of organized crime and 
informality.  
 
Chapter 6 examines the unanticipated consequences of the development and re-
form of security institutions in Timor-Leste. During the process of security sector 
development and reform there were two critical turning points, which had a cru-
cial and far-reaching impact on the stability of the country as well as long-term 
institutional development. The first critical turning point was the decision to es-
tablish the defence and police forces, which took place in 2001 and the modalities 
that followed in terms of recruitment policy, delineation of roles, institutional 
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framework, and allocation of resources. The second critical turning point took 
place after 2006 in the process of undertaking the restructuring of police and the 
supposedly comprehensive review of the security sector. The process of security 
sector development in Timor-Leste illustrates the clear failure of UN and 
Timorese institutions to maintain the rule of law and provide security. This chap-
ter illustrates that the UN's good intention to bring security and long term stabil-
ity to post-conflict Timor-Leste by developing the defence forces and equipping 
them to deal with external threats and by empowering the police service to en-
force the law and maintain internal public security has adversely contributed to 
prolonging instability and insecurity, creating unaccountable and authoritarian 
police and defence forces, thereby developing institutionalized sources of con-
flict.   
 
The concluding Chapter 7 assembles the key findings from the three case studies 
in a thematic and conceptual fashion. This concluding chapter draws a number of 
contingent generalizations for each component of typological framework. The 
chapter argues that the inability of peacebuilding organizations to achieve in-
tended consequences and anticipate and prevent certain negative dynamics rep-
resents the liberal peacebuilding impossible. So, the wider impact of peacebuild-
ing reveals that the potential of peacebuilding is compromised by default, re-
mains incomplete, and is perpetually hybridized and transformed.  
 
In light of the arguments outlined above, the overall contribution of this thesis is 
the problematization of the ethos and agency of liberal peacebuilding by disen-
tangling the long-term consequences and impact on post-conflict societies. At the 
epistemological level this thesis develops innovative analytical and inter-
disciplinary tools for expanding the systematic critique of peacebuilding inter-
ventions. At the empirical level, this thesis reveals the pitfalls that peacebuilding 
creates in post-conflict societies and shows the limitations of international peace-
building in reaching their intentions, the inability of anticipating and preventing 
most of the consequences, and avoiding responsibility for the consequences of 
their purposive actions. The argument of this thesis that having good intentions 
for peacebuilding is not sufficient contributes to redefining the order of things in 
peacebuilding. As will be illustrated in the following chapters, good intentions 
must be followed by cautious actions that have at their heart the anticipation and 
prevention of harmful consequences and those peacebuilding organizations must 
accept the responsibility for their consequences.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Peacebuilding Theories, Impact Assessment, and 
Discordance of Consequences 
 
 
 
“All systems of general ideas about man and socie-
ty have unintended consequences when they are 
given practical effect, and it is a commonplace that 
the distance between doctrine and practice is no-
where wider or harder to bridge than in political 
life.” 
 
      (John Gray, 1993)15 
 
 
 
Introduction  
As this thesis is primarily concerned with disentangling the impact of peace-
building, it is important first to delve into the key theoretical dimensions that 
underpin peacebuilding in theory and practice, with a particular emphasis on 
how existing knowledge tackles the question of peacebuilding consequences and 
impact assessment. Hence, this chapter explores three questions. What are the 
dominant theoretical debates and practices underlining contemporary peace-
building, and how do they envisage building peace in post-conflict societies? 
How is the impact of peacebuilding assessed by the community of practitioners 
and academics? How does the existing theoretical and policy literature grasp the 
question of peacebuilding consequences? In its classical meaning, peacebuilding 
seeks to change and transform conditions of structural violence and conflict.16 As 
a new disciplinary strand and body of knowledge, peacebuilding is invoked to 
                                                        
15
 John Gray, Post-liberalism: Studies in Political Thought, London and New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 
73. 
16
 Johan Galtung, Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research, Vol. II, Copenhagen: Christian 
Ejlers, 1976, p. 297. 
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explain the attempts to eradicate structural factors that trigger violence in the 
first place through a broad variety of loosely coordinated actions to implant, rear-
range, and reconcile a set of norms, rules, and practices in a post-conflict society 
or fragile state that aim at achieving initially a stable peace as a precondition for 
establishing a more durable and sustainable peace.17 Since its conceptual for-
mation two decades ago, there are two main stands within peacebuilding theo-
ries that are gaining theoretical prominence, and undergoing social elaboration. 
Although with internal varieties and fractures, the dominant strand is referred to 
as liberal peacebuilding and the alternative strand belongs to the new, emerging 
critical approaches to peacebuilding. 
 
Liberal peace currently dominates mainstream peacebuilding practices. Further-
more, the debates reinforcing this research programme undertake and develop 
positivist arguments that are mainly related to causality, problem-solving and 
policy-oriented approaches. Their core assumptions are that establishing peace 
and building a liberal state will produce a stable peace. However, since its incep-
tion, liberal peacebuilding has fallen short in establishing conditions for sustain-
able peace as most of the recipient societies continue to suffer from insecurity, 
weak democracy, fragile peace, and contested and fragmented sovereignty. On 
the other hand, alternative approaches dominated by the critical and emancipa-
tory peace arguments take post-positivist and discursive approaches and seek to 
provide alternative views of peace and conflict in theory and practice. Most of the 
critical approaches to peacebuilding provide reflective analysis of how liberal 
peacebuilding facilitates a counterproductive environment that results in devel-
oping weak and unaccountable local polity, fragmenting local sovereignty, and 
maintaining fragile peace.18 The alternative view of peacebuilding highlights the 
power of local agency, the primacy of local autonomy, as well as the importance 
of context, culture, welfare, needs, and interests.19  
 
Beyond this, the evaluation of the impact of peacebuilding in post-conflict socie-
ties does not tackle adequately the question of the long-term consequences of 
peacebuilding. In particular, the contemporary politics of impact assessment dic-
                                                        
17
 For a broad variety of definitions on peacebuilding see: Roger Mac Ginty (ed.), Routledge Handbook 
of Peacebuilding, London: Routledge, 2013.  
18
 David Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Raise of Post-Liberal Governance, London and New 
York: Routledge, 2010. 
19
 See: Oliver P. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, London: Routledge, 2011; and David Chandler, Em-
pire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building, London: Pluto Press, 2006.  
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tated by the material dominance of donors and power holders, coupled with an 
inadequate assessment of peacebuilding consequences have contributed to the 
ignorance of different types of long-term consequences that peacebuilding inter-
ventions have produced in post-conflict societies. This chapter argues that sys-
tematic thinking on the consequences of peacebuilding is widely absent in con-
temporary peacebuilding debates. In a limited number of academic studies, the 
notion of unintended consequences is invoked implicitly, in a peripheral and se-
miotic context, without sufficient explanations regarding how they define and 
understand such consequences when applied to evaluating the impact of peace-
building. Furthermore, the invocation of the discourse of peacebuilding conse-
quences predominantly follows a paradigmatic demarcation and reflects con-
tempt between the supporters of liberal peacebuilding and proponents of critical 
approaches to peacebuilding. The ontological positionality of each side deter-
mines what counts as consequences. While the existing research on peacebuild-
ing sheds light on different outcomes of international peacebuilding, it also di-
lutes the question of responsibility for the negative consequences that have been 
produced, were unanticipated, and above all remained unprevented. 
 
From liberal peace to liberal peacebuilding 
What we know today as liberal peacebuilding has its roots primarily in the en-
lightenment work of Immanuel Kant and his ingredients for perpetual peace 
transmitted to contemporary international affairs by Michael W. Doyle and his 
liberalist thinking during the early 1980s.20 Kant argues that in order to achieve 
perpetual peace it is necessary to change the nature of states and make universal 
the republican political regime based on a civil constitution, which operates 
based on commerce and trade, judicial rights for citizens, and representative gov-
ernment with a clear division of powers.21 To sustain this, he suggests an institu-
tional framework of „pacific unions‟, which will guarantee a just and global 
peace, expand economic cooperation and interdependence, and provide collec-
tive security.22 To regulate the orderly functioning of this system, Kant suggests 
establishing cosmopolitan law, which will operate in conjunction with the pacific 
                                                        
20
 Michael W. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 
12, No. 3, 1983, pp. 205-35. 
21
 Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 74-85. 
22
 Ibid, p. 74-85. 
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union to foster universal hospitality and develop the rules for safeguarding 
peaceful international relations. Nevertheless, this utopian prescription of human 
conduct did not stop the many long and violent wars of modern history in Eu-
rope and beyond. In response to the dominance of political realism within inter-
national relations during the Cold War, Michael W. Doyle marks the liberalist 
revival by actualizing Kant‟s liberal legacies to explain the contemporary dynam-
ics of war and peace.23 According to Doyle, the key to the liberal peace thesis is 
the existence of domestic liberal democratic systems where political and civil 
rights are respected and advanced, governments are democratically elected and 
exercise limited powers, economic activity is largely free from state intervention, 
and the social welfare of citizens in protected.24  
 
The institutionalization of the liberal peace ideology began initially with the UN 
mandate to maintain international peace and security.25 Because of the dominant 
power-oriented collective-security, the UN during the Cold War undertook a rel-
atively small number of limited peace operations - ranging from light preventive 
deployment to conflict management operations.26 Between 1945 and 1987, the UN 
conducted fifteen peace operations in the Middle East, South-East Asia, and Afri-
ca.27 All these operations had two tasks in common: observing the peace by moni-
toring and reporting on the maintenance of cease-fire, and keeping the peace by 
establishing zones of disengagement.28 UN peace operations during the Cold 
War reflect the interest of the international community in establishing some 
common rules of conduct and highlight the gradual recognition for human 
rights, state responsibility, and democratization.29 In the early 1990s, the sup-
pressed internal conflicts combined with new types of ethnic cleavages were in-
creasingly perceived as a serious threat to international peace and security.30 This 
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raised the necessity for international intervention and post-conflict peacebuild-
ing. 
 
Between 1988 and 1999, the UN conducted thirty-four peace operations. Moving 
beyond observational tasks, UN peacekeeping „expanded to include the verifica-
tion of troop withdrawal, the organization and observation of elections, volun-
tary surrender of weapons, and human rights verification‟.31 These peace support 
operations signified the official incorporation of liberal ideological caveats in the 
renewed UN peace operations and interventionism after the end of the Cold War. 
In 1992 the UN Secretary-General report „An Agenda for Peace‟ provided the 
landmark policy strategy on how to intervene in violent conflict and establish a 
liberal peace. 32 From this moment on, post-conflict peacebuilding started to be 
defined in terms of actions that seek to „identify and support structures, which 
will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into con-
flict‟.33 The report highlighted that „[p]eace at home and the urgency of rebuild-
ing and strengthening our individual societies necessitates peace abroad and co-
operation among nations‟.34 The new multilateral agenda for peacebuilding came 
as a realization of previous limitations the UN discovered as they endeavoured to 
build a sustainable peace through light footprint missions in post-conflict situa-
tions, and the insufficiency of the UN to address complex problems emerging 
from the absence of functional states, a lack of welfare, and ethnic divisions.  
 
Since then, liberal peacebuilding has assembled and constituted its characteristics 
based on the assumptions that building a liberal state and establishing peace will 
produce a stable peace. The caveats and impetus of the liberal peace project are 
mutually constituted and reproduced by the work of the liberal epistemic com-
munity and the practice of peacebuilding organizations. At its core, the expanded 
liberal peace project operates on a number of Western self-mirroring assumptions 
such as: democracies tend to be more peaceful; free elections produce democratic 
practices and political stability; establishing the rule of law promotes effective 
governance; power-sharing arrangements promote ethnic reconciliation; a ne-
oliberal economy promotes a free-market and economic growth; and a vibrant 
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civil society promotes human rights and social inclusion.35 This conceptual scope 
of liberal peacebuilding was adapted by the UN in 2001, stating that peacebuild-
ing efforts should „focus on fostering sustainable institutions and processes in ar-
eas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, 
transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect 
for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and 
non-violence‟.36 
 
The liberal peace agenda has gradually expanded and has incorporated elements 
from the field of development, governance, and security. Some of the key consti-
tutive elements of the expanded agenda of liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict 
societies include: reforming the security sector; creation of power-sharing institu-
tions and determining electoral choices; establishing the rule of law and justice 
systems; building a new liberal civil society; and establishing a market-based 
economy. These liberal dimensions of liberal peace serve either as pre-conditions, 
enablers, or to reinforce the liberal peace project. These dimensions of liberal 
peacebuilding are derived from multiple ideological sources and interests, and 
have been applied universally with slight contextual nuances, while being re-
formed and reproduced in the course of the multiple trials and failures of peace-
building practices.37  
 
However, from all these dimensions of liberal peace, it is important to examine 
security issues and institutions because of the political implications of security 
and the quality of peace they produce.  In the immediate phase after conflict, re-
forming the security sector is considered one of the main tasks of peacebuilding 
organizations.38 Prior to the institution building process, the establishment of se-
curity infrastructure is considered fundamental for ensuring the stable consolida-
tion of state institutions, as well as post-war social and economic recovery. Effec-
tive security is considered necessary to carry out credible elections, but equally 
electing legitimate political leadership is seen as crucial for establishing a credible 
security system. As evident in many cases, violent conflicts leave particular lega-
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cies that make peace difficult to build and states hard to reconstruct.39 The UN 
defines security sector reform as „a process of assessment, review and implemen-
tation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as 
its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and 
its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the 
rule of law.‟40  
 
As part of security sector reform, the UN and other peacebuilding organizations 
have undertaken activities to reform the police sector, to establish new security 
forces, reform the intelligence sector, to train border and prison guards, and to 
develop other necessary public security providers. Among the most important 
aspects of security sector reform is effective disarmament, demilitarization and 
the reintegration of former combatants, which is seen as crucial for ensuring re-
form that operates based on the rule of law, civilian control and democratic ac-
countability.41 However, reforming the security sector is a highly politicized pro-
cess as it involves shifting power relations from informal security groups - who 
act as informal structures but are usually the former state security forces or from 
opposition groups - to institutionalized forms of security under democratic and 
civilian control.42  
 
Under the institutionalization dimension, liberal peacebuilding privileges a set of 
actions to write a new constitution based on the peace settlement provisions, to 
change the electoral system to support power sharing, and a more inclusive, con-
sensual nature of politics, and to establish legal and political order to regulate the 
functioning of governmental sectors.43 The main local actors involved in power-
sharing deals are ex-combatants, warlords, and self-proclaimed political and civil 
society elite.44 While some see this as an opportunity to transform and control po-
tential peace spoilers in the war-to-democracy transition, others contest it by ar-
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guing that such a strategy ultimately excludes emerging moderate parties, civil 
society groups, and above all hinders effective accountability for past atrocities.45  
 
Establishing the democratic rule of law in war-torn societies is a complex and dif-
ficult process. The rule of law is seen as an essential part of liberal peacebuild-
ing.46 The rule of law aims to replace local transitional, indigenous and custom-
ary laws and practices on the grounds that they are violent, illiberal, suppressive, 
unequal, and embedded in power structures. The rule of law is considered a dis-
tinct normative value of modern liberal democratic states, but also an instrumen-
tal principle to achieve political and social order as a precondition for post-war 
stability, peace and justice.47 Thus, establishing the democratic rule of law 
through the establishment and enforcement of state-based structures such as ju-
dicial, penal and police bodies is considered essential for consolidating social 
trust and stability, promoting security and justice, and establishing democratic 
governance.48 Although the rule of law is seen important in post-conflict socie-
ties, primacy is given to stability and peace over justice and reconciliation. 49   
 
While liberal peacebuilding has contributed to initiating post-conflict political, 
economic and social recovery, such as establishing new constitutional and insti-
tutional frameworks, developing electoral choice, and setting up basic public ser-
vices, it has not entirely succeeded in most cases (such as Cambodia, Bosnia, Ko-
sovo and Timor-Leste) to establish what it has intended in the first place: to build 
sustainable and lasting peace. Due to its inherent interventionist nature and de-
sire for stability and control, liberal peace has tried to re-engineer post-conflict 
societies with political and economic models that did not fit the local context and 
culture and the democratic will of the people. Asymmetric power, the imposition 
of a political, economic and social system, unaccountable practices, and the posi-
tionality of colonial exploitation expressed by western-dominated states, organi-
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zations and NGOs have left post-conflict societies exposed to multiple conse-
quences, failures and anomalies. Putting a primary emphasis on shortsighted 
immediate results and relying on externally positioned intentions has ignored the 
possible negative and long-term consequences of liberal peacebuilding.  
 
Critique as alternative and the alternative of critique  
As a result of the shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding in practice, including 
failures and different spectrums of consequences, a critical scholarship is emerg-
ing that seeks to examine the performance, effectiveness, and implications of 
mainstream peacebuilding praxis. Critical approaches criticize the inconsistent 
performance of liberal peacebuilding, particularly the contrast between its pro-
claimed goals, its unfulfilled promises, and failure to provide a sustainable peace. 
They provide a different ontological, epistemological, and methodological per-
spective, which signifies the emergence of a new alternative research pro-
gramme, and a new mode of peacebuilding, which consequently marks a new 
generation of peacebuilding.50 This „critical turn‟ in peacebuilding follows Robert 
Cox‟s logic of challenging the dominant theories that adopt a problem-solving 
and instrumental rationality approach.51  
 
In general, critical approaches to peacebuilding express their propositions by ne-
gating the mainstream liberal approaches to peacebuilding. Among the critical 
approaches to peacebuilding, two waves can be distinguished: critique-as-
alternative and critique-with-alternative. Critique-as-alternative invokes critique 
as an end point, critiquing for the sake of critiquing and following the quest for 
the impossible and incomplete. The text and subtext of critique represent the al-
ternative. On the other hand, critique-with-alternative invokes critiques as a pro-
cess and pathway to come to an alternative solution without denying the im-
portance and immanency of critique. The critique-as-alternative has concentrated 
largely on „revealing the implicit political underpinnings of international peace-
building, and demonstrated their flaws‟52, such as ideological inconsistencies and 
flawed sources of legitimacy. They consider the contested nature of liberal peace-
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building as the facilitator of an environment, which can develop weak and unac-
countable local polity, fragment local sovereignty, and maintain fragile peace. So, 
in essence, they have described building peace in the present actualities as at-
tempting the impossible.  
 
Some of these critiques are related to the creation of an environment for delaying 
sustainable development by imposing good governance and a democratization 
agenda, by challenging local processes by imposing external conditionality, 
which reflects normative incoherence under the conditions of contested legitima-
cy. The exercise of sovereign authority by UN international administration is 
seen as running the risk of developing institutions that „will be less the creations 
of the people in question, and more products of external interests.‟53 Although 
liberal peacebuilding aims to foster self-sustaining peace through effective, legit-
imate self-governance, the extensive external involvement „can create new politi-
cal and economic patterns in the host society that come to rely on the continua-
tion of large-scale external aid and guidance‟.54 Critical approaches hold that lib-
eral peacebuilding removes political authority from local political institutions, 
weakening their capacity to develop and implement public policy, and thereby 
creating a culture of dependency.55 In addition to this, driven by security, eco-
nomic and strategic self-interests, states and international organizations engaged 
in post-conflict reconstruction often demonstrate an unwillingness to commit suf-
ficient resources, to operate in a coordinated and effective manner, and to be ac-
countable for the human rights abuses and local damages directly caused by their 
international staff.56 
 
An example of critique-as-alternative that represents the first generation of criti-
cal approaches to peacebuilding is David Chandler‟s notion of „post-liberal gov-
ernance‟.57 To Chandler, most of the classical liberal concepts - such as sovereign-
                                                        
53
 Christopher Bickerton, ‘State-building: Exporting State Failure’, in Christopher Bickerton, et al. 
(eds.), Politics Without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations, London: 
Routledge, 2006, p. 96. 
54 
Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar 
Statebuilding, Washington, D.C.: IPA, 2007, p. 6.  
55
 Dominik Zaum, Sovereignty Paradox, p. 241.  
56
 Simon Chesterman, ‘Building democracy through benevolent autocracy: Consultation and account-
ability in UN transitional administrations’, in Edward Newman and Roland Rich (eds.), The UN role in 
promoting democracy: Between ideals and reality, Tokyo: UN University Press, 2004, p.102; Daniel 
Philpott and Gerard F. Powers, Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
57
 David Chandler, The Raise of Post-Liberal Governance, London and New York: Routledge, 2010. 
23 
 
ty, democracy and good governance, rule of law, civil society and economic de-
velopment - no longer mean the same and cannot be judged by the same criteria 
as invoked earlier in the traditional or classical liberal framework. 58 In the para-
digm of international statebuilding, Chandler points out that „autonomy appears 
to be the problem which requires management rather than the unproblematic 
starting assumption‟.59 Accordingly, the post-liberal governance framework does 
not operate based on the principles of human rights, political legitimacy and the 
social contract, but instead it seeks, as Chandler asserts, „to secure stability 
through balancing internal and external interests and concerns as matters of 
technical and administrative competences in the formulations of good govern-
ance‟.60 He defines this type of international regulation of non-Western states and 
societies as „Empire in Denial‟, where „the new forms of international control at-
tempt to evade responsibility and accountability for the exercise of power‟.61 
Chandler‟s critique uses post-positivist epistemology to decouple the weaknesses 
of mainstream thinking, but intentionally does not provide any alternative solu-
tion apart from implicitly favouring the human agency and political autonomy of 
the state as a form of political community. Accordingly, his work resists provid-
ing alternatives and preserves the permanent quest for the impossible.62  
 
While the critique-as-alternative has been criticized by the gatekeepers of liberal 
peace for being exaggerated, unconvincing, and mis-characterizing63, a new type 
of critique-with-alternative has emerged in recent years. The critique-with-
alternative first seeks to decouple the shortcomings of democratization and mar-
ketization policy in an attempt to suggest some modifications and alternative so-
lutions. The attempts made by critique-with-alternative to provide alternative 
solutions to the shortcomings of democratization vary from those who favour 
inaction and non-intervention to those who suggest limited engagement. Some 
advocate for broader local ownership and consent, which will empower local 
agency and provide legitimacy for the external actors.64 Others suggest adapting 
democratic principles that recognize the importance of the local context, empow-
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er local population, and accept indigenous forms of governance.65 Another prop-
osition advocates for a hybrid model of combining local indigenous principles 
with those of a more liberal and cosmopolitan nature.66 This would incorporate 
local perspectives in the decision-making process, and bring the everyday pro-
cesses of society to the forefront.       
  
Concerning the marketization policy, most responses reflect that there is no 
standard model of economic growth and therefore neo-liberal economic models 
do not work in many post-conflict societies, suggesting that some dose of protec-
tionism is necessary to protect vulnerable societies from the uncertainties of lib-
eralizing markets and privatizing economic enterprises. 67 Responding to this, the 
critique-with-alternative advocates for societies and political communities to play 
a greater role in deciding on economic priorities and protecting local economic 
activities from the negative effects of neo-liberalism and globalization, as well as 
mixed economic models that adjust to post-conflict situations and build on social 
welfare models.  
 
The most elaborate alternative to liberal peacebuilding to date is Oliver Rich-
mond‟s post-liberal peace thesis that advocates for a new, critical research pro-
gramme, which consolidates a more systematic and pragmatic conceptualization 
of peace. Richmond argues that as a result of focusing on peace at the interna-
tional, regional, and state levels, liberal peacebuilding has failed to engage with 
the local context, or to explore the everyday forms of peace, care, empathy and 
emancipation.68 Accordingly, he argues that „without an engagement with needs 
and welfare, peacebuilding will not lead to a sustainable outcome because there 
are few peace incentives for citizens or elites‟.69 Richmond defines as a „post-
liberal peace‟ the transformation of liberal peace to engage proactively with the 
local, to recognize their needs and seek their support and consent.70 For him, 
„post-liberal peace‟ has a transitory and fluid nature, which seeks to emphasis 
„the everyday‟ „local agency‟ and „local context‟ as a convenient space that re-
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claims a new social contract that recognizes the plurality of peace, remains open 
to customary governance, and prioritizes social welfare and empowerment. Re-
cently, Richmond has suggested „peace formation‟ as the derivative product of 
hybrid forms of post-liberal peace, which emphasises the primacy of local legiti-
macy and perspectives in conjunction with facilitative and constructive interna-
tional engagement.71 
 
Richmond suggests a number of policy changes that would lead to a more sus-
tainable peace than the liberal peacebuilding agenda. First, any peacebuilding 
agenda should have a detailed understanding of local cultures, traditions, and 
needs. According to Richmond, they should see peacebuilding as „an empathetic, 
emancipatory process, focused on everyday care, human security and a social 
contract between society and polity; as well as internationals, the latter two 
which act as providers of care rather than merely security‟.72 Second, the econom-
ic framework should focus on a locally led mixed economy, focusing on the 
needs, welfare, and empowerment of the most marginalized. Hence, Richmond 
suggests social democracy as a convenient political system where any economic 
liberalization should be based on local expert knowledge, local consensus, and 
should consider socio-economic implications and ensure that social safety nets 
and labour rights prevail.73 Third, Richmond holds that „local decision making 
processes should determine the basic political, economic, and social processes 
and norms to be institutionalized in context‟.74 Finally, Richmond argues for an 
„international support for these processes, and guidance on technical aspects of 
governance and institution building without introducing or endorsing hegemo-
ny, inequality, conditionality, and dependency‟.75 In addition to this, Richmond 
holds that in order to engage with the local agency, context and the everyday 
manifestation of peacebuilding, a methodological shift should be adapted where 
local field research is a primary source of inferences together with ethnographic 
and anthropological methods.76  
 
Thus far, critical approaches to peacebuilding have focused on decoupling the 
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shortcomings of liberal peace, setting a new expanded interdisciplinary research 
programme, and undertaking an emancipatory perspective to empower the lo-
cal. At the theoretical level of critique, the notion of emancipation and agency are 
appealing. However, when it comes to the practical applications of critical ap-
proaches, there is yet to be filled with evidence regarding their success and the 
potential consequences they might produce. More broadly, both liberal and criti-
cal approaches to peacebuilding have not yet been able to handle properly the 
question of the consequences of peacebuilding due to ontological and epistemo-
logical differences. Proponents of liberal peacebuilding have predominantly ig-
nored peacebuilding consequences, as that would have been seen as a self-
defeating prophecy and an undesired refutation of their theoretical propositions.  
 
The liberal peace research agenda is more prone to tackle questions related to the 
removal of obstacles and the creation of conditions for enforcing the liberal peace, 
rather than looking at alternative perspectives or critically engaging with the 
consequences of their prior wrongdoings. Accordingly, this discussion of liberal 
and critical approaches to peacebuilding illustrates the need for methodological 
and epistemological pluralism, the need for analytical flexibility to overcome the 
entrenched logic of research programmes, and the need to pursue of new fron-
tiers of critique to capture the impact of peacebuilding actualities and its conse-
quences. This logic of inquiry affects also how impact assessment is conduced as 
well how peacebuilding consequences are examined, as illustrated by the re-
minder of this chapter.  
 
The assessment of peacebuilding impact  
Impact assessment is one of the most difficult and complex types of evaluations, 
which look at the long-term effects and consequences that have been influenced 
by particular purposeful intervention. A recent study by the World Bank defines 
impact assessment as: 
 
“… evaluations that draw from a set of methods designed to establish a 
counterfactual or valid comparison, to the intervention in question. The 
objective is to measure the net impact of the intervention, which in theory 
is the difference in outcomes for those receiving the intervention com-
pared to what the outcomes would be for the same participants without 
the intervention”.77 
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In general, impact assessment serves multiple purposes, such as: fulfilling nar-
row procedural requirements, understanding the influence of certain interven-
tions, and learning from mistakes to improve future interventions.78 Impact as-
sessment is also seen as necessary for organizational learning to be able to ex-
plore the relation between intentions and outcomes, as well as measuring the 
success of peacebuilding.79 Impact assessment is a necessary aspect of peace and 
conflict sensitivity knowing that the number of conflicts is not reducing, and that 
peacebuilding efforts are not capable of developing sustainable peace in post-
conflict societies. Although it is not the primary intention of this thesis to provide 
an in-depth analysis of various impact assessment approaches to peacebuilding 
practices, it is important to highlight the key features that are dominant and evi-
dent at the moment, especially, to illustrate the inadequacy of existing approach-
es towards impact assessment and the intentional ignorance for the spectrum of 
negative consequences.  
 
First, the majority of peacebuilding evaluation exercises are conducted mainly as 
a procedural requirement by donors and the evaluation of performance is often 
the only element incorporated which often follows confirmation bias and over-
looks broader factors, alternative indicators, evolving actors, processes, and 
structures, unintended effects, and alternative implementation options.80 Impact 
assessments of peacebuilding practices only look at the micro-level but do not 
connect or look for the broader impact that a particular project has had over cer-
tain actors, processes, and places.81 In most cases, the broader holistic social pro-
cesses are not included in the peacebuilding impact assessment. Most of the im-
pact assessment is conducted within the framework of projects, which are seen as 
universal, template-like, concrete and measurable units of activities limited in 
goals, activities, beneficiaries, time, and intended outcomes. So, the scope of 
events that this type of evaluation involves is largely limited and the timing of 
evaluation is often conducted immediately after the completion of the project.82 
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In fact, impact assessment in peacebuilding is borrowed from the development 
community, which is different by nature from peacebuilding programmes.83 
 
Needs assessments to guide programmatic interventions are often conducted 
based on a linear model of identifying a need and consequently outlining practi-
cal and affirmative actions to address that need. This type of reductionist logic 
often does not encounter „complex interrelationships within a societal context, 
the multiple reasons a particular need exists and the multiple impacts, intended 
and unintended, a remedial action can have‟.84 Lederach rightly argues that 
„peacebuilding activities do not always correspond smoothly with the categories 
of thinking established for relief, development, or other social projects‟, high-
lighting that peacebuilding impact assessment requires capturing long-term pro-
cesses, dynamics, and relationships.85 Lederach suggests that „outcomes should 
be understood as dynamic – as a process of understanding and learning – rather 
than as static results that are seen as products and end points‟.86 He further main-
tains that „[w]hen we look for ways to measure peacebuilding outcomes as pro-
cess-structures, we focus on that which is not immediately visible. Products are 
visible, but they rarely provide us with strategic indicators‟.87 In their examina-
tion of peace practices, Anderson and Olson find that success in a particular 
peace project does not necessarily mean success on a broader societal scale.88  
 
Second, long-term effects of peacebuilding are often ignored in donor-directed 
impact assessments of peacebuilding. For example, the comprehensive study of 
the Carnegie Commission on preventing deadly conflicts does not make any ref-
erence to the spectrum of consequences of peacebuilding, nor to the need to pre-
vent the consequences of international engagement in post-conflict societies.89 
The spectrum of consequences that emerges from peacebuilding operations is of-
ten excluded from the measurement indicators. The mainstream indicators of 
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peace that rely on technocratic and routine logics of performance and impact as-
sessment are unsuitable to measure sensitive and complex questions related to 
unintended consequences.90 Often driven by conformist bias, the internal and ex-
ternal evaluation of peace operations have a tendency to seek out evidence, 
which is supportive of the tools and strategies invoked by the intervening parties. 
Evaluations rarely question or disprove the logic of intervention. The external, 
long-term, and unintended impact is often overlooked, and instead a convenient 
logic of evaluation is invoked by focusing on intended effects and systematically 
searching for positive impacts. The UN and bilateral donors do not include im-
pact assessments and the spectrum of consequences that have emerged as a result 
of their actions and non-actions.91 The UN Secretary-General‟s periodical reports 
on Kosovo, East Timor, and Bosnia have ignored entirely this crucial dimension. 
Similarly, UN agencies, international NGOs, and bilateral donors have not dealt 
sufficiently with the unintended consequences of their programmes. Even 
UNDP, which has some of the most advanced analysis and evaluation tools, does 
not engage with analysing unintended consequences.92  
 
The absence of impact assessment and the examination of consequences are 
shaped by a number of complex technical and political factors.93 Technically 
speaking, tracing unintended consequences, side effects, and adverse outcomes is 
difficult as it requires in-depth analysis, for which there have not been clear 
methodological instructions to date, and the evaluation aspects of key actors are 
not equipped with adequate and capable people to undertake such a type of 
analysis. Furthermore, such a process is time consuming and requires a long-
term perspective and thorough examination, for which international actors are 
not keen on due to their interests for short-term results and reporting. Politically 
speaking, an examination of negative effects is unwelcome because it is perceived 
as self-defeating and unacceptable as it could potentially reduce credibility and 
funding prospects, and damage the future role of particular agencies and agents 
in engaging with conflict situations. In addition, revelations of negative impacts 
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raises questions of responsibility for which actors need to take responsibility, 
provide answers, and be held accountable.  
 
Such considerations notwithstanding, in recent years, the notion of long-term ef-
fects and unintended consequences of peacebuilding related programmes has 
begun to be included as an indicator in impact assessment studies. In their im-
pact assessments, most international organizations adhere to the OECD defini-
tion of impact, where the notion of unintended consequences is included. Impact 
is defined as „[p]ositive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects 
produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unin-
tended.94 The OSCE equates unintended effects with risks and allows the identi-
fication and discussion of unintended effects but leaves the option open to ex-
clude them from reporting.95 However, apart from listing a number of indicators 
of impact, there is no conceptual clarity, systemic guidance on how to identify 
them, and almost no mention of the need to incorporate them in policy planning 
and precautionary considerations for preventive actions. Within academic re-
search on peacebuilding, impact assessment is conducted mainly to identify cases 
where the peace process has either succeeded or failed and to ascertain conclu-
sions concerning levels of violence and how to address it.96 However, insufficient 
consideration is given for more complex examples of peace processes. There is 
little consensus on how to explore the spectrum of consequences, often attributed 
to the lack of agreed standards for assessing the negative and positive conse-
quences of peacebuilding.97  
 
A recent study on the evaluation of peace operations authored by Paul F. Diehl 
and Daniel Druckman argues that evaluations of long-term peacebuilding suc-
cess operate based on different indicators from those short-term assessments.98 
Their analysis show that contemporary qualitative thresholds and standards for 
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measuring peacebuilding success are too modest and do not capture the dislocat-
ed and hidden consequences that peacebuilding creates, based on which the true 
impact can be inferred. As their study shows, existing measures of peacebuilding 
success are based on misguided indicators.99 For example, to measure success 
with regard to local security, the number recruited and trained by national forces 
is noted, as well as the number of inter-ethnic incidents. In the field of the rule of 
law, measures of progress include: passing a new constitution; passing laws and 
codes of conduct; the number of courts established; the number of law enforce-
ment forces and prisons available.100 Indeed, these types of indicators might not 
be suitable to capture the long-term consequences of peacebuilding. Measure-
ment of impact requires examining multiple inter-acting factors and processes 
over the same and different field to provide more accurate inference.   
 
Consequently, inadequate engagement with assessing the spectrum of conse-
quences reduces the ability to assess the impact and the ability of peacebuilding 
organizations to achieve the intended outcomes.101 A number of peace evaluation 
studies suggest that the assessment of peacebuilding impact in relation to peace 
processes should be designed to serve for learning and improvement purposes.102 
While this constructive perspective is useful and necessary, it overshadows the 
function of impact assessment as a form of assigning responsibility as well as le-
gitimizing or de-legitimizing the agency of peacebuilding. Equally important is 
to assert the worth, value, and merit of peacebuilding actions and to evaluate the 
practical and moral abilities of agents. Justifying impact assessment on the basis 
of the necessity to reveal failures facilitates organizational learning from past 
mistakes and affords the possibility to change the routine, making it more prone 
to caution and sensitivity.  
 
Discordance of consequences in peacebuilding research 
In a number of limited studies, the notion of peacebuilding consequences has 
been discussed, but mainly in ambiguous, implicit, and semantic terms. Policy-
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makers invoke the notion of consequences to issue an unattributed apology, to 
emphasize the otherness of their agency, and to avoid responsibility. The episte-
mological differences between liberal and critical approaches have profoundly 
affected the way in which peacebuilding consequences are examined. While criti-
cal approaches have invoked the discourse of unintended consequences to signi-
fy the shortcomings of peacebuilding strategies, the same notions are used by lib-
eral proponents to neutralize and weaken the responsibility for these conse-
quences, and to soften the critique by presenting it in acceptable language.  
 
When the notion of consequences is invoked in peacebuilding research, in most 
cases no explanation or reference is provided as to they are defined or under-
stood and no criterion is used to guide how certain consequences are identified 
and analysed. Often, the notion of unintended and unanticipated consequences is 
used semantically and inter-changeably as an empty signifier, for which it is nec-
essary to explore carefully the context and subject of discussion to excavate im-
plicitly the meaning, causal relation, and the assignment of responsibility. An in-
depth survey of literature illustrates this point. In 1999 Stephen J. Stedman, one 
of the first proponents of the liberal peace thesis, raised explicitly the problem of 
unintended consequences that emerges out of the scope of purposive actions of 
the international community in internal conflicts. He identifies four types of ac-
tivities that unintentionally exacerbate conflict: international economic reform; 
humanitarian relief; humanitarian intervention; and preventive diplomacy.103 
Although Stedman does not clarify the invocation of unintended consequences, 
he implicitly shows that unintended consequences are directly caused by a varie-
ty of techniques in international conflict management intervention.  
 
In At War‟s End, Roland Paris invokes the notion of „unanticipated consequences‟ 
to describe the pathologies arising from democratization and marketization poli-
cy, which are undertaken by the international community to build sustainable 
peace in post-conflict societies, but ultimately, Paris argues, threaten to destabi-
lize internal peace.104 In another context, Paris and Sisk invoke interchangeably 
the concept of consequences and shortcomings with the notion of dilemmas and 
contradictions.105 Similarly, the OECD does not make any reference to the criteria 
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and definitional conditions for invoking the notion of unintended consequenc-
es.106 In other instances, unintended consequences are equated with wider nega-
tive impacts.107 The invocation of the notion of unanticipated consequences is not 
supported with any evidence regarding the absence of anticipation, foresight, 
and predictability among peacebuilding organizations.   
 
An edited volume published in 2007 by Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and 
Ramesh Thakur marks the first explicit and systematic attempt to shed light on a 
number of unintended consequences of peacekeeping in post-conflict societies.108 
They define unintended consequences as „acts that were not intended when these 
mandates were adopted or when they were executed‟.109 Aoi et al. explicitly dis-
tinguish unintended consequences from the failure to achieve intended conse-
quences, as well as from mixed motives of the interveners.110 This narrow defini-
tion of unintended consequences enabled authors to identify a number of nega-
tive peripheral outcomes of peacebuilding including: an increase in corruption; 
criminal activities and trafficking; human rights violations, and unaccountable 
practices from troop-sending states; distortion of the host economy; sexual vio-
lence against local women and children; and the spread of HIV/AIDS.111Alt-
hough this study invokes a narrow definition of unintended consequences and 
disqualifies a large number of peacebuilding outcomes from being considered as 
failures, it is an important pioneering study.  
 
However, several contributors to this volume define unintended consequences 
differently depending on their topic of study, thereby failing to bring conceptual 
clarity and provide useful guidance on how to trace and study the unintended 
consequences of peacebuilding. For example, Katarina Ammitzboell invokes in-
terchangeably the notion of wrong policies, lack of policies, and unintended con-
sequences.112 Similarly, Shin-wha Lee equates unintended consequences with the 
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inadvertent outcomes of peace operations113, whereas Frederic Megret equates 
unintended consequences with those outcomes that fall entirely outside of the 
peacekeeping mandate.114 This multiplicity of meanings and conceptual ambigui-
ty shows that even the most explicit study on unintended consequences within 
peacebuilding research to date does not follow a coherent definition, or a proce-
dure for identifying and assessing unintended consequences.  
 
The invocation of peacebuilding consequences is largely influenced by the para-
digmatic contempt between liberal and critical approaches to peacebuilding. The 
ontology of the critique of liberal peacebuilders is mainly to improve the perfor-
mance and restore the effectiveness of the liberal peace project. Despite this, the 
intentionality behind exploring the unintended consequences of peacebuilding is 
derived by positivist epistemologies, which have driven the research to be affili-
ated with problem-solving logic and normative explanations of empirical evi-
dence and state practices. For instance, Paris accepts the fact that liberal peace-
building has suffered from a number of „real‟ shortcomings, which he tends to 
justify by arguing that „peacebuilding is tremendously a complex and prone to 
unanticipated consequences, yet it is also too important to lose or abandon‟.115 
Aoi et al. place the studying of unintended consequences as instrumental means 
of improving the overall effectiveness of peace operations. Indeed such a reduc-
tionist conceptualization of unintended consequences leaves aside potentially 
important consequences and legacies that direct the intentional action of interna-
tional peacebuilding in practice.  
 
On the other hand, the invocation of unintended consequences by critical ap-
proaches represents a carefully worded attribution of negative effects of peace-
building, which represent a balanced quest to reveal weaknesses to delegitimize 
contemporary peacebuilding practices in order to open up spaces for alternative 
forms of peacebuilding. David Chandler explicitly argues that his work Empire in 
Denial - which examined how the international community exercises extensive 
authority without responsibility and accountability towards the targeted subjects 
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– aims to „draw out in greater detail the largely neglected elements of denial and 
evasion and, in so doing, develop an explanation of how these aspects have 
shaped and influenced policy practices and also to develop a broader under-
standing of the negative and unintended effects of these practices‟.116 Michael 
Pugh, another critical scholar, equates unintended consequences with the nega-
tive impact of liberal peacebuilding, arguing that neoliberal policies of self-reliant 
welfare together with the marketization and privatization of socially owned en-
terprises result in a number of unintended exacerbations. These consequences 
include: expanding the class of uninsured „bare lives‟; encouraging informal eco-
nomic activity; providing selective services to few communities based on the 
sphere of influence; ignoring the entire population due to lack of capacity, man-
date or incentives.117 While Richmond recognizes the fact that unintended conse-
quences are never-ending processes that occur in any type of power relationship, 
he suggests engaging with bottom-up social ontologies to understand the local 
context, and engage with the difference and hybridity of social practices.118 
Richmond's position represents a more balanced, adequate, and realistic attribu-
tion of unintended consequences than the previous invocations.  
 
Another pattern of differences relating to how liberal and critical approaches 
have engaged with peacebuilding consequences is the spectrum of solutions and 
strategies they have offered to deal with unintended consequences. Compared to 
critical approaches to peacebuilding, the proponents of liberal peacebuilding are 
generally more explicit about how to prevent and deal with unintended conse-
quences when they occur. Supporters of liberal peacebuilding identify the follow-
ing main sources that give raise to unintended consequences: a lack of planning 
and coordination; insufficient resources; and a lack of multilateral commitment to 
transform promises into practices, as well as insufficient understanding of local 
context. Consequently, mitigating these weaknesses is considered a recipe for 
containing, managing, and reducing unintended consequences. On the other 
hand, critical approaches to peacebuilding often focus on revealing the weak-
nesses of liberal peacebuilding and rarely provide alternative peacebuilding solu-
tions. The critique and eventual alternative of critical approaches to peacebuild-
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ing is often a counterfactual solution to those of mainstream peacebuilding theo-
ries and praxis.  
 
For instance, Aoi et al. suggest that although unintended consequences are inher-
ent weaknesses of peace operations, we should „enhance our capacity to prevent, 
contain and manage potentially negative unintended consequences by improving 
our understanding of how they come about and by exploring ways in which we 
can improve our ability to anticipate and counter them.‟119 In achieving this, Aoi 
et al. submit that:  
 
… through research into past actions and by systematically thinking 
through the consequences our actions are likely to evoke, we should be 
able significantly to reduce some of the obvious negative consequences 
experienced in the past. Anticipating the potential unintended conse-
quences of our actions should become a standard aspect of our planning 
procedures and processes.120  
 
In the same line of reasoning, Ulrich Schneckener holds that „unintended conse-
quences are a frequent feature of international statebuilding efforts and are hard 
to avoid.‟121 He suggests managing these unintended consequences by reducing 
gradually the international engagement, showing a willingness to evaluate and 
learn from processes, and to remain flexible by trusting the local actors to man-
age the state structures and affairs.122 In another study, Paris and Sisk argue that 
unintended consequences can be managed, if not resolved, by understanding lo-
cal contexts, and paying attention to the long-term consequences of the short-
term stabilization and recovery efforts.123 They echo this when they argue that: 
 
At best, the many dilemmas of postwar statebuilding can only be man-
aged, not resolved. Occasionally, innovative policies or clever decisions 
can ameliorate them, but effective management must itself be based on a 
careful analysis of the underlying contradictions and tensions that give 
rise to these dilemmas. It must also be based on extensive knowledge of 
the host country, and careful consideration of the long-term consequences 
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of initial short-term stabilization and recovery efforts.124  
 
While analysing the political economy of peacebuilding, Salil Ripathi comes to a 
similar conclusion that „coherent conflict prevention also requires ably planned, 
implemented and coordinated strategies in order to anticipate and avoid, to the 
extent possible, unintended consequences that exacerbate rather than alleviate 
the causes of violent conflict in a given context‟.125 Stedman identifies the solution 
to manage unintended consequences as the need to increase strategic planning, 
and initiate a debate on „the ethics of choice among tools, approaches, and cases 
of intervention - and the interests that are at stake‟.126 In addition, James Mayall 
argues that:  
 
… the contemporary internationalist formula, with its emphasis on de-
mocratization, the empowerment of civil society and human rights, is like-
ly to meet the same uncertain and inconsistent fate. Respect for the law of 
unintended consequences requires that those involved in post-conflict re-
construction should pay close attention to the particular cultural and his-
torical conditions of the societies in which they operate.127  
 
Accordingly, this short overview shows that the spectrum of solutions on how to 
deal with peacebuilding consequences mainly accept that potentially negative 
consequences occur and engage in developing instrumental mechanisms to re-
spond to and manage the consequences and less to prevent them before they take 
place. The appropriate mechanisms to manage unintended consequences are 
considered: systematic thinking; learning from previous mistakes; developing 
innovative policies to understand the local context; and excavating local 
knowledge and past histories. Supporters of liberal peacebuilding have realized 
that dealing with unintended consequences requires engaging with the local con-
text, culture, and knowledge, which represents the first meeting point and 
agreement with critical approaches to peacebuilding. Such realizations reveal ar-
tificial divides at the theoretical and paradigmatic level, and demonstrate a 
shared understanding at the factual levels. However, the comprehensive over-
view of existing literature on peacebuilding consequences reveals that although 
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there is some awareness of peacebuilding consequences, it still remains concep-
tually unclear; it is not studied in a systematic manner.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the positionality of liberal and critical strands of 
peacebuilding on the question of peacebuilding consequences, the politics of im-
pact assessment, and the discursive invocation of consequences in peacebuilding 
research. The current state of research on post-conflict peacebuilding studies un-
intended consequences at an insufficient level despite the importance and rele-
vance of this issue. The few studies that invoke the notion of unintended conse-
quences often do not clarify the analytical meaning of unintended consequences, 
are bound to certain paradigms and normative commitments, and rarely provide 
any solutions regarding how to deal with unintended consequences.  
 
The contemporary impact assessment of peacebuilding practices undertaken by 
scholars and practitioners has been unable to engage sufficiently with peace-
building consequences. Impact assessments of peacebuilding practices only looks 
at the micro-level but do not connect or look for broader impacts that a particular 
peacebuilding project has had over certain actors, processes, and places. Impact 
assessment methodologies are inadequate to capture the complex, dislocated, 
dissembled, and long-term effects of peacebuilding projects. The external, long-
term, and unintended impact is often overlooked, and instead a convenient logic 
of evaluation is invoked by focusing on intended effects and systematically 
searching for a positive impact. There are also serious anomalies with the con-
duct and empirical sources of impact assessment. Consequently, inadequate en-
gagement with assessing the spectrum of consequences reduces the ability of 
peacebuilding organizations to achieve the intended outcomes and evaluate the 
success or failure of a mission. 
 
From this chapter, it can be concluded that the research on peacebuilding conse-
quences should advance in at least three aspects: 1) develop further conceptual 
and analytical clarity and expand study of the spectrum of consequences; 2) 
move beyond paradigmatic contempt for studying peacebuilding consequences 
and invoke the principle of pluralism, which will eventually enable a plurality of 
knowledge excavation and investigate the intertwined complex figuration of 
peacebuilding; and 3) conduct systematic research using multiple approaches 
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and move away from mainstream and conventional epistemological approach-
es.128 Accordingly, the next chapters will seek to address this challenge of ad-
vancing knowledge on peacebuilding intentionality, consequences and responsi-
bility by bringing conceptual clarity, developing analytical and methodological 
tools, and examining a number of post-conflict case studies systematically and in 
detail.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Typological Framework of Peacebuilding Intentionality, 
Consequences, and Responsibility  
 
 
 
“Wherever men try to trace responsibility home to anyone, 
it is the instinct of punishment and of the desire to judge which is 
active. Becoming is robbed of its innocence when any particular 
condition of things is traced to a will, to intentions, and to respon-
sible actions. The doctrine of the will was invented principally for 
the purpose of punishment – that is to say with the intention of 
tracing guilt.” 
 
(Friedrich Nietzsche, 1889)129 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The theoretical discussion of liberal and critical peacebuilding theories in the 
previous chapter revealed numerous anomalies that impede the ability to under-
stand and study the long-term impact of peacebuilding. The discussion also es-
tablished that it is essential to explore new alternative theoretical and methodo-
logical avenues in order to examine this ignored dimension of peacebuilding. To 
capture the complexity of peacebuilding consequences, it is necessary to develop 
more complex epistemological and methodological frameworks. Simplifying and 
essentialising the process won't do justice to the mess of peacebuilding in post-
conflict societies. This chapter outlines a new conceptual and typological frame-
work for studying the impact of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. It is 
driven by the commitment to provide a pathway for registering the ignored di-
mensions of peacebuilding in theory and practice. The typology is constructed 
based on the logic of differentiation and the need for conceptual clarity and reali-
ty-adequate analysis. The typology is an integrative framework consisting of 
three core constitutive elements: intentionality, consequences, and responsibility. 
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These three aspects constitute the most puzzling dilemmas of individual and col-
lective social agents.  
 
At the heart of the constitutive attributes of human agents, including organiza-
tions as collective agents are the notions of intentionality, anticipation, preventa-
bility, and responsibility. They represent the texture of the human condition and 
the social construction of the reality of peacebuilding. They constitute some of the 
most essential properties of social agents. While intentions give meaning and 
drive to an action, anticipation is the assurance of the appropriate conduct and 
execution of intent, and preventability is the re-assurance that obstacles during 
the performance of the act are addressed to satisfy the desired and reasoned in-
tent. Responsibility is a regulatory moral mechanism that seeks to ensure the per-
formance of the three previous attributes of agency. These concepts will be inte-
grated together to consolidate a typological framework that will explore the de-
clared intentions of peacebuilding organizations, examine critical turning points 
that shaped actions and decisions, and then look at the broad spectrum of differ-
ent unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences that have 
emerged to facilitate assigning different aspects of responsibility. Forging this 
new conceptual organization of critical assessments of peacebuilding impact 
seeks to develop a new ethos for peacebuilding critique rooted in new inter-
disciplinarity, pluralism and consilience of knowledge, and based on the pursuit 
of care, precaution, and responsibility in thinking and acting for peacebuilding. 
To substantiate the innovative typological framework and the necessary episte-
mological foundations, a new methodological approach is constructed referred to 
as „Critical Practice Tracing‟ (CPT), a qualitative mixed method that integrates 
elements of critical discourse analysis, practice, and process-tracing. This breadth 
of conceptual and methodological tools will be applied to the three in-depth case 
studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste.  
 
Typological framework of peacebuilding intentionality, consequences, and 
responsibility  
The analysis of impact assessment and the discursive patterns of consequences in 
peacebuilding research in the previous chapter argue for the necessity for con-
ceptual and analytical clarity concerning the notion of intentionality, conse-
quences, and responsibility. The contextual and multi-disciplinary discussion of 
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the epistemology of intentionality, anticipation, preventability, and responsibility 
earlier in this chapter provided a comprehensive understanding of their key at-
tributes and dichotomies (intended-unintended; anticipated-unanticipated; pre-
vented-unprevented). Recognizing the necessity to provide conceptual clarity 
and study the multiplicity and complexity of intentionality, consequences, and 
responsibility in the peacebuilding context, this section presents a new typology 
framework, which conceptualizes these concepts to capture a complex pathway 
of interconnectedness and interactions as a systemic framework for assessing the 
impact of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies.130 George and Bennett argue 
that typological theorizing has the 'ability to address complex phenomena with-
out oversimplifying, thus clarifying similarities and differences among cases to 
facilitate comparisons, provide a comprehensive inventory of all possible kinds 
of cases, to incorporate interaction effects, and to draw attention to 'empty cells' 
or kinds of cases that have not occurred and perhaps cannot occur'.131 
 
The typological framework has four components: declared intentions, critical 
turning points, spectrum of consequences, and responsibility.132 These concepts 
enshrine the essential attributes to capture the form, matter, process, and the 
meaning of peacebuilding and its legacies in post-conflict societies.133 Assessing 
the impact of peacebuilding requires exploring the linkages between outcomes in 
the form of consequences, traced back to the declared intentions and key actions 
and decisions, in order to assign responsibility for consequences. The typological 
framework is a linear-complex pathway simplified to capture key categorized 
concepts under examination (intentionality, consequences, and responsibility), 
while preserving and presenting details of the complex interconnection and in-
teraction of multiple agents, processes, and structures. Linear and systemic de-
pictions of non-linearity are applied here to guide the procedural exploration of 
the impact and consequences of peacebuilding actions in post-conflict societies.  
 
The exploration of the typological elements in practices is highly complex, non-
linear, and contingent on uncertainties, multiple deviations, and interconnec-
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tions. However, the essential ontological intent of the typological framework is 
the de-complexification of key constitutive elements, capturing fragments of their 
non-linear self-organization, analysing the fitness of peacebuilding practices, and 
identifying the emergent features. In identifying critical turning points and the 
spectrum of consequences, the typology framework does not seek causality in 
positivist and Newtonian sense, but more to gain a complex understanding of 
causation as correlation. In other words, the typology identifies causation as be-
ing associated with contributing factors, triggers, ontological entities, structures, 
relations, conditions and process that contribute to the emergence of consequenc-
es and processes.134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Declared intentions 
 
The first component of this typology is declared intentions. Intentionality and 
intentional action is closely related to the successful satisfaction of the content of 
intent, which undergoes a practical reasoning process.135 Intentionality is a key 
ingredient of a socially constructed world.136 In this typology declared intentions 
refers to the official mandate, goals and purposive social actions undertaken by 
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the agents of liberal peacebuilding. What are described here as declared inten-
tions are often referred to in peacebuilding theory and practice as a mandate, ob-
jectives and goals. Declared intentions are those goals and objectives that are 
made public, incorporated in policy and legal documents, and which officially 
guide the actions of international peacebuilders in post-conflict societies. In other 
words, declared intentions can be considered also intended consequences. The 
declared intentions of international peacebuilding missions constitute the norma-
tivity of peace, which consists of values, beliefs, and purposes that aim to be im-
planted, implemented, and sustained in post-conflict societies as foundations for 
new state structures, the rearrangement of social relations, and integration into 
broader global structures, process, and dynamics.  
 
The normativity of peacebuilding lies within the idea of building peace by build-
ing democratic state institutions, establishing the rule of law and an impartial jus-
tice system, promoting human rights, and developing an open market-oriented 
economy. These values and norms are translated into purposes and are opera-
tionalized through practices and strategic actions that constitute the bedrock of 
international peacebuilding ideology, which is predominately affiliated with 
Western political culture. Declared intentions can include: local stability; econom-
ic reconstruction; public security and order; institution building, and developing 
human rights and legal systems. 
 
The normativity of intentions is formed from a number of inter-linked factors: 
successful practice of the values and norms reflecting Western statehood; politi-
cal and economic control of international system by Western states; and the mor-
al and practical failure of local actors to maintain their internal peace without in-
ternational engagement. Declared intentions are mainly collective intentions.137 
Declared intentions are created through a speech act and linguistic process. They 
are essential for guiding what Searle calls „word-to-world‟ which are constituted 
in the first place by the reversed dialectic of forming intentions from experi-
ence.138 A social institutional reality is created by the linguistic representation of 
declared intentions. Declared intentions of peacebuilding can be assessed by ana-
lysing the official mandate of liberal peacebuilders, which is often invoked within 
UN Security Council resolutions, mission implementation plans, and other oper-
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ative and regulative documents. The formation of intentions undergoes a com-
plementary process between normative and practical aspects, the incorporation 
of the interests, input, and compromises of multiple actors, as well as contextual 
factors that underline the state of fragility, destruction, and problems in the post-
conflict recipient state. While declared intentions are often set prior to action, 
they can also be expressed while performing the action. Declared intentions do 
not operate in a vacuum. They are connected with some other intentions and are 
also correlated with a set of abilities, capacities, dispositions, and ways of doing 
things, and know-how that mediate the translation of intentions into practice.139  
 
Critical turning points  
 
The second component are critical turning points, which are defined here as the 
key decisions and actions as well as non-decisions and non-actions that have con-
tributed to the emergence of the spectrum of consequences. Drawing from the 
complex systemic assumptions of non-linearity140, this thesis has based its critical 
practice tracing not on the proportionality between causes and effects, but con-
siders critical turning points around which the deviation in the fulfilment of de-
clared intentions and planned actions takes place. Critical turning points are 
those sensitive and influential chains of events, which can be large or small 
events, with the potential to have a significant impact on peacebuilding processes 
and the consequences that follow. Behind critical turning points are multiple 
cognitions related to the utilitarian, functional, power-related, and legitimization-
based motives of actors.141 Al-Rodhan et al. argue, „[t]urning points highlight ac-
cumulated trends and numerous on-going and intertwined causal conditions, 
rather than a fatal discontinuity with the past. They make underlying trends and 
tensions explicit, bring them to the surface and put them on view‟.142  
 
As part of the critical turning points, elements of path dependence and critical 
junctures are analysed as well as the influence of initial conditions, irreversibility, 
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and inflexibility of the sequence of actions.143 Path dependence in its broad mean-
ing will be useful to trace back the critical turning points that influenced (rather 
than determined) the spectrum of consequences, while also looking backwards 
on the intentionality, anticipation, and preventability to assign attributive ele-
ments to the spectrum of consequences. Although the type of path dependence 
analysis will look at the influence of the previous choices, actions, and decisions, 
it will not treat the sequence of events as linear, causally linked or as necessarily 
determined by previous events. The analysis will cautiously explore how contin-
gent events and interactions of narratives and practices influence the spectrum of 
consequences and inform other courses of actions. In this sequence of analysis, 
missed opportunities will be examined and consideration will be given to the 
reasons and factors that shaped the course of events, and how such a course of 
events correlated with the question of intentionality, anticipation, preventability, 
emergence of consequences, and the assignment of responsibility. 
 
In exploring critical turning points, it is crucial to identify the key intentional ac-
tions and decisions of international and local agents that have shaped peace-
building consequences. Intentional action is the product of agency, which is a 
continuous process that flows from reflexive monitoring, controlling, and coordi-
nating, while also signifying the possession of capacities to undertake, change, 
and influence the sequence of conduct. In this whole process, the key aspect is the 
criteria and procedure for the identification of critical turning points. Critical 
turning points are identified based on the salience and importance of actions and 
decisions, which are seen as crucial in implementing the declared intentions. Crit-
ical turning points signify times when breaks and continuity with path depend-
ence are possible and more likely. The historical events considered as critical 
turning points are those that strongly influence the fabric of history. Critical turn-
ing points are those moments where the agency and structure interact in a dialec-
tical sense to allow new social elaborations. Decisive decisions are reached dur-
ing key constitutional, political, policy, and legal processes, which have solidified 
the structural regulation of post-conflict societies, have accommodated the local 
power struggle, and have stabilized the governance practices of the particular 
segments of declared intentions. The key actions associated with these key deci-
sions will be examined to explore the following scenarios: the reasoning behind 
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such actions; the influence of context; reactions and interactions with domestic 
agents; the availability of capabilities and authority to perform the actions; 
missed opportunities; and the limitations, constraints and the obstacles that have 
emerged during the performance of multiple actions in pursuit of the implemen-
tation of declared intentions.  
 
Spectrum of consequences 
 
The third and main component of this typology is the spectrum of consequences. 
The approximation of the spectrum of consequences with particular actions and 
intentions requires a systematic and processual examination of the linkages and 
correlation between intentions, actions, and outcomes. For the purpose of this 
research, a spectrum of consequences refers to the various types of consequences, 
which are either directly caused by international peacebuilding actions, or indi-
rectly caused when international peacebuilders did not take preventative action. 
Negative consequences are the main focus of case study research because the un-
intended positive effects are generally claimed post facto as being intentional, 
well-planned results of their actions.144 For practical reasons, concepts such as 
„consequences‟, „effects‟ and „impact‟, are used interchangeably as implicitly in-
corporated within the mainstreaming notion of consequences. The spectrum of 
consequences can also be associated with the complex notion of „emergent fea-
tures‟ or the critical realist notion of „social elaborations‟.145 The idea of emergent 
features and social elaborations aims to capture those outcomes that have been 
produced by the interaction of units, but which cannot be reduced to the proper-
ties of the units.  
 
The foregoing analysis clearly illustrated that the notion of consequences is used 
with extensive ambiguity, definitional inaccuracy, and paradigmatic contempt. 
An assemblage of different varieties of consequences and the absence of integra-
tion of cumulative knowledge can also be noted.146 Driven by the theoretical 
guidance on differentiation within international relations, this thesis identifies 
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three types of consequences to guide the assessment of peacebuilding impact. 
These three types of consequences are: unintended consequences, unanticipated 
consequences, and unprevented consequences. As Buzan and Albert argue, dif-
ferentiation enables us to „distinguish and analyse the components that make up 
any social whole‟.147 In particular, the segmented and functional dimensions of 
differentiation are crucial for guiding the categorization of consequences within 
three essential attributes of the presence and absence of peacebuilders agency: 
intentionality, anticipation, and preventability. Differentiating between these 
forms of agency as demonstrated by this thesis has been inexistent thus far in 
peacebuilding studies, including in wider debates of international relations. A 
differentiated account of peacebuilding consequences brings more conceptual 
clarity and empirical accuracy. Differentiation is essential for reconstructing theo-
retical and empirical knowledge on the spectrum of consequences and also for 
guiding pragmatically reality-adequate critique and practice.148  
 
The three types of consequences are differentiated based on the criteria of the ab-
sence of their affirmative attribution – the unfulfillment of intention, anticipation, 
and prevention. This is the essence of their discursive formation.149 Ontologically, 
this form of social analysis could be referred to as „anti-agency‟ within conceptual 
and empirical inquiry. Consequently, the epistemological dimension is far more 
complicated and hard to disentangle in practice. Similarly, methodological ade-
quacy and calibration is challenging. However, this does not mean that it is im-
possible and undoable, as the conceptualisation of the typological framework in 
this chapter show. The spectrum of consequences informs the worlds of scholars 
and practitioners with the complexity and non-linearity that exists within agency 
and consequences. It also raises awareness about the need to create a new culture 
of thinking and practice where the spectrum of consequences, side effects, and 
multiplying consequences are considered during the planning stage when pre-
ventable measures can be taken. The spectrum of consequences can be used to 
build an alternative narrative and the necessary institutional memory to flag up 
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future challenges and to avoid unintended side effects that downgrade agency, 
damage social structures, and raise the contentious issue of responsibility.  
 
Unintended consequences  
 
Unintended consequences are the most well-known of all types of consequences. 
In recognition of their inevitable emergence during purposive human conduct, 
reference is sometimes made to the 'law of unintended consequences', which re-
flects the advanced normative maturity of it as a practice and concept. In the 
broadest sense, unintended consequences can be defined as consequences that 
have emerged but were not intended by the conductor of the action (agent). Vari-
ous definitions of unintended consequences have already been discussed earlier 
in this chapter, and their ill-defined invocation in peacebuilding research was 
elaborated on in the previous chapter. In the context of peacebuilding, unintend-
ed consequences can be defined as those consequences that have emerged as a 
result of the direct action of peacebuilding organizations, which are not goal-
oriented and are not intended by the agents, and as such fall outside of the scope 
of intentionality and declared intentions.  
 
Unintended consequences could often be foreseeable and desirable consequenc-
es. In principle, unintentionality is traced through the failure to fulfil the intend-
ed and desirable goals, and the outcomes that fall out of the rational and reason-
able actions of international peacebuilding actors. However, describing an out-
come or effect as unintended consequences creates tremendous challenges for 
understanding the factors behind unintentionality, the process whereby it oc-
curred, and how the context and other intermediary factors interfered to impact 
the outcome. In other words, unless the unintended consequence is traced back 
to the responsible agent and the actions and decisions taken by him or her (or 
them), and unless the scope and conditions of unintentionality are verified there 
is a high risk that the unintended consequences will not be adequately identified 
and accounted for. Furthermore, this criterion of tracing retrospectively the con-
sequences whose occurrence were not declared as intended is complicated in 
practice, particularly when there is limited access to resources, impediments to 
accessing policy documents, and difficulties with tracing responsible agents.  
 
However, a practical way to overcome these epistemological and methodological 
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difficulties is look thematically at the outcomes of international peacebuilding 
engagement, to evaluate them against their declared intentions, and to verify the 
intentionality of the responsible agent. In a more practical explanation, the unin-
tended consequences of peacebuilding activities can be identified and examined 
through the following guiding initiators:    
 
 The occurrence of consequences within the field of declared intentions 
that were not intended to be achieved when the key decisions and actions 
were taken during critical turning points;  
 Evidence of failures and inabilities to achieve the declared intentions and 
exploring the type of consequences they have produced; 
 The critical comparison between the contested and problematic factors in 
evidence when the key actions and decisions were taken, and their ap-
proximation and interconnectedness with long-term outcomes;  
 Evidence of the emergence of consequences within the field of declared in-
tentions, and by spilling over into other social terrains, as well as the ex-
amination of side-effects in other fields, which are not necessarily strictly 
connected with the field of declared intentions; 
 Evidence of reactions, criticism, and tendencies to try to change the course 
of unintended consequences with another sequence of actions and deci-
sions within the realm of the same declared intention. 
 
Unanticipated consequences  
 
The second distinct type of consequences incorporated in the typology is unantic-
ipated consequences. Unanticipated consequences are defined here as those con-
sequences that have emerged, which were not anticipated, not foreseen, and not 
predicted by peacebuilding organizations. Beyond the negative connotation of 
the spectrum of consequences, unanticipated consequences could be seen as posi-
tive and desirable outcomes. Equally, foreseen consequences are not necessary 
intended.150 An unanticipated consequence does not mean it is unpredictable. 
The literature on unanticipated consequences attributes their emergence to a 
number of factors, including: limited contextual knowledge; limited rationality 
and error; ignorance; and immediate interests. The anticipation and predictability 
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of consequences is an extremely difficult task due to the agent‟s self-reflective 
character and capacity to change its position and behaviour in the course of in-
teraction with other agents and other sources of knowledge and experience.151 
While in the case of unintended consequences, there is a case to be made about 
the emergence of anti-agency; in the case of unanticipated consequences the case 
is more about incomplete-agency. Compared to unintended consequences, unan-
ticipated consequences are easier to conceptualize and the scope of factors that 
influence the spectrum of unanticipated consequences is resolved and evident to 
a large extent. 
 
Regarding the identification of unanticipated consequences, this thesis identifies 
five conditions that facilitate their identification and examination:  
 
 Evidence that peacebuilding organizations do not have sufficient and ad-
equate knowledge about the complexity of an issue and the potential con-
sequences that can emerge; 
 Evidence that agents ignore the anticipation of consequences or have lim-
ited capacity to anticipate potential consequences; 
 Evidence whereby the agent may erroneously assess the present and fu-
ture situation before executing the chosen action, under the fallacy and as-
sumption that outcomes experienced in the past will also continue in the 
future; 
 Evidence of the immediate interest, where the agent displays paramount 
concern with the foreseen immediate consequences but fails to consider 
other future consequences of the same act; 
 Evidence of the self-defeating prophecy, where the agent fears some con-
sequences and thus attempts to find solutions before the problem occurs, 
thereby excluding the non-occurrence of the problem. 
 
Unprevented consequences  
 
Unprevented consequences are a new type of consequences introduced in this 
typology, which have not been examined before in the context of peacebuilding 
studies, or in broader philosophical and social science inquiry. Even the word 
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itself is new to the English language, as it is not incorporated to date in any dic-
tionary. In this typology, unprevented consequences are seen from a non-
determinist point of view and thus refer to the consequences that have occurred 
as a result of inaction by the agents of peacebuilding either at the stage before the 
effect is created or during an early stage of development, when the consequence 
would have been preventable and avoidable. The unpreventability of conse-
quences is measured and assessed within the agential realm and possibility of the 
agents, which includes the availability of authority, and the presence of alterna-
tive possibilities for action.152 A guiding criterion for demarking unprevented 
consequence is the availability of clear warning or signal of the potential conse-
quence if appropriate action is not taken to prevent it. Unprevented consequenc-
es are not the same as unpreventable consequences. Unprevented consequences 
could have been intended, anticipated, or avoidable consequences. Inaction can 
be intentional or unintentional, as well as motivated by the individual, collective, 
or strategic interests of international and local peacebuilding agents. While any 
purposive action can generate unintended consequences, the failure to react and 
prevent certain effects before they take place can generate unprevented conse-
quences. In terms of ethics and moral judgements, unintended consequences are 
relatively comprehendible and possibly excusable. However, in cases of unpre-
vented consequences where the knowledge and capabilities were in place, the 
failure to prevent negative consequences cannot be justified, and therefore 
should be apprehended through the appropriate allocation of responsibility.  
 
Following this definition of unprevented consequences, the notion of missed op-
portunities will be incorporated as a central component of unprevented conse-
quences. Missed opportunities in the context of peace and conflict studies refer to 
those processes and events where there was a mismatch between the availability 
of early warnings and effective responses.153 Within policy circles, there has been 
a problem that practitioners are sometimes not receptive to warnings, therefore 
important decisions are not taken, although they could have prevented negative 
consequences. Policymakers do not take early warnings seriously for a number of 
reasons: the „low stakes perceived to be at risk‟; a lack of analysis and interpreta-
tion of early warning signals; uncertainties regarding the appropriate response; 
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reluctance for undertaking premature and unnecessary responses; and policy 
overload which induces passivity.154 Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl define 
missed opportunities as „failures to take timely, appropriate actions in response 
to early warning of an emerging crisis‟.155 While the failure to prevent might be 
an important factor when it comes to unprevented consequences and missed op-
portunities, there is often a much more complex reasoning behind non-action, 
which may reflect self-interest and is not considered as a failure from the per-
spective of the policymakers.  
 
Cases of unprevented consequences and missed opportunities in peacebuilding 
contexts can unfold under different circumstances where: there can be inade-
quate analysis and inaccurate forecasts of the consequences; warnings are ig-
nored; the response is slow, weak or absent; responses are ill-intentioned; or re-
sponses are incompatible, incomplete or contradictory with a complex situa-
tion.156 However, to identify unprevented consequences it is also necessary to in-
corporate an explanation of the actual outcomes of the cases under examination. 
In practical terms, the criteria against which unprevented consequences can be 
evaluated are:  
 
 The authority and responsibility of an agent to deal with the actions, deci-
sions, and outcomes in the first place;  
 The availability of alternative possibilities for action and the presence of 
decisive turning points when clear warning or signal of the potential con-
sequence where present but not taken into consideration to prevent it; 
 The absence of political commitment to mobilize sufficient human and 
material resources as a means to reach the intended goals and undertake 
preventive measures;  
 The knowledge of deviation from intended goals and failure to act to pre-
vent the unintended and unanticipated consequences during a stage of 
development when they would be controllable and preventable. 
 
It is important to note that the attribution of the spectrum of consequences is rela-
tional to and contingent on the normative position taken and the social functions 
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performed. In this thesis, unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented conse-
quences are determined in relation to the failure to fulfil the declared liberal in-
tentions set by international peacebuilders. However, seen from a different per-
spective, for instance, these consequences can also be intentionally produced by 
other (local) actors. For example, while we may consider that a particular failure 
of the international community led to unintended consequences, such conse-
quences may have been perceived by locals as purposive achievements. The same 
logic can apply to cases of unanticipated and unprevented consequences.  
 
Responsibility  
 
Putting an emphasis on the intentionality and on the capacity for anticipation 
and prevention provides a better understanding of agential capacity and respon-
sibility in post-conflict societies, as well as their interaction is various social struc-
tures. However, the question of international responsibility and the establish-
ment of adequate institutional mechanisms to hold international peacebuilders 
responsible for their actions has remained one of the less-frequently exported 
Western institutional mechanisms. Such typological theorizing opens the path for 
exploring the prospects for identifying the responsible agency, and to eventually 
hold them accountable for their actions. In this regard, an agent would be re-
sponsible for their actions and related outcomes while they are fulfilling certain 
responsibilities (implying here free will and autonomous agency), and have the 
capacity to perform actions and make decisions through a reasoning process.  
 
Toni Erskine echoes this when he defines moral agency as „capacities for deliber-
ating over possible course of action and their consequences and acting on the ba-
sis of this deliberation‟.157 Drawing on this logic, institutions as organizations that 
also embody persistent set of norms and practices can be considered agents due 
to their capacity to form intentions and undertake purposive actions. As Erskine 
argues „deliberative capacity manifest in an institution‟s formal decision-making 
structure might be deemed enough to counter the charge that institutions lack the 
ability to form intentions‟.158 Assigning moral agency without allocating respon-
sibility is purposeless; therefore, once the criterion for moral agency is clarified it 
is necessary to clarify the variety of measures associated with the notion of re-
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sponsibility. Assigning moral responsibility is to either prescribe or evaluate the 
actions of agents „who are able to foresee, understand, and intended the out-
comes of what they do or do not do‟.159  
 
Therefore, conceptual differentiation of aspects of responsibility is essential to 
bring clarity and open up space for reconstructing new concepts that are more 
reality adequate to practice; it facilitates the determination of how much and 
when to impute for bad consequences.160 Assigning responsibility and judgment 
is performed in relation to the inability to fulfil the declared intentions, to uphold 
to the authority granted, and to take actions that result in negative consequences. 
A differentiated account of responsibility is more solid and provides a stronger 
basis for studying the current practices of international responsibility. For this 
reason, unpacking the notion of responsibility to its three aspects is essential. 
More importantly, a differentiated account of responsibility is more appropriate 
to impute for unintended, unanticipated and unprevented consequences. It pro-
vides the conditions under which different agents are imputed to different as-
pects of responsibility. In this regard, it is argued that in the case of post-conflict 
peacebuilding there is a strong case to hold international institutions responsible 
for the unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences by invoking 
three types of responsibility: 1) attributability; 2) answerability; and 3) accounta-
bility. Imputing responsibility has both moral and consequentialist logic - to dis-
count, discredit, and question the moral agency of peacebuilders, and to hope for 
changes in the current practices of irresponsibility. In essence, holding someone 
responsible and attributing to someone a moral fault is a matter of moral necessi-
ty to maintain the social order, and it is a demand to treat each other through cer-
tain social standards.161  
 
Attributability implies the assignment of certain „light attributes‟ to the conduct 
of the agent, such as blaming or excusing agents for the outcomes of their inten-
tional decisions and actions, in proportion to the „damage‟ and „harm‟ caused. 
Attribution is in very essence a reaction to wrongdoing, which resulted in caus-
ing harm to someone. Attributability can lead agents to accept and acknowledge 
legitimate criticism, and commitment to apologise and find ways to compensate 
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for harm through material and non-material means.162 Often attributability is 
manifested through blaming, shaming, naming and charging for decisions, ac-
tions and outcomes. This is evident in academic, policy, and everyday life dis-
courses. Blaming is in essence an interpersonal moral realm, which equates sanc-
tions in the analogous case of objective criminal punishment and sanctions. At-
tributability is the easiest and most common way to hold international peace-
building agents responsible for the consequences of their actions. It does not have 
any legal repercussions, but rather aims to bring about moral responsibility, to 
reveal the shortcomings of the actions of agents, to identify their moral agency, 
and to downgrade the legitimacy of international peacebuilding agents.  
 
Answerability is associated with the obligation of the agent to clarify and justify 
his or her conduct to a particular social or political authority and general public. 
Being 'answerable' concerns the responsibility of political representatives to an-
swer to their electorate or general public for their actions or (ab)use of power. In 
the case of peacebuilding organizations, they are obliged to be answerable only 
to the body that appoints them, whether that is the UN Security Council, a re-
gional body, or individual sending states. Answerability is evident through poli-
cy reporting and monitoring, within the periodical report to the UN Security 
Council, or special research and review studies of overall peacebuilding and 
statebuilding policies. An example of answerability mechanism is the Iraqi In-
quiry undertaken by the UK government. Another important dimension of an-
swerability is transparency and publicity, which allows the involvement of vari-
ous social groups in evaluating the actions of particular agents. Political repre-
sentatives are expected to inform the general public about their actions and to 
explain and justify the rationale behind their political conduct. Answerability 
thus requires transparency in the political performance of public officials. So, a 
public official may be answerable for certain actions and decisions without being 
accountable for them. 
 
Accountability is the most commonly known aspect of responsibility in post-
conflict societies. In domestic and democratic polities, political accountability is 
seen as an effective shield to protect against potential abuses of power. Neverthe-
less, the discourse of responsibility is not absent from the peacebuilders' dis-
course. For example, the EU considers (at least rhetorically) that „the international 
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community has a political and moral responsibility to act to avoid the human suf-
fering and the destruction of resources caused by violent conflicts‟.163 Political 
accountability can operate on different levels. Horizontal political accountability 
is a form of inter-institutional or intra-institutional checks and balances where 
accountability is related to the extent to which the designated tasks are fulfilled, 
while complying with legal provisions. Such actions include parliamentary ques-
tioning, internal auditing, monitoring and evaluation. On the other hand, vertical 
political accountability describes the accountability connection between govern-
mental representatives and wider social forces operating outside of government, 
such as: civil society, the media, and other pressure groups. Beyond these as-
pects, the most important dimension of accountability is the enforcement aspect 
through rewarding or sanctioning certain political actions through (re)election 
prospects or judicial prosecution. 
 
In tackling the question of responsibility, it is important to examine the possibil-
ity for holding peacebuilding agents responsible for the consequences of their ac-
tions under three options: attributability, answerability, and accountability. Nev-
ertheless, assigning responsibility for certain acts is easier than imputing the con-
sequences, which are dislocated in time and space from the performed act or 
non-performed act. Therefore, it is essential to trace carefully how certain acts 
have produced a spectrum of consequences upon which responsibility is as-
signed.164 In the case of unintended consequences there is a need to invoke at-
tributability and answerability because, despite the presence of unintentionality, 
there should be some assignment of light modes of responsibility. Holding some-
one to blame for an unintentional consequence is based on evidence that the actor 
has possessed legal authority and responsibility, and has been incapable of reach-
ing the intended outcomes. The assignment of these two types of responsibilities 
would serve the purpose of uncovering the spectrum of unintended consequenc-
es, identifying the responsible agency, as well as identifying the mistakes and 
drawing moral lessons to avoid and handle more effectively negative unintended 
consequences.  
In the case of unanticipated consequences, a lack of prediction and anticipation 
during the planning phase, as well as an ignorance of local knowledge and short-
sightedness need to be scrutinized as part of the process of locating responsibility 
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through attributability and answerability. Failing to anticipate and avoid the 
emergence of the spectrum of consequences needs to be attributed and the agent 
needs to provide answers for his choices and actions. Invoking the first two 
modes of responsibility is of a consequentialist nature, which aims to improve 
anticipation, planning, coordination, and to increase contextual knowledge be-
fore any action is taken in post-conflict societies. Finally, in cases of unprevented 
consequences there is a need to invoke three kinds of responsibility and hold the 
responsible agent accountable for not acting to prevent the occurrence of conse-
quences. There is also a need to hold the responsible agency accountable for 
choosing non-action, which could be intentional or unintentional, and motivated 
by the individual, collective, or strategic interests of international and local 
peacebuilding agents. Therefore, there is a strong case for imputing the conse-
quences of peacebuilding. The specific and relational account of responsibility, 
especially in the form of attributability and answerability is more suitable for ad-
dressing cases of unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences. 
Due to the fact that peacebuilding actions and their consequences are triggered 
by collective actions, these differentiated accounts of responsibility should be al-
located in the collective sense, to peacebuilding organizations as agents and to 
individuals when possible under the condition that clear evidence permits such 
imputation.  
 
Putting the typological framework into practice 
The existing methodological approaches applied by scholars of peacebuilding 
vary from highly quantitative and statistical approaches as exemplified by the 
work of Doyle and Sambanis165, qualitative positivist and problem-solving mo-
dalities applied by Paris166, to more critical, constructivist, and poststructuralist 
work evident in the work of Richmond167, Chandler168, and Pugh.169 All of these 
studies use different levels of analysis and also different numbers of cases and 
within-case cases. It is understandable that the ontological position combined 
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with ideational and materialist interests shapes significantly the argumentative 
orientation, epistemological conveniences, and the methodological approaches. 
While this broad variety of methodological approaches to peacebuilding research 
provides interesting and valuable inferences, they often fall short in synchroniz-
ing and calibrating their theoretical and empirical arguments with adequate epis-
temological approaches and methodological tools. Constructing an adequate 
methodological approach is essential for putting the typological framework into 
practice. The complexity of the subject of inquiry in this thesis requires mixing 
existing methods with elements of innovative methodological advancement. In 
other words, new epistemological inquiry as outlined in the typological frame-
work requires the adaptation of adequate methodological tools. Accordingly, this 
thesis has developed a new derivative and integrative mixed method, which 
combines elements of qualitative critical discourse analysis with practice, and 
process-tracing that will be applied through case study research.  
 
Critical practice tracing (CPT) 
 
Critical practice tracing (CPT) seeks to engage ontologically with an understand-
ing that social reality is almost incomprehensible and only certain fragments of it 
can be captured through research inquiry. Critical practice tracing is proposed 
here to primarily deal with the peacebuilding actualities evident with fragments 
of our knowledge on: dislocated social articulations, unattributed consequences, 
multi-directionality and displacement of agency, and the persistence of harm, in-
equality, and injustice. In this complex situation, failures are reduced and neu-
tralized, success has remained a measure of the dominant, and realistic analyses 
have remained lost in perennial suppression. Capturing the complexity of peace-
building legacies in post-conflict societies requires an exploration of aspects such 
as: the metaphysical dimension of peacebuilding; undefined social practice; inter-
jections between discursive and material aspects of social life; a multiplicity of 
networks of actors with distinct agendas; and exploring peripheries and the dis-
placement of events and outcomes.170  
 
Examining these aspects does not necessarily mean that there is a distinct reality 
out there ready to be discovered, independent of our actions, and perceptions. It 
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is in the act of tracing the impact of peacebuilding that critical practice tracing 
seeks to follow the complex pathways of how certain intentions have been trans-
lated into action, where multiple processes have led to the emergence of unin-
tended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences. Based on this, it is possi-
ble to examine how special responsibilities have been assigned to the responsible 
agents. By combining these different stages and conceptual devices, it is possible 
to: examine the mess that peacebuilding has often created in post-conflict socie-
ties; balance our social reality; and avoid overstretching contextual circumstances 
in endless circles of generalizations. Critical practice tracing seeks to embrace 
complexity, apprehension, deliberate imprecision, and enactment.171 Through 
this engagement, elements of justice can be served in this socially and epistemi-
cally constructed world.  
 
The assembled notion of critical practice tracing can be best understood by disas-
sembling and exploring separately each constitutive element: critique, practice, 
and tracing of processes through exploration. Critique is one of the central as-
pects in the philosophy of science, which seeks to: interrogate various bodies of 
knowledge; destabilize embedded theories and social practices; favour reflexivi-
ty, subjectivism and emancipation; and promote epistemological pluralism.172 
The critical dimensions of critical practice tracing build on the different forms of 
epistemologies of critical approaches, but methodologically it relies on Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA), which is a type of discourse research that studies is-
sues of practical social relevance.173 As a critical approach, CDA rejects value-free 
science and theoretical objectivity, thereby adapting a post-positivist approach of 
multi-disciplinarity that combines textual and social analysis. CDA is seen as a 
social practice that operates in a dialectical and mutually constitutive relationship 
with the social world, where discourse shapes the social world and the social 
world shapes discourse.174 CDA disentangles the form and substance of argu-
mentation.175 Furthermore, CDA engages in the textual analysis of language and 
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seeks to explain its use within social interaction.176 By its very nature, CDA is his-
torical and can be understood only in relation to its particular context.177  
 
While most discourse theory concentrate on textual analysis, Fairclough's dis-
course method is more appropriate for this research question as it takes an inter-
disciplinary perspective that combines textual, societal, and cultural processes 
and structures.178 Fairclough applies the concept of discourse across three dimen-
sions: discourse as text, discursive practice and social practice. At the textual lev-
el, the content and form of expression are analysed to examine how content is or-
ganized in particular forms, and how different contents imply different textual 
forms.179 The function of discourse practices, seen as processes related to the pro-
duction and consumption of the text, mediate the relationship between texts and 
social practice, and as such can be seen in function of a hegemonic struggle to 
transform the order and power relations of discourse.180 The notion of inter-
subjectivity between text and context connects to the dimension of social practic-
es, which seeks to explore the institutional context, and the wider group or social 
context.181 Of relevance, Fairclough seeks to combine different inference logics: 
the textual level involves description, whereas the discourse practice follows an 
interpretive approach and the social practice and context follow an explanatory 
approach.182  
 
In addition, critical hermeneutics will be applied in this thesis as a method of in-
quiry with the purpose of interpreting the intentions and meaning behind the 
appearances of an action.183 However, the exploration of the intentionality behind 
a subject or a phenomenon is partial without historical context and broader struc-
tural dynamics that inform such thinking and acting processes. The hermeneuti-
cal approach is basically a form of empirical phenomenological research, which is 
closely related to the reflective-interpretative process, which includes „not only a 
description of the experience as it appears in consciousness but also an analysis 
and astute interpretation of the underlying conditions, historically and aestheti-
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cally, that account for the experience‟.184 Interpretative analysis enables us to 
grasp meaning and action as part of an interrelated complexity and commonly 
situated whole.185 Interpretative analysis enables making and remaking declared 
intentions as a point of entry set in a particular context, time and place. They also 
facilitate the exploration of counterfactuals and the interpretation of the spectrum 
of consequences.  
 
The second dimension of critical practice tracing is practice. Practice as a theory 
and a method is adequate for capturing material and ideational dimensions, the 
complex interaction between insider and outsider agents, as well as normative, 
cultural and institutional aspects of peacebuilding. Practice is one of the core as-
pects in Bourdieu‟s sociological inquiries.186 He sees practice as central for under-
standing the social world, social interactions, and social behaviour.187 Practices 
are not consciously organized and orchestrated. They are characterized by fluidi-
ty and indeterminacy where there is no prescribed recipe of rules and normative 
models of behaviour, but it is a sort of a game that requires social competences. 
Theodore R. Schatzki defines practices as „embodied, materially mediated arrays 
of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding‟.188 
According to Adler and Pouliot, practices are „patterned actions that are embed-
ded in particular organized contexts and, as such, are articulated into specific 
types of action and are socially developed through learning and training‟.189 Most 
importantly, practices interweave the material setting with language and mean-
ing within a social world. Practices are both structural and agential as they occur 
within a social structure and they enable agents to form intentions and perform 
acts, while being shaped by the knowledge and context the agents possess. Prac-
tices enable both change and continuity, whereby stability is perceived in the re-
peated nature of performances and change is perceived in the agential capacity to 
make social changes through practical acts.190   
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The third component of critical practice tracing is process-tracing. Process-tracing 
provides the opportunity to contextualize social events and investigate the emer-
gence of the spectrum of consequences in a processual and systemic manner. In 
this thesis, process-tracing is used as a critical and non-linear genealogical meth-
od, which captures fragments of discursive formations and practices, power dy-
namics, and dominant events that lead to multiple and dislocated consequenc-
es.191 Process-tracing explains „why a particular outcome happened in specific 
cases‟.192 George and Bennett define process-tracing as a method that attempts to 
„identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - 
between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the depend-
ent variable‟.193 Process-tracing provides an opportunity to overcome simplistic 
attitudes of positivist methodologies, which work on the logic of setting a limited 
number of pre-defined hypotheses and seeking to falsify, modify, and verify 
them against the existing theories through a structured and large amount of em-
pirical evidence. Instead, process-tracing examines how certain outcomes have 
been influenced by certain causal factors, either in the form of initial and inde-
pendent triggering conditions or in the form of intervening conditions that occur 
during an evolutionary stage before a particular outcome has taken place. Pro-
cess-tracing offers more than historical explanations as it takes a social science 
approach by seeking to use the contextual and case-related inferences for theory 
testing and development.194 
 
Process-tracing also recognizes the influence of path-dependent processes, which 
envisions that social events often follow a linear and narrow trajectory consisting 
of plausible alternatives and critical junctures that determine the prevailing alter-
native and the evaluation, as well as the social learning process that constrains 
actors to follow particular paths.195 As part of process-tracing, counterfactual 
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analyses are also possible. Counterfactual thinking involves „imagining alterna-
tives to one or more features of a perceived event‟.196 While tracing the triggers of 
the outcomes, counterfactual analyses are also suitable for interpreting „how var-
ious outcomes could have been prevented‟197 and that a „slight change could easi-
ly have led to a different outcome‟. 198 For these reasons, process-tracing sets the 
stage for identifying how social phenomena can rarely be explained with refer-
ence to simplistic and linear causality. Instead, process-tracing points to the un-
determined, nonlinear, complex interrelationship and the blurred divide between 
different independent conditions, and the subsequent outcomes. Thus, process-
tracing provides the opportunity to test certain theories, to eliminate alternative 
explanations, and to generate new theoretical and case-related knowledge.199 
 
Critical practice tracing is a qualitative mixed-method approach that is suitable 
for addressing the research questions within this thesis. As illustrated in the table 
below, when CPT is applied to the typological framework it illustrates the analyt-
ical focus of each stage in the typology, outlines more precisely the objects and 
sources of analysis, and specifies the applicable methodological tools. CDA is an 
appropriate epistemological approach as it allows for disentangling the applica-
tion of declared intentions into practical actions and decisions by providing a tex-
tual analysis of the social construction of meaning. CDA also facilitates the explo-
ration of the spectrum of consequences by examining multiple observable and 
documentary sources of social practices, which can then allocate relational re-
sponsibility to particular agents. To disentangle declared intentions, a textual 
analysis is undertaken of the official discourse where the objects of analysis are 
the UN Security Council resolutions, mission statements, and other policy and 
strategic documents. Inter-textual analysis of the official discourses facilitates the 
identification of the declared intentions and to situate the discourse in a language 
that corresponds to reality. This approach also provides a lens through which key 
critical turning points can be analysed and the spectrum of consequences can be 
disentangled. Nevertheless, the narrative of the spectrum of consequences in 
each case study is developed through the analysis of multiple sources of infor-
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mation that include: official discourses, media reports, discourses of political op-
ponents, sources of factual local knowledge, civil society perspectives, as well as 
marginal discourses of excluded groups.200  
 
Parallel to the textual analysis, discursive practices are essential to verify the fol-
lowing issues: to what extent the international and local actors were aware of the 
spectrum of consequences of their actions; the level of their contextual 
knowledge; their understanding of their expectations; subjective articulations of 
achievements and success; and the methods and technologies used to neutralize 
and dilute responsibility.201 Discursive and social practise can be captured and 
crosschecked through field research observations and interviews with a variety 
of international and local actors. Observing the complexity of multiple actions, 
the dynamics of critical turning points, and the emergence of the spectrum of 
consequences through the lens of practice provide a more effective, reality-
adequate analysis. Practice-based inquiry provides the opportunity to explore a 
wide range of social practices and phenomena, and to assemble their attributes to 
verify the connection between observed outcomes and the inability to fulfil the 
declared intentions, and to apply the types of consequences when necessary.  
 
Similarly, process-tracing can examine the key events and critical junctures that 
have played a significant and observable role on the outcomes. Critical practice 
tracing is not utilized to make causal inferences or ascriptions, but rather to iden-
tify and illustrate the emergence of different consequences, missed opportunities 
related to critical and decisive turning points, and the complexity of agent inter-
actions. The cautious identification of critical turning points provides a solid ba-
sis for generating observable implications and tracing the outcomes. A larger 
number of casual chains do not necessarily increase the richness of observations, 
but an in-depth knowledge of individual cases increases the likelihood of a suc-
cessful application.202 Within the critical turning points of a particular case, mul-
tiple factors can be explored which provide a strong basis for drawing inferences 
related to the spectrum of consequences and to assign responsibility. In addition, 
process-tracing analysis can be used to identify the problems of peacebuilding 
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practices, as well as the features that have emerged outside the realm of inten-
tion, anticipation, and prevention.  
 
Each methodological choice entails ontological politics because social inquiry is 
never a purely technical process.203 Methodology is a social activity with political 
implications. In this spirit, critical practice tracing is constructed as an approach 
to disentangle the consequences of international peacebuilding organizations in 
post-conflict societies, to reveal the weaknesses and harmful outcomes of the lib-
eral peace project, and to make a moral case for holding peacebuilders responsi-
ble for unintended, unanticipated and unprevented consequences. In this spirit, 
positivist tendencies for simplifying and quantifying complexity are avoided to 
make room for a more adequate combination of methods and knowledge. Critical 
practice tracing seeks to mediate new frontiers of critical local perspectives in 
pursuit of a more just, cautious, inclusive, and emancipatory peace. It gathers dif-
ferent types of knowledge in different modes to enact a rethinking of peacebuild-
ing. Table 1 below illustrates the application of CPT in researching the key com-
ponents of the typological framework by presenting clearly what is the analytical 
focus, objects and sources of analysis and the usefulness of the particular compo-
nents of CPT. The remainder of this chapter and the next three case study chap-
ters will illustrate critical practice tracing in practice. As the typological frame-
work and methodology outlined so far in this chapter has been constructed to 
suit the research question, they inform the organization of the empirical chapters. 
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Table 1: The Application of Critical Practice Tracing to the Typological Framework 
 Declared intentions Critical turning points  Spectrum of consequences Responsibility  
 
Analytical focus  Identification of 
peacebuilding inten-
tions 
 Formulation process 
of declared inten-
tions 
 Elaboration of the 
selected declared in-
tention  
 Identification of key critical 
moments when turning points 
occurred 
 Examination of reasoning, 
actions, and interaction of ac-
tors 
 Examine peacebuilding prac-
tices, controversies and chal-
lenges  
 Set the context for the elabo-
ration of the spectrum of con-
sequences 
 Trace a broad variety of conse-
quences by analysing the out-
comes of the implementation of 
declared intentions and the con-
troversies surrounding critical 
turning points   
 Elaborate the scope of conse-
quences and the collateral implica-
tions 
 Assess whether consequences are 
unintended, unanticipated, or un-
prevented  
 
 Correlate the type of con-
sequences with agents' ac-
tions and propose the ap-
propriate type of responsi-
bility  
 Explore the availability of 
institutional mechanisms 
to hold insider and outsid-
er agents responsible for 
the spectrum of conse-
quences  
Objects and 
sources of analy-
sis  
 UN official texts 
 Strategic policy doc-
uments  
 Policy statements  
 
 Official texts 
 Legal and political documents 
 Historical records  
 Independent studies and as-
sessments  
 Media texts and videos  
 Field research and interviews 
 
 Official assessments and evalua-
tion texts 
 Opinion polls 
 Historical records  
 Independent studies and assess-
ments  
 Media texts and videos  
 Field research and interviews 
 
 Official assessments and 
evaluation texts 
 Legal and policy docu-
ments 
 Historical records  
 Field research and inter-
views 
 
Methodological 
tools (CPT com-
ponents)  
 Intertextual / inter-
pretative discourses 
 Critical hermeneutics  
 Process-tracing 
 Discursive and social practice 
 Counterfactual analysis 
 Process-tracing 
 Discursive and social practice 
 
 Process-tracing  
 Critical discourse analysis  
 Institutional/legal analysis  
 Critical hermeneutics 
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Case study research  
The typological framework using critical practice tracing will be applied to a 
small number of in-depth case studies. Across the social sciences, case-based ap-
proaches are gaining relevance as the in-depth knowledge of a smaller number of 
cases provides a better understanding of the whole range of cases. In this context, 
John Gerring argues that variable-centred approaches are being replaced by 
causal and case-related approaches.204 Most definitions of case study research 
highlight the flexibility, advantages, and the usefulness of conducting an in-
depth examination of a number of contextual factors that provide fertile grounds 
for further generalizations.205 George and Bennett define the case study approach 
as „the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test 
historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events‟.206 In addition, 
Orum et al. comment that case studies „provide information from a number of 
sources and over a period of time, thus permitting a more holistic study of com-
plex social networks and of complexes of social action and social meanings.‟207 
Case study methods are considered adequate for theory development and theory 
testing.208 George and Bennett identify four strong advantages of case methods 
that make them valuable for testing hypotheses and particularly useful for theory 
development: a) their potential for achieving high conceptual validity; b) their 
strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; c) their value as a useful means 
to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of 
individual cases; and d) their capacity for addressing causal complexity.209  
 
Despite claims from positivists that case studies provide limited explanations and 
suffer from case selection bias210, George and Bennett argue that case study find-
ings can be used to draw „middle-range contingent generalizations‟, either by 
                                                        
204
 John Gerring, Case Study Research, p. 3-4. 
205
 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3
rd
 ed., London: Sage Publications, 2003, 
p. 13-4. 
206
 Aleksander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, p. 5. 
207 
Anthony M. Orum, et al., ‘Introduction: The nature of the Case Study’, in Joe R. Feagin, et al. (eds.), 
A Case for the Case Study, UNC Press, CA, 1991, p. 6. 
208
 Aleksander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, p. 109. 
209
 Ibid, p. 19. 
210
 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994; Barbara Geddes, ‘How the Cases 
You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics’, Political Analysis, Vol. 
2, 1991, pp. 131-50.  
 69 
broadening or narrowing their scope or by introducing new types and subtypes 
through within-case analysis that uses process-tracing, historical explanations 
and cross-case comparisons to increase the explanatory power.211 Indeed, contin-
gent generalizations, as advocated by George and Bennett, provide relevant in-
ferences both for nuanced theories related to academic debates and for policy 
makers and practitioners. Alongside these advantages, case study research poses 
a number of challenges to existing theoretical debates and real world knowledge. 
As George and Bennett observe, testing and developing theories through case 
research aims to „strengthen or reduce support for a theory, narrow or extend the 
scope conditions of a theory, or determine which of two or more theories best ex-
plains a case, type, or general phenomenon‟.212 Case study research is also con-
sidered suitable for situations involving a small number of cases with complex 
components.213 It also enables dealing with a wide variety of evidence and obser-
vations that cover contemporary events.214 
 
Drawing on the above support for the relevance of case study research, this thesis 
will examine three country case studies in detail, by exploring a number of crite-
ria guided by the scope of research in this thesis. Case selection is an important 
component of good research design.215 Selecting cases should always be based on 
a number of criteria and also correspond to the research question. Based on this, 
this thesis applies a two-tier approach for selecting cases. The first tier is based on 
a number of principal criteria concerning typical post-conflict states that have ex-
perienced protracted and extensive international peacebuilding engagement. The 
second tier of case selection follows a diverse case approach and focuses on a di-
mension of peacebuilding within the country cases established from the first tier 
process. The combination of typical cases with contextual uniqueness and diverse 
sub-cases increases the external validity of the contingent generalizations and the 
overall thesis argument. 
 
Accordingly, the four principal criteria applied for case selection within the first 
tier are: 
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1. Cases with extensive and protracted international peacebuilding engage-
ment and where multiple peacebuilding missions occurred;  
2. Cases where the liberal peace framework was implemented; 
3. Cases that illustrate the complexity of international and domestic factors 
and the persistence of „unstable liberal peace‟, with partially with success-
es and/or failures, despite extensive international support and assistance; 
4. Cases that have been typical cases for developing and testing peacebuild-
ing theories, but which also include unexplored and ignored dimensions 
that can be examined in order to expand the perspective of peacebuilding. 
 
Before examining case studies based on the above selection criteria, it is im-
portant to provide a brief explanation of these criteria. The first criterion is to ex-
amine cases with extensive, protracted, and multiple peacebuilding missions. 
This includes those cases where the UN or regional peacebuilding organizations 
have temporarily taken over the entire governance of the country and have had a 
comparatively large civilian and military presence. An examination of these cases 
with a long and heavy footprint provides more opportunities to observe their 
impact over time and to trace the spectrum of consequences more thoroughly 
and accurately. The second criterion is more obvious and relates to the first crite-
ria. As the sole purpose of this thesis is to disentangle the long-term impact of 
liberal peacebuilding, it is crucial to examine those post-conflict societies where 
liberal peacebuilding frameworks are explicitly implemented. Cases with this lib-
eral peacebuilding framework can be identified when the mandate aims to 
achieve liberal peace objectives, such as: institution-building, security sector re-
forms, political reforms, democratization and marketization. The third criterion is 
more specific as it focuses on cases where there has been documented evidence of 
partial success in building peace and the renewed efforts to maintain peace at 
any cost. Focusing on such cases provides more space to examine the nuances 
that shaped peace, and to trace broader consequences of peacebuilding. The 
fourth criterion is related to the re-examination of typical cases of peacebuilding 
that have received extensive academic attention, which would provide an oppor-
tunity to revise the existing knowledge, expand the frontiers of critique, develop-
ing new theoretical perspectives. 
 
Based on the first tier of case selection criteria, three cases are selected: Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Timor-Leste. These three cases experienced vio-
lent conflicts and humanitarian intervention, underwent a period of international 
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administration and peacebuilding, and challenged the potential of liberal peace-
building for building sustainable peace. Bosnia and Herzegovina is an important 
case as it has experienced protracted, extensive, and multiple international ad-
ministrations since the end of war in late 1995, which was triggered by the disso-
lution of Yugoslavia. While Kosovo is geographically in the same region with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, it has been a crucial case of heavy footprint internation-
al peacebuilding missions in circumstances of partially recognized statehood. The 
Kosovo war that ended in 1999 also arose within the context of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and the suppression of ethnic Albanians by the Milosevic regime. In-
ternational peacebuilding in Kosovo aimed to correct the mistakes made in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, but despite extensive international assistance, Kosovo en-
dured instability, fragmentation, and political uncertainties, as the dedicated 
chapter explores. Timor-Leste rose from a colonial struggle for liberation and ex-
perienced a long civil war, which ended with a referendum on independence in 
1999 and six subsequent UN statebuilding and peacebuilding missions with var-
ied duration and scope of executive authority. These three country cases have 
provided experimental ground for developing peacebuilding approaches and as 
such they hold strong potential for exploring empirically the typological frame-
work through critical practice tracing. However, the conceptual and methodolog-
ical angle of this thesis facilitates the analysis and exploration of these three post-
conflict country cases from a fresh, new perspective.  
 
Exploring the impact of all dimensions of peacebuilding within these cases 
would involve a lengthy and potentially superficial examination of the main cat-
egories of activity. For this reason, the second tier of within-case selection is em-
ployed to identify particular and important dimensions of liberal peacebuilding, 
based on the criteria elaborated above, on which the typological framework can 
be applied. The second tier of case selection criteria include: 
 
1. Within the broader context of a country case study, there is a sectoral di-
mension that relates to constitutive aspects of liberal peacebuilding (eg. 
rule of law, security sector reform, building political institutions). The sec-
toral dimensions chosen had negative impacts that, within the particular 
case, remain distinct for their political salience and destructive role in the 
peacebuilding process, having a consequentialist impact by delaying rec-
onciliation and the consolidation of peace;  
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2. Within-case cases that illustrate the different types of consequences, which 
have emerged from similar declared intentions. 
 
Based on the second tier criteria, the chapter on Bosnia and Herzegovina exam-
ines the unintended consequences of police reform in detail. Police reform falls 
under the liberal peacebuilding component of establishing the rule of law and 
stability as critical aspects of the post-conflict transition to stable peace and de-
mocracy. In the case of Kosovo, the emergence and the development of Serb par-
allel structures is examined to illustrate an unprevented consequences of interna-
tional peacebuilding in Kosovo. Building effective government structures and 
advancing ethnic reconciliation are major component of liberal peacebuilding 
and the inability to prevent the emergence of parallel governance resulted in fail-
ing to achieve these intended goals. In the case of Timor-Leste, security sector 
development and reform is examined to explore the emergence of unanticipated 
consequences, which had collateral damage for peace, democratic governance, 
and development of the country. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Two-tier approach to case selection 
 
 Tier one: Typical post-conflict peacebuilding cases 
 
 Bosnia and Her-
zegovina 
Kosovo Timor-Leste 
 
Tier two: 
Diverse sub-cases 
Police reform Serb parallel struc-
tures  
Security sector reform 
 
 
 
 
In undertaking this critical assessment of peacebuilding impact, field research 
has been conducted in the three case studies examined in this thesis. While field 
research was conducted in Kosovo during several visits between 2011 and 2013, 
field research in Bosnia and Herzegovina was conducted during May 2012 and 
the research visit to Timor-Leste was made during September 2013. During these 
visits to the field, the author conducted around 40 interviews in total with na-
tional government officers of relevant ranks, international workers, as well as lo-
cal and international civil society activists. In each case, around fifteen persons 
were interviewed, who are implicitly and explicitly cited in this thesis. The inter-
views with relevant actors assisted in crosschecking key arguments within each 
chapter. Interviewees were asked a broad range of open and structured questions 
about peacebuilding intentionality, consequences, and responsibility.  
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Most importantly, field research strengthened confidence in the explanatory 
power of the key critical turning points identified in each chapter, and improved 
accuracy regarding the identification and examination of the spectrum of conse-
quences. As this thesis tackles the long-term consequences of international gov-
ernance in post-conflict societies, the field research visits to the three countries 
was conducted at an ideal time as most of the formal international administra-
tions have left the country, the international presence has been visibly down-
sized, and the effects of peacebuilding and statebuilding can be observed more 
clearly. While the three selected case studies in this thesis have been widely re-
searched by peace and conflict academics and are arguably subject to „research 
fatigue‟216, the identity of the author being from Kosovo has facilitated the access 
to more detailed information in relation to the Kosovo case. This perspective also 
informed the approach to the field research in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ti-
mor-Leste.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced a new analytical and typological framework of peace-
building intentionality, consequences, and responsibility, as well as outlined a 
new mixture of qualitative methods that can be applied to three case studies. The 
assemblage and critical complementary approach taken in this chapter reveals 
that to deal with the complexity of peacebuilding intentionality, consequences, 
and responsibility it is necessary to combine a variety of existing and differentiat-
ed concepts and approaches and embrace them in the context of peacebuilding.  
 
In this chapter, the assemblage of four key aspects of human agency, namely in-
tentionality, anticipation, preventability and responsibility, provide a grounded 
understanding of the caveats that enable and obstruct the enactment of human 
agency, bringing about social change, and reaching desired outcomes. The link-
age between intentionality, consequences and responsibility is crucial for under-
taking a critical assessment of peacebuilding impact. The examination of conse-
quences requires tracing back key triggering actions, and behind each action 
there is a dose of intentionality, which represents the starting point of a circle and 
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is influenced by previous knowledge, experiences and events. The identification 
of consequences enables the retrospective examination of the factors that led to 
its formation, especially the presence of intentionality, anticipation, and prevent-
ability. This helps to understand social actualities, and to attribute specific and 
relational responsibility for the consequences to responsible agents (as individu-
als and collectives). The complex interaction of these aspects enables us to em-
brace and harness the complexity and discontent of contemporary peacebuilding 
actualities, where intentionality does not match with actions taken, the conse-
quences remain unaccounted for, and the appropriate assignment of responsibil-
ity is almost inexistent.  
 
Therefore, the typological framework introduced in this chapter is constructed on 
solid foundations to capture a variety of key aspects, which are essential to criti-
cally assess the impact of peacebuilding. Although it may look simplified and 
linear, the framework is adequate for capturing the complexity of the formation 
and transformation of intentions in post-conflict situations. The framework also 
allows us to examine how internal and external factors shape critical turning 
points, and how such crucial developments have a spill-over effect to produce 
multiple consequences, the majority of which are unintended, unanticipated, and 
unprevented. The declared intentions of peacebuilding organizations are the ba-
sis against which the meaning and reasoning of peacebuilding is established. De-
constructing the intentionality of peacebuilding helps reveal the basis of action, 
the clashing agenda of local and international actors, and the incompatibility 
with other declared intentions. When translated into multiple actions, declared 
intentions start producing immediate and distant outcomes. It is the distant out-
comes (unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences) of peace-
building that are the subject of inquiry in this thesis. However, the connection 
between the spectrum of consequences and declared intentions is only visible 
through embracing closely key critical turning points (important actions and 
events), which have served as enablers, barriers, and triggers of certain conse-
quences. When the declared intentions are identified alongside the crucial turn-
ing points and spectrum of consequences, then it is possible to assign responsibil-
ity. In this regard, the assignment of responsibility is only possible through this 
systematic and non-linear process.  
 
After this conceptual and methodological elaboration, the next three empirical 
chapters will explore the long-term impact of peacebuilding and also apply the 
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theoretical and methodological work developed so far in this thesis. Critical prac-
tice tracing will guide the empirical analysis as a combined new approach. While 
in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the unintended consequences of police re-
form will be examined, in the case of Kosovo the emergence and development of 
Serb parallel structures will be analysed to illustrate an unprevented consequence 
of peacebuilding. The case study of Timor-Leste will explore the unanticipated 
consequences of security sector reform. In each of the cases, the declared inten-
tions are outlined, then two critical turning points and their spectrum of conse-
quences are examined to analyse the performance and impact of peacebuilding 
activities, and to explore the attributability, answerability and accountability for 
the consequences to particular agents. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Unintended Consequences of Police Reform 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina   
 
 
 
“With hindsight, I think I should not have left 
Bosnia until this last great reform – the reform of 
Bosnia‟s police force – was properly secured. To my 
regret, much of this has been allowed to unravel by 
the international community (and especially the EU). 
For this, I fear, Bosnia will pay heavily in the future.” 
 
                   (Paddy Ashdown, Former High Representative for Bosnia, 2009)217 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Following the end of the Bosnian war between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats in 
1995, multiple police forces served their own political and military groups and 
became involved in inter-entity „peaceful‟ confrontation. These police forces were 
overcrowded, unprofessional, under political control, and acted against human 
rights standards. Richard Holbrooke, the broker of the Dayton Peace Accords 
(DPA) referred to the local police forces as „the worst and most extreme elements‟ 
in all three communities.218 These police forces consisted of over 44,000 persons 
across the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and operated as mono-
ethnic paramilitary units organized within three parallel ethnic structures, which 
made them unsuited for correct and effective civilian law enforcement. Police 
were viewed as the main actors involved in extensive human rights abuses and 
as enforcers of ethnic cleansing and political violence. After the war, these police 
forces became one of the main obstacles to peacebuilding as they continued vio-
lent practices associated with the war and advanced mono-ethnic policies of dis-
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crimination, harassment and intimidation of citizens from different ethnic 
groups. 219   
 
While there have been multiple important developments in Bosnia and Herze-
govina (BiH)220, the struggle to reform police forces is unique and important for 
examining the processes and outcomes of such a complex undertaking. 221 Police 
reform, as part of security sector reform, has been one of the main components of 
liberal peacebuilding praxis in BiH. The police reform undertaken in BiH has 
been the first such experience for the UN and the EU in a post-conflict society. 
Both missions have been declared successful and were highly praised for their 
performance. However, the spectrum of consequences they produced has re-
mained largely ignored and under-researched. Assessments of the wider impact 
remain elusive and have not been examined sufficiently, especially from the 
prism of unintended consequences.  
 
This chapter examines two critical turning points of police reform in BiH from 
1996 to 2008, which have been central to shaping the spectrum of unintended 
consequences. The first phase occurred from 1996 to 2002 and was led by the UN, 
and the second phase took place from 2003 to 2012 and was led by the EU. The 
first stage began with the initial work of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and International Police Task Force (IPTF) on certi-
fying and structuring police forces without challenging the operation of multiple, 
overlapping, and fragmented police forces at the entity and cantonal level. The 
UNMIBH and IPTF focused on reforming the police service and re-establishing 
the rule of law. However, this policy of legitimizing the existing mono-ethnic po-
lice structures became one of the main obstacles to overcoming a number of is-
sues, including: embedded nationalist politics in the country; the linkage between 
police and organized crime; addressing serious cases of war crimes; facilitating 
the return of refugees; and proceeding with peaceful inter-ethnic co-existence. 
The international community did not intend this spectrum of consequences, but 
it came as a direct result of the mistakes made during the initial stages after the 
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war. These consequences were further nurtured by insufficient international co-
ordination, and a lack of cooperation, resources, and knowledge to comprehend 
the harmful effects that the police reform would bring to the peace process.  
 
These unintended consequences during the UNMIBH mission later became the 
main obstacle to the peace process and informed the main goal of police reform 
within the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM). After 2003, 
when the UN handed over the process to the EU, the main challenges of police 
reform included how to: make the police forces work together; remove them 
from political control; make police more accountable; and increase their coordi-
nation and effectiveness. The EUPM focused its activity on restricting police forc-
es by assisting, mentoring, and monitoring local law enforcement forces in the 
fight against organized crime, as well as working on building institutional and 
technical capacities for police forces, making police forces free from political in-
ference, and accountable to the public. A lengthy and contradictory negotiation 
process to reform police forces lasted for almost ten years. This EU-led police re-
form process changed its intentions and incentivising mechanisms several times, 
which resulted in nurturing of political confrontation and exclusionary politics, 
strengthening of nationalist factions and suppressing political moderation, as 
well as discouraging cooperation and promoting obstruction. The EU did not in-
tend these consequences but it contributed to their emergence with badly chosen 
policies, shifting conditionality, and inherited legacies of structural barriers estab-
lished in the DPA. However, the responsibility for consequences remains largely 
unaddressed. This chapter illustrates the absence of practices among the interna-
tional and local stakeholders to take responsibility for the consequences of their 
purposive actions. In line with the earlier discussion in the methodology chapter, 
in this chapter aspects of attributability and answerability will be assigned to 
specific agents for the unintended consequences examined in this chapter.  
 
Declared intentions, police reform and peacebuilding in BiH 
The foundation document that solidified the declared intentions for peacebuild-
ing in BiH is the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and its eleven annexes. The 
DPA annexes form the basis of all international intentional actions in BiH since 
the war ended in 1995, alongside specific modifications introduced continuously 
since then by the international community. In essence, the declared intentions of 
the international community included: establishing security, creating institution-
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al and political conditions for stability, establishing democratic governance 
through elections, establishing federalized power-sharing, and promoting human 
rights and human security.222  
 
As this chapter aims to explore the impact of police reform in BiH, it is important 
to examine briefly the formation and transformation of the security-related inten-
tions in the country. In this regard, the international community identified five 
security-related areas for intervention: the establishment of an Inter-Entity 
Boundary Line; managing the armies‟ disintegration, disarmament, and defense 
reform; managing police reform and the establishment of institutional architec-
ture for security institutions in the country. Later on, the Office of High Repre-
sentative (OHR) and the EU modified the structure and content of declared inten-
tions, as evident with periodical changes and reshuffling of Mission Implementa-
tion Plans.223 In general, security sector reform faced a great deal of local re-
sistance primarily related to contextual factors and war legacies in BiH, including 
ethnic division, organized crime, corruption, and unemployment. Within these 
complex circumstances and tendencies towards ethnic fragmentation, police re-
form was considered one of the most important aspects for securing a united 
Bosnia.224 A major declared intention was to strengthen the management capacity 
of the police force to implement appropriate policing tasks, as would be required 
by a democratic society that has effective services to uphold and enforce law and 
order in an impartial way.225  
 
As this chapter will examine, the police reform process in BiH was one of the 
most complex, protracted, and problematic post-conflict projects undertaken by 
the international community. During the first phase between 1996 and 2002, the 
UNMIBH and IPTF carried out initial work in certifying and structuring police 
forces without challenging the operation of multiple, overlapping, and fragment-
ed police forces at the entity and cantonal level. The UNMIBH and IPTF focused 
on reforming the police service and establishing the rule of law by working on 
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three dimensions: individual police officers, law enforcement institutions, and 
the relationship between the police and the public.226 In achieving this, IPTF was 
charged with the 'light' authority to monitor, observe, advice, train, facilitate, and 
assess the policing dynamics in BiH. The focus of these goals was driven mainly 
from contextual factors evident after the war in BiH.  
 
Following the inability of the IPTF to reform successfully police forces and estab-
lish solid structures for democratic policing in BiH, the EU launched its first po-
lice mission abroad in 2003 to address this issue in BiH. The declared intentions 
of EUPM aimed at „mentoring, monitoring and inspecting, to establish in BiH a 
sustainable, professional and multi-ethnic police service operating in accordance 
with best European and international standards‟.227 In doing so, EUPM‟s activi-
ties consisted of improving the capacities of local police forces and the institu-
tional framework of police, as well as monitoring political control over the po-
lice.228 The reasoning behind the non-executive mandate for EUPM was to avoid 
creating a culture of dependency within the local police on the international 
community, and to promote local ownership.229 The intention behind the for-
mation of EUPM was to establish and strengthen the institutional mechanism 
that would make the police forces efficient, functional, and accountable, as well 
to provide support for the European integration process of BiH. The ultimate 
goal for EUPM was to establish best European and international standards on 
policing. Beyond these declared intentions, the collective strategic and self-
interested intentions of the EU were to: functionalize EU foreign policy, to in-
crease its international agency for peace and stability abroad, to pre-empt risks 
coming from its neighbouring regions, and to utilize EUPM for the Europeaniza-
tion and modernization of BiH police forces.230 The primacy of external intentions 
made EUPM a successful mission not based on its impact or legacy, but based on 
its modest performance and its deployment ability.231  
 
The main intention behind the police reform was to make the law enforcement 
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agencies competent and capable of tackling organized crime in a professional, 
systematic, and effective manner. The EUPM changed its intentions and reorient-
ed its strategic objectives according to domestic political circumstances and the 
dynamics imposed by the EU as part of the comprehensive approach that com-
bines crisis management, enlargement conditionality, and development aid.232 
These constantly shifting intentions have made EUPM a one-stop shop for fixing 
and dealing with situational challenges in Bosnia. The EUPM initially dealt with 
police reform, then it moved to tackling organized crime, political accountability 
of police, and it later worked on visa liberalization and the facilitation of the EU 
integration process in the country. 
 
Critical turning point I: DPA arrangements and UN-led police reform 
The first critical turning point for dealing with police reform in BiH was the peri-
od during the finalization of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) provisions on 
police re-structuring and the subsequent organization and implementation of 
UN-led international police forces, which took place between 1996 and 1997. Lat-
er events related to police reform that followed this initial momentum followed a 
path-dependent trajectory for several years until new momentum was created. 
The initial conditions that later triggered multiple implications are reflected in 
the Constitution of BiH, which was included as an annex to the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. Therein, the parties and the international community agreed that a 
new police system would be introduced, which would institutionalize the exist-
ing police forces that were ethnically-divided and organized as separate and in-
dependent operations throughout the country. The responsibility for running po-
lice affairs in accordance with „internationally recognized standards‟ was dele-
gated to entities, cantons, and their respective ministries of interior. In such a 
widely decentralized police system, with thirteen law enforcement agencies, no 
competences were envisaged for the state level institutions. The decision to allow 
a decentralized police force and immediate local ownership over the police ser-
vice was taken as the US and European partners could not agree to grant the 
IPTF an executive mandate and the authority to arrest people, fearing that this 
would trigger destabilization and ethnic violence.233  
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To assist in this transformation of a communist and post-conflict police force to a 
democratic police force, the international community agreed to establish an In-
ternational Police Task Force (IPTF) that would operate as a civilian police com-
ponent, managed by the UNMIBH.234 This mandate was set during the first Peace 
Implementation Committee (PIC) meeting in London in December 1995.235 In es-
sence, the IPTF had fewer than 2000 international police officers and had a broad 
and vague mandate, limited resources, unqualified international personnel that 
had to deal with decentralized police structures entrenched in their political 
strongholds and uncompromising attitudes toward change and reconciliation.236 
To achieve this broad mandate, IPTF decided to focus its activity on a number of 
areas, such as the: reformation of police through training, selection, certification 
and de-certification procedures; and restructuring police forces by establishing 
policing practices that are de-politicized, impartial, human rights-oriented, and 
accountable to the public.237 However, the operation of IPTF suffered from organ-
izational problems, as well as challenging and competing relations with other 
loosely coordinated international organizations. It also lacked effective sanction 
mechanisms to punish the non-compliance of local police forces, apart from rhe-
torically rebuking them for the failure to provide public security in BiH and the 
ability to de-certify individual police.238 
 
Between 1996 and 2002, IPTF struggled with the issue of how to deal with police 
forces and correct the mistakes made during the initial stages after 1996, when 
UNMIBH and IPTF certified and structured police forces without challenging the 
operation of multiple, overlapping, and fragmented police forces at the entity 
and cantonal level. The main activity of IPTF was to complete a full screening 
and certification of law enforcement personnel, and to make police in line with 
internationally accepted standards. From 44,000 personnel, UNMIBH registered 
23,751 officers from which 481 officers failed to pass the certification proce-
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dure.239 For those who did not manage to pass the certification, an independent 
review panel was created to handle appeal cases, which had no overruling au-
thorities but could suggest that the IPTF Commissioner reconsider his decision in 
case any additional information or evidence was not included in the certification 
process. The strategy of international community was that through vetting and 
screening of local police forces, they would be able to filter and reconstruct the 
police forces, remove the deviant and spoiler elements, and ensure compliance 
with international policing standards.240 This process took effect in late 1998 
when the IPTF was granted authority for human rights investigations and police 
force restructuring.241 The IPTF also held training activities for all police forces 
that passed the certification requirement. 
 
As the DPA already accepted the decentralized police structure in BiH, the IPTF 
was left with a weak assistance mandate, whose effectiveness was largely de-
pendent on the consent of the Parties, which was absent at that time.242 Between 
1996 and 1997, the IPTF was mainly involved in observing the security situation 
and the performance of local police forces regarding population transfer, return 
of refugees, early elections, and public order. However, it had no authority to en-
gage in reforming the policing culture in BiH, which was inherited from social-
ism and had radicalized during the war. The IPTF also had no clear strategy for 
ensuring that the rule of law would contribute to peacebuilding and the post-war 
stabilization of BiH. As the efforts for implementing security aspects of DPA 
were underway and the inter-boundary lines were being set, the challenge of 
working with local police forces became more obvious as they either withdrew 
from supporting international efforts, or became active protagonists of obstruc-
tion. As IPTF was vulnerable when facing local actors, they patrolled with IFOR 
and later SFOR troops for protection and enforcement. The UN Secretary General 
stated at some stage in 1996 that „[i]t is unrealistic to envisage a civilian police 
operation continuing its work without the framework of security provided by the 
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presence of a credible international military force.‟243 The First Deputy Commis-
sioner of IPTF, Robert Wasserman, later explained the situation: 
 
It appears the framers of Dayton perceived that the IPTF would somehow 
simply monitor local police to see they didn„t get out of hand and then 
advise willing parties on how to professionalize the police with modern 
practices. There was no thought given to the fact that the ethnic rivalries 
meant there was no functioning police to protect minorities after Day-
ton.244 
 
 
The final aspect of police reform included capacity building and training for all 
police that passed the certification requirement. However, a shortage of resources 
and professional trainers obstructed the complete fulfilment of this goal. The 
IPTF provided short training courses, which consisted of information about po-
lice reconstruction, human dignity, and community policing.245 UNMIBH also 
established two police academies in BiH to train police and new cadets, including 
minority police. Parallel to UNMIBH‟s police restructure, which involved creat-
ing efficient institutional and organizational structures, reducing political inter-
ference in police work, establishing independent police commissioners, and de-
ploying minority police officers to different regions of BiH, other activities in-
cluded: strengthening police components within the criminal justice system, 
which included creating various institutional mechanisms to foster cooperation 
between police and judicial bodies in BiH,246 and consolidating effective state law 
enforcement institutions and inter-police cooperation mechanisms, such as an 
integrated State Border Service, which manages the land and airspace borders on 
the whole territory of BiH. As part of this goal, UNMIBH also helped to strength-
en the capacities for combating organized crime and human trafficking. In addi-
tion, UNMIBH prepared the Bosnian police and armed forces to participate in 
UN peacekeeping operations, such as in Timor-Leste, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and 
DRC. 
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Overall, UN-led police reform in BiH tried to build a democratic police, downsize 
the police forces, Westernize the local culture of policing, and build an independ-
ent and publically accountable police structure. However, these aims became 
problematic as they were implemented in the institutional and political environ-
ment created by the DPA, which facilitated the exploitation of political institu-
tions by nationalist factions to halt progress, jeopardized the fate of an integrated 
Bosnian state, and resisted through institutional means the international peace-
building agenda in the country. The structural constraints of DPA prolonged the 
fate of police reform and eventually provided institutional incentives for non-
cooperation following the successful downsizing and re-structuring of the com-
plex, decentralized, and multi-layered police structure in BiH.247 Furthermore, 
the weak mandate of the IPTF that involved monitoring and assistance activities 
proved to be insufficient and inadequate for undertaking such a complex police 
reform. As Holbrooke rightly argues, an executive authority would have perhaps 
been necessary for ensuring a more successful police reform process.248 
 
Spectrum of unintended consequences I 
Although in 2002, the UN declared the IPTF as a successful mission that man-
aged to reform, downsize, reshuffle, train, monitor, and empower the local police 
forces249, a number of implications and consequences have emerged as a result of 
the intentions, actions, and outcomes of this process. The spectrum of conse-
quences from the first critical phase of police reform arises from the contrasting 
agendas and intentions of local and international actors, as well as the incompat-
ible conceptions of the organization and purpose of police forces. While the par-
ties were obliged to accept and implement in full the DPA and its annexes, in 
practice the parties have continuously tried to re-interpret and revise the agree-
ment, thereby resisting the reintegration of the Bosnian state. While the IPTF and 
IFOR were responsible for providing security, ensuring freedom of movement, 
facilitating the implementation of DPA, they suffered from internal problems and 
enforcement gaps, which eventually reduced their capacity to implement their 
declared intentions. Faced with multiple challenges, the IPTF lacked the direc-
tion, resources, and capacity to handle the issue it was mandated to conduct in 
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the first place. Holbrooke admitted that „[t]he creation of a weak International 
Police Task Force has especially serious consequences ... We had identified the 
problem before Dayton but could not overcome our internal difficulties‟.250 
Hence, the main missed opportunity during this stage of police reform was the 
failure to pursue a more centralist structure for police forces, which led to nu-
merous consequences that were not intended at various later stages. The spec-
trum of consequences that has emerged during this first phase of police reform 
varies from broader and structural issues to more concrete and immediate effects: 
 
1. Multiple decentralized, ineffective, and politicized police structures; 
2. Police forces in service of protecting war criminals and obstructing inter-
ethnic reconciliation; and 
3. Breeding chronic human insecurity. 
 
Each of these consequences is treated individually below. 
 
Multiple decentralized, ineffective, and politicized police structures 
 
Despite the efforts of the IPTF to undertake comprehensive police reform, the po-
lice structure dictated by DPA with multiple interior ministries at the entity and 
cantonal level and weak state level cooperation and coordination left the security 
sectors in BiH fragmented and overstaffed with police, who failed to cooperate 
effectively, share intelligence or undertake joint operations. Nationalist factions 
in each entity had the authority to control cantonal and entity-based ministries of 
internal affairs, as well as police structures. The budget and oversight for police 
was left in the hands of cantonal and entity based parliaments, which were con-
trolled by nationalist parties. These structures controlled networks of nationalist 
groups, criminal gangs, and corrupt activity. The formation of multiple police 
structures left room for structural political interference and control over the oper-
ation of police forces, and the instrumentalization of police to impede the imple-
mentation of DPA provisions. The very structures that the international commu-
nity established in DPA became the main constraints in implementing the police 
reform. Between 1996 and 2002 when the UN led the police reform process, the 
leadership of ethnic communities in BiH demonstrated a lack of political will to 
improve the functioning of police and judiciary in accordance with international 
standards and uphold to their obligations outlined in the DPA annexes.  
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The decentralized police structure provided opportunities for local police forces 
to delay police restructuring due to disagreement over the uniform insignias, mi-
nority representation in the police force and the multi-ethnic structure of police 
command at the canton level.251 Motivated and orchestrated by political factions, 
local police forces mainly in Serb and Croat dominated parts of BiH, manned il-
legal checkpoints that aimed to obstruct minority returns, inter-entity freedom of 
movement, and harass citizens on an ethnic basis.252 Local police forces, guided 
by municipal authorities, failed to respond to IPTF requests that high-ranking 
officials act to halt the organized patterns of preventing the return of displaced 
persons and orchestrating crimes against them and their property.253 There are 
multiple reports of such activities in the region of Drvar and other localities in 
Republika Srpska. The preservation of decentralized police forces consequently 
provided space for creating parallel, unofficial, and ethnically-based police struc-
tures, which impeded the necessary cooperation for investigating ethnically mo-
tivated crimes and obstructed minority return.254 Mono-ethnic police structures 
significantly increased insecurity in places that were ethnically mixed. The at-
tempts of the IPTF to integrate police officers from minority communities faced 
the resistance and disobedience in the Croat-controlled areas of the Federation 
and in Republika Srpska.255 Hence, the decision to create decentralized police 
forces in BiH and the inadequacies associated with the UN-led reform of police 
structures was unintentionally exacerbated by the initial international decision of 
Dayton's architects to leave police structures unchanged and partially reformed 
and reduced.  
 
The rushed process for completing the certification of police officers often disre-
garded criminal records and illegal activity among police officers. As early as 
1996, Holbrooke confesses that the main obstacle to the implementation of DPA 
civilian aspects was the presence of Serb „secret police‟ under the stewardship of 
Radovan Karadzic who interrogated and threatened civilians and politicians that 
cooperated with the international presence after the war.256 In relation to the re-
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turn of minority communities, an extensive number of police officers had occu-
pied houses and properties of displaced people, thereby complicating the return 
process and sending an inappropriate message from supposed law enforcers.257 
Nationalist factions intentionally delayed the police reform process by exploiting 
the legal provisions of DPA by rejecting any attempt that would lead to strength-
ening the unity of BiH.258 Human rights abuses committed by local law enforce-
ment personnel were intentionally undertaken and were guided by nationalist 
political agendas.259 Local political parties exploited the regular occurrence of 
elections as a pretext to delay police reform, arguing that police reform, minority 
recruitment, and refugee return would harm their election campaigns.260 In other 
cases, they encouraged local police forces to delay issuing identification cards for 
ethnic minorities, thus delaying the re-integration of returnees to their pre-war 
homes.261 
 
Backed by their political leadership, the Bosnian Serb police forces were the first 
to resist the police reform process with the justification that they were not con-
sulted during the Dayton negotiations and that they had no ownership of the 
process. Bosniak police forces were more compliant, whereas Bosnian Croats 
were somewhere in between. Bosnian Serb police forces demanded over 6,000 
police for Republika Srpska (RS) alone (as opposed to 11,500 designated for the 
Federation shared between Croats and Bosniaks), and refused to release the 
names of their police so that they could undergo a screening and vetting process 
for war crimes allegations. Until 1998, Bosnian Serb police loyal to Radovan 
Karadzic continuously worked against the implementation of DPA and defied 
the IPTF and other international organizations operating in BiH. Examples of the 
involvement of local police in criminal networks and abusing minorities - reflect-
ed negatively on the IPTF‟s ability to monitor the local police forces' compliance 
with international human rights standards. Cases are also reported of police ar-
resting each other on war crimes allegations issued by ethnically affiliated 
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courts.262 As such incidents demonstrate, the IPTF was predominantly investigat-
ing irregularities and pleading with the parties to comply voluntarily with demo-
cratic policing standards. Due to these circumstances and their lack of profes-
sionalism, IPTF monitors were constantly discredited by different local police 
forces.  
 
Even after passing the screening and certification process, local police were reluc-
tant to investigate criminal offences and human rights abuses committed against 
minority returnees.263 Layers of inefficiency enabled police to avoid combating 
organized crimes and corruption. These two crucial aspects of public order and 
good governance were unintentionally overshadowed by the priority given to 
police reform and the securitization of the return process. Police reform and the 
institutional design of the security sector were unsuccessful in developing a pro-
fessional and accountable police service in Bosnia. Beyond their nationalist sym-
pathies and defensive internal loyalties, police officers in BiH were poorly paid 
and continued to engage in corruption, trafficking in human beings, drugs, and 
other illegal activities.264 This unfortunate situation was exacerbated by reports of 
UN personnel frequenting brothels and nightclubs and tolerating the operation 
of trafficking networks.265 
 
Police forces in service of protecting war criminals and obstructing inter-ethnic reconcili-
ation   
 
The decentralized arrangement allowing multiple police forces has led to the un-
intended consequence of delaying the identification and prosecution of war 
crimes suspects throughout the country.266 Police structures and entity-level se-
curity institutions protected indicted war criminals, including Radovan Karadzic 
and Ratko Mladic. As a Crisis Group report noted in 1999, „police forces maintain 
a reputation for corruption, brutality, lawlessness, and often, as the private ar-
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mies of ruling ethnic parties‟.267 Local police were one of the most susceptible so-
cial categories for committing war crimes. Hence, the UN's failure to tackle police 
reform effectively meant that many indicted war criminals were hidden within 
new police structures, which provided protection to nationalist leaders and supe-
rior war crimes fugitives.268 A large number of police in RS were prosecuted for 
war crimes after almost twenty years of hiding within local police structures. This 
illustrates that a network of war fugitives have infiltrated local police forces, de-
spite the IPTF screening and certification process and EUPM involvement in 
mentoring and advising these police structures.269 The IPTF managed to remove 
fewer than 40 police officers on the grounds of involvement with war crimes. 270  
 
Numerous examples point out the failure of local police to execute court orders, 
apprehend, and arrest war crimes suspects. An Amnesty International report 
highlights that „enormous problems remain with police investigations of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity and war crimes‟.271 Of particular importance, the 
report highlights that „the presence and influence of present or former police of-
ficers may seriously undermine and compromise police investigations into war 
crimes carried out in the police area of responsibility where they are or were 
serving‟.272 Furthermore, the presence of war criminals within the police reduced 
public confidence in the police, especially among the minority returnees. Local 
police constantly failed to provide witness protection, which is essential for ad-
vancing war crimes cases.273  
 
Later in 2005, Human Rights Watch asserted that „[p]olice assistance to war 
crimes prosecutors and investigative judges remains half-hearted at best, in part 
because police officers are often themselves implicated in the commission of war 
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crimes‟.274 A well-known example of the police protecting war criminals in Re-
publika Srpska is the case of Dragomir Andan, a senior RS police officer who was 
forced to resign in 2007 for not cooperating with ICTY in the hunt for indicted 
war criminals. He was accused of participating in wartime atrocities, protecting 
former Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic and cooperating with orga-
nized crime figures. The OHR decision to remove him from office clearly stated 
that: „Dragomir Andan has, whether through his actions or his failures to act in a 
position of responsibility, contributed to shielding war crime indictees from jus-
tice and preventing the efforts of those who have tried to do so‟.275 The Chief 
Prosecutor of ICTY in her address to the UN Security Council on 23 November 
2004 reiterated the connection between police restructuring and arresting war 
criminals: 
 
“[The fact] that nine years after Dayton, the authorities of Republika 
Srpska have not apprehended a single individual indicted by the ICTY... 
confirms the existence of fundamental systemic weaknesses built into the 
law enforcement and security structures of BiH, and in particular Repub-
lika Srpska”276 
 
The lack of inter-entity police cooperation, as well as the absence of standardized 
legal provisions across the country, resulted in a poor track record on war crimes 
cases. A 2005 OSCE survey of war crimes trials in BiH showed that some prose-
cutors confessed that „it is very difficult to trace defendants‟ and that „cooperation 
between entity police is not on a high level which has a considerable impact upon 
the ability to discover the defendants‟.277 Decentralized police structures compli-
cated the exchange of information on war crimes cases between entity police ser-
vices and their respective ministries of interior. The OSCE noted that „the proce-
dure for the issuance and circulation of arrest warrants is also deficient both 
within and between the Entities‟.278 The Bosnian National War Crimes Strategy 
published in December 2008 admitted that „[i]n the organizational structure of 
most district/cantonal courts and prosecutor's offices, as well as police bodies, 
there are no special departments for war crimes, nor is there a sufficient number 
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of legal officers and advisors, that is, investigators who would assist the judges 
and prosecutors in the work on war crimes cases‟.279 The evidence presented here 
of unintended consequences suggests direct linkages between inadequacies of 
police reform, delayed transitional justice and protracted ethnic division. The de-
sire to resolve an aspect of peacebuilding (police reform) had the unintentional 
spillover effect of delaying the prosecution of war criminals and serving justice 
for the victims and their families – essential aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding 
and reconciliation.  
 
Breeding chronic human insecurity 
 
The failure of the architects of Dayton to anticipate the complications regarding 
police reform and the failure to effectively transplant international policing 
standards to the oversized, fragmented, and politicized local police forces 
through monitoring, and capacity building resulted in multiple unintended con-
sequences. In the process of police reform, local police forces coordinated their 
activities with nationalist factions. This deepened ethnic insecurity, led to human 
rights abuses against the minority refugee returnees, impeded the formation of 
new mixed and secure communities, delayed the provision of basic public order 
and safety essential for social peace, political freedom, gradual reconciliation, co-
existence and economic development.  
 
The IPTF and UNMIBH dealt with over 1,000 cases of alleged police human 
rights abuses annually.280 One of the major shortcomings of the IPTF was their 
failure to provide community-level security and order. This consequently led to 
chronic local insecurity, unsatisfactory election process, inter-ethnic tensions, de-
layed minority return, and a failure to protect human rights. The UN blamed lo-
cal political structures for these obstructions. A UN Secretary-General report held 
that „[f]or almost two years, the authorities in the Republika Srpska have fol-
lowed a policy of minimum implementation of the peace agreement. They have 
done little or nothing to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing and to return refu-
gees to their homes‟.281 Ethnic imbalances within the police affected the return of 
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refugees and the overall security of minority communities. In other words, the 
mono-ethnic composition of police forces also unintentionally shaped the mono-
ethnic composition of communities. There are multiple cases where criminal 
networks exploited the lack of cross-entity police cooperation by moving opera-
tions between entities to avoid capture.282  
 
Despite the police reform process, no progress was made by 1998 on dealing with 
police crimes against minority returnees. After 1998, the de-certification policy 
was slow and resistance from high-ranking local police officials constantly de-
layed the resolution of cases of police crimes. The return of refugees and dis-
placed persons in BiH has been one of the most challenging tasks facing interna-
tional peacebuilders. The process experienced many difficulties, including: the 
extensive number of refugees and IDPs, which exceeded over a million persons; 
resistance from nationalists and entity institutions; technical and material diffi-
culties, as well as a lack of coordination and cohesion among the responsible in-
ternational agencies. A number of factors contributed to this, including: limited 
freedom of movement; deep ethnic divisions and insecurity; the presence of land 
mines; the absence of housing and sheltering; property disputes; and limited re-
sources.283 However, the overarching impediment to the return process during 
this period has been the security problem caused by local police forces, resistance 
and non-cooperation of local authorities, and ineffective police services.284  
 
The fragile conditions on the ground, which were preserved by the violence or-
chestrated by local police forces and the failures of the IPTF and IFOR/SFOR, 
made impossible the return of nearly two million refugees and IDPs to their orig-
inal municipalities during 1996. This was reflected during the first elections 
where most IDPs were forced to vote in the district of their temporary residence, 
thereby solidifying the territorialisation of ethnicity in favour of extreme nation-
alist parties, and de facto ratifying the ethnic cleansing carried out during the 
war.285 During this initial phase, UNHCR discouraged refugees and IDPs from 
returning to their place of origin, and IFOR/SFOR obstructed the return on the 
grounds that such processes would increase ethnic confrontation and cause ten-
                                                        
282
 Crisis Group, ‘Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU’, Europe Report No. 164, Brussels: 
ICG, 6 September 2005, p. 2. 
283
 ‘Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 1035 (1995)’, UN Doc. S/1996/210, 29 
March 1996, p. 11. 
284
 ‘Ibid, p.11. 
285
 Florian Bieber, Post-War Bosnia: Governance, Inequality and Public Sector Governance, Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 89. 
 94 
sions, challenge the fragile peace and stability, and harm the post-conflict recov-
ery process.  
 
One of the approaches used to reduce the security threats was to create multi-
ethnic and mixed police services, and send minority police officers to guard mi-
nority returnees. However, as a UN report reveals, even after two years of efforts 
to reconstruct the police services in BiH, „there are still numerous instances where 
local police throughout BiH do not operate according to the principles of demo-
cratic policing, especially in areas designated for the return of minority refugees 
and displaced persons‟.286 The same report reveals cases of police beatings, fail-
ure to issue identity cards to minorities, house burnings and property cases that 
relate to returning minority displaced persons and refugees.287 In pursuit of the 
goal of creating a multi-ethnic police force as a precondition for ensuring the se-
curity of returnees, UNHCR in cooperation with IOM encouraged refugees, who 
were former police officers, to return to BiH, assisting them to re-settle in their 
homes of origin, and arranging for the exchange of serving officers between the 
Republika Srpska and the Federation.288 In 2002, Crisis Group reported cases 
where „local police, prosecutors and courts often fail to bring those responsible 
for nationally motivated violence to book‟.289 
 
Police reform in BiH predominantly focused on tackling ethnically sensitive as-
pects of police reform, trying to reintegrate and restructure the various deviant 
political factions and ensuring their basic compliance with democratic policing. 
However, this strategy unintentionally overshadowed the gender dimension and 
quotas within local police forces and among international police monitors. An 
unintended consequence of the insufficient integration of female police was the 
failure to address wide spread cases of domestic and gender-based violence in 
BiH, as it was believed that a male-dominated local police force would not be 
sensitive and empathetic enough to investigate such crimes.290 This failure arose 
due to the ethnic-based criterion for organizing the police, as well as a lack of 
awareness among UNMIBH in the early stages regarding the importance of in-
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cluding a gender dimension in BiH's police reform. Moreover, the emphasis on 
recruiting minority police officers based on ethnic background has unintentional-
ly enforced ethnic identity of police forces and jeopardized merit-based and pro-
fessional capacity, which are essential for effective policing.  
 
Driven by the tendency to assume that female police officers would be weak and 
face discrimination and harassment from radical factions in society, the long-term 
need to include women in community policing was unintentionally ignored. The 
primacy of the ethnic-based approach to regulating police structures also affected 
negatively the public perception, trust, and attitude towards public safety and 
law enforcement agencies in the country.291 In addition, poor performance by 
IPTF police and ineffective management and oversight by UNMIBH led to the 
unintended consequence, when the IPTF police became involved in trafficking 
women for sexual exploitation in BiH, in close cooperation with local police forc-
es.292 These criminal acts alongside lacking accountability significantly down-
graded the image and credibility of the UN and other major international actors 
in BiH. 293 
 
The discussion of the key actions and decisions surrounding the first critical turn-
ing point in the reform of police structures in BiH reveals how well-intentioned 
decision to accommodate the positions of three different parties in conflict result-
ed in the formation of new police structures, which were decentralized, mono-
ethnic, and subject to political control from national factions. By agreeing to pre-
serve old policing structures, international peacebuilders unintentionally con-
tributed to practices such as: allowing political interference into law enforcement 
structures; informal policing and cooperation with criminal groups; protecting 
war criminals and obstructing transitional justice; and spreading human insecuri-
ty, human rights abuses, and discrimination against IDPs, minorities, and wom-
en. The linkage between the initial decisions on police reform and the conse-
quences briefly discussed above were traced by examining the practice of the 
IPTF, which failed to restructure and democratize police forces, and facilitated 
the exploitation of local police by nationalist factions, thereby obstructing the im-
plementation of DPA provisions. It was possible to identify these consequences 
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by examining the presence and absence of human and societal security, the extent 
to which the rule of law was enforced, and the way in which power was divided. 
The next round of analysis explores another critical turning point for police re-
form in BiH and traces the practices that led to unintended consequences to un-
derstand critically change and continuity in the practice of peacebuilding in rela-
tion to agency, intentionality, correction, reproduction, improvements on previ-
ous practices. 
 
Critical turning point II: Police restructuring under EUPM  
The second critical turning point regarding the attempt to reform police struc-
tures in BiH arose during 2004 and 2005 under the EU. At this stage, the unde-
clared intention was to correct previous international mistakes to depoliticize the 
police forces, making them more centralized, effective, accountable, and congru-
ent with European policing standards. Aware that police reform in BiH was far 
from complete when IPTF ended its operation in 2002, the European Union Po-
lice Mission (EUPM) was established in BiH on 1 January 2003, as a temporary 
mission with non-executive powers. The EUPM was the first EU mission aboard 
under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).294  
 
When IPTF completed its mission, it did not challenge the de-centralized, politi-
cized, and ethnically-organized multiple police forces in BiH. Consequently, the 
main challenge for EUPM was to restructure the police, while addressing the 
fragmented, overstaffed, financially unviable and inconsistent nature of BiH po-
lice forces.295 The EUPM also needed to deal with the legacies of IPTF‟s ineffec-
tiveness, implementing a non-executive mandate, and merging European police 
who serving within the IPTF. Accordingly, the EU used its foreign policy tools, 
development conditionality and enlargement leverage as 'carrots and sticks', by 
making police reform one of the main conditions for advancing Bosnia‟s Europe-
an integration process.296 The EUPM took on a major challenge to restructure and 
centralize police forces, but failed to anticipate the complexity, political re-
sistance, and longevity of the process. Before establishing the EUPM, an EU fact-
finding mission visited BiH in late 2001 and early 2002 to assess the feasibility 
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and requirements prior to establishing the first ESDP mission. However, the fact-
finding mission could not grasp the complex situation on the ground due to its 
short duration and limited scope to consult key local and international stake-
holders.297 Consequently, the proposal for the mandate, operational plan, and 
other technical and financial aspects allocated to EUPM were largely inadequate 
for the domestic conditions in BiH, as they were based on incomplete and inaccu-
rate observations.298  
 
To operationalize its mandate of reforming BiH's police forces for the second 
time, EUPM articulated its strategic planning by creating four areas to guide their 
activity. These strategic areas included: „police independence and accountability; 
organized crime and corruption; financial viability and sustainability; and insti-
tutional capacity-building at management level‟.299 While the main preoccupation 
of EUPM was police reform, their efforts to fight organized crime were limited to 
providing institutional support to Bosnian police authorities. Regarding orga-
nized crime and corruption, EUPM mainly engaged in assisting local police to 
develop technical capacities and supported local police forces during major crime 
investigations. The EUPM engaged in soft approaches by trying to coordinate all 
local and international actors, networking and exchanging information, and 
promoting partnership with civil society.  
 
However, multiple structural constraints effectively weakened the EUPM's abil-
ity to make a positive contribution. For example, a major task of EUPM was to 
operationalize State Border Services (SBS) and the State Investigation and Protec-
tion Agency (SIPA), building legislation for these two agencies and strengthening 
their role in relation to entity and canton level institutions, which resisted the 
centralization of police operation. The EUPM supported the Ministry of Security 
at the state level, which was established in December 2002, by helping to draft 
legislation and policies. Concerning the goal of police independence and ac-
countability, the EUPM was unable to reach this strategic priority due to struc-
tural factors and negative legacies of 15 police forces at the entity and cantonal 
level, which had their separate and complex sets of laws and practices that were 
deeply entrenched in politicized and mono-ethnic networks. As the appointment 
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of senior police officers continued to be based on political affiliation and support 
from political parties, the EUPM was unsuccessful in depoliticizing the police 
forces and such ongoing practices did little to improve the accountability of BiH 
police.  
 
Informing the four strategic priorities was the overall police restructuring process 
for which the mission was prolonged for several years. The rationale for police 
reform was to reduce complex political processes to technical issues, considering 
the decentralized, fragmented and politicized police structures as an impediment 
to BiH's EU and NATO integration, as well as an impediment to the implementa-
tion of the DPA.300 In December 2003, the PIC Steering Board welcomed the in-
tention of the High Representative (HR) „to focus on implementing the effective-
ness of the police in Bosnia, in close cooperation with EUPM‟.301 Accordingly, HR 
Lord Ashton took measures to establish an internationally-led commission to 
lead the policy discussion on sensitive aspects of police reform and devised a 
tangible and implementable proposal for reforming BiH's police structures. The 
Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) was established by a HR decision in July 
2004, and justified the necessity for such a reform process with reference to Bos-
nia‟s failure to join NATO's Partnership for Peace, Republika Srpska's failure to 
arrest war crime indictees, and the lack of inter-agency cooperation. It followed 
the logic of resolving issues through commission that was applied during earlier 
reforms of indirect tax administration, and defence and intelligence services.  
 
The PRC intention was to reach an agreement for „a single structure of policing in 
BiH under the overall political oversight of a ministry or ministries in the Council 
of Ministers‟.302 This aimed to resolve the failure of IPTF to build an effective po-
lice service in BiH, and to respond to the growing demands from PIC Steering 
Board to implement urgently systemic changes in security and law enforcement 
structures. The HR‟s decision gave the PRC six months to finalize a report that 
would suggest a single police structure that would be free from political interfer-
ence and organized into regions.303 So the desired goal of this police restructuring 
process was defined from the beginning, which effectively jeopardized later the 
                                                        
300
 European Union, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the preparedness of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilization and Association agreement with the European Union’. Brus-
sels: EU, 18 November 2003. 
301
 PIC, Communiqué by the PIC Steering Board, Brussels: PIC, 11 December 2003. 
302
 OHR, ‘Final Report on the Work of the Police Restructuring Commission of Bosnia and Herze-
govina’, Sarajevo: OHR, December 2004, p. 2. 
303
 OHR, Decision Establishing the Police Restructuring Commission, Sarajevo: OHR, 05 July 2004. 
 99 
dynamics of PRC and their final deliberation. Before the reform started the HR 
set out twelve principles, which were intended to address the deficiencies and 
challenges in the work of the local law enforcement agencies.304 
 
In the middle of the process, the EU emphasized that a successful police restruc-
turing in BiH should centralize the competence for police matters, including leg-
islation and budgeting, to the state level, while political oversight of police 
should be exercised by the Ministry of Security at state level, and finally the size 
and shape of local policing regions should be determined according to criteria 
that ensured effective policing rather than addressing political considerations.305 
To convince local actors that the EU was serious, the European Commissioner for 
External Relations, Christopher Patten, sent a letter to the Chair of the Council of 
Ministers on 16 November 2004, stating that the ineffective law enforcement in 
BiH posed threats to the EU‟s internal security, and the EU cannot consider as 
partners those police forces that do not operate and have broadly the same com-
petences as police elsewhere in Europe.306 Accordingly, the EU and the interna-
tional presence in BiH strongly intended to reduce the police reform to a tech-
nical process and remove the political struggle behind it, while considering the 
reform crucial for an effective rule of law in the country.307 A US report revealed 
that Bosnian interlocutors complained „that EU mixed messages on SAA condi-
tionality and shifting OHR approaches have hindered the conclusion of a police 
reform package, and have made it more difficult for us to follow a constantly 
changing EU lead‟.308 
 
However, reducing a highly sensitive political process to a technical process re-
sulted in a number of problems that undermined prospects for a solution on po-
lice restructuring. The working methodology adopted by PRC did not allow for 
voting on conclusions, but was designed to reach consensus. The PRC met on 
seven different occasions where the details of reform were discussed. The Chair 
of PRC presented the report to the Chair of the Council of Ministers and 
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HR/EUSR309 on January 2005. In line with the pre-determined criteria and prin-
ciples of police reform in the HR‟s decisions, the PRC's final report provided two 
broad recommendations: 1) vesting state level institutions with legislative and 
executive competences and giving the Minister of Security of BiH responsibility 
for overall political oversight of the single structure of policing in BiH; and 2) the 
territorial organization of police forces around three options regarding the geo-
graphical size, shape and location of local police areas.310 Due to disagreement on 
this matter the Chair of PRC left the HR to take a decision on the options. While 
for the single structure of police there was complete international consensus, for 
the number of local police areas there was considerable flexibility. However, the 
PRC did not manage to reach a full consensus as some of the RS representatives 
rejected most of the recommendations for creating a single state structure, as they 
would lose direct political control over police operations in RS. The Chair of PRC 
differentiated between professional consensus and political consensus to ease the 
allocation of responsibility to RS representatives for rejecting the police reform 
proposal.  
 
During 2005 several negotiations were held that concluded the „Vlasic Agree-
ment‟, which reflects three EU principles that: 1) all legislative and budgetary 
competences for police matters must be managed at the state level; 2) there 
should be no political intervention in operational police matters; and 3) police 
areas should be established according to professional technical criteria. However, 
this agreement was rejected by the RS national assembly (RSNA). While the 
EUPM strongly favoured the five-region model that was seen as technically the 
best option, the „nine plus one‟ option was also accepted an alternative for reach-
ing political agreement. On January 2005, HR/EUSR decided to adopt the nine 
plus one option. This represented the first setback and missed opportunity to 
build a unified police structure in BiH.311 
 
During this time, EUPM was promoting the message that the failure to reach an 
agreement on police reform in 2005 „will have severe effects not alone on policing 
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but also on the future of BiH in its aspirations to advance towards EU in the fu-
ture‟.312 However, the RS Prime Minister Dodik rejected the police reform pro-
posal in September 2005 and justified his rejection citing the lack of a mandate 
from the RSNA. From this point on, the EU strengthened its pressure by making 
the signing of an SSA conditional on accepting police reform. Consequently, one 
month later the RSNA accepted the agreement on restructuring of police struc-
tures and opened the path for transferring all the competences over police legisla-
tion and financial matters to the state level. The main institutional mechanism to 
deal with police reform was the newly-established Directorate for Police Recon-
structing Implementation (DPRI). This opened the path for the State and Federa-
tion parliaments to adopt the same agreement. 
 
The work of DPRI was short-lived as the implementation of police reform 
reached a new significant obstacle that came after Bonsia's October 2006 general 
elections. The new Prime Minister of RS, Milorad Dodik changed his policy alt-
hough he had signed the 2005 police reform agreement, and took a strong stance 
against the agreed single police structure. This was an unexpected drawback for 
the EUPM and international actors, as they had not expected that a change of 
government would also affect the police reform process. A compromise was 
reached that created seven new police coordination bodies, which did not affect 
entity competences over police. In other words, the centralization of police was 
postponed in favour of a more incremental approach.  
 
The new negotiation process lasted almost eight months until an agreement was 
reached on October 2007 with the so-called Mostar Declaration, whereby all par-
ties reaffirmed the commitment for police reform, guided by the EUPM. Howev-
er, the police reform legislation was not adopted until April 2008, marking the 
end of the longest and most difficult reform talks in the post-Dayton history of 
BiH, and the beginning of the complex implementation of police institutions and 
operational architecture.313 In June 2008, the EU signed a Stabilization and Asso-
ciation Agreement (SAA) with BiH, which marked the beginning of a new phase 
for the country. Dimitrij Rupel, Slovenian Foreign Minister who presided as EU 
Council President at that time, declared that „the adoption of laws on police re-
form is very satisfactory and an important step in enabling further progress in 
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the integration process. It paved the way for the signing of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement‟.314 The Head of EUPM, Brigadier General Vincenzo 
Coppola, declared that:   
 
The adoption of the police reform legislation is of major importance for 
BiH as it not only moves the country out of the police reform deadlock, 
which represented a major obstacle on BiH‟s path towards Europe, but al-
so represents a step forward towards the creation of a more efficient police 
structure.315 
 
Despite this deal, the laws adopted remained in line with the existing constitu-
tional arrangement in BiH and did not require greater centralization of police 
structures of law enforcement agencies. Autonomous cantonal police forces con-
tinue to be supervised by entity police structures, parallel to the existence of 
state-level police institutions.316 This arrangement ultimately went against the 
2006 EU principles on police reform, which questions the seriousness, consisten-
cy and the fluidity of EU conditionality. The former Head of European Commis-
sion Delegation in BiH openly admitted that the police reform was weakened 
and its implementation was uncertain.317 In a broader sense, this signifies that the 
police reform was held hostage to failed constitutional reform, and effective po-
lice reform in BiH is dependent on the modalities of constitutional changes that 
have not occurred for almost 20 years since the end of the Bosnian war. This 
marks a failed decade of police reform in Bosnia, which ultimately did not 
achieve the declared intentions, but rather triggered multiple unintended conse-
quences, some of which will be explored in the reminder of this chapter.  
 
During this second critical turning point, police reform in BiH experienced the 
transformation and complementarity of declared intentions - moving from EU 
integration and peacebuilding to statebuilding. The EU did not pursue a coherent 
approach towards the Bosnian authorities as part of the police reform process, 
the HR/EUSR decision also changed approach, as evident with the example of 
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top-down approach. Internationally-led attempts to make constitutional changes 
and impose police reform were ineffective and further encouraged local re-
sistance.318 The failure of police reform was an unintended consequence of the 
priority given to short-term and immediate goals and results.319 The HR and the 
international community failed to accept that police reform was a long-term pro-
cess. Most importantly, police reform failed as on the surface the declared inten-
tions were related to reforming the police structures that would improve the rule 
of law, free the police from political interference, and increase accountability, but 
in practice the entire police reform process tackled political issues, such as the 
constitutional rearrangement of entities, rather than dealing with technical as-
pects of policing.  
 
Spectrum of unintended consequences II 
The protracted decade of police reform resulted in fulfilling partially the declared 
intentions, while producing numerous unintended consequences. The linkage 
and complementary of intentions, processes, and policy mechanisms led to many 
unintended consequences. As the intentions informing police reform were pre-
sented as „expected outcomes‟, and the divided and inconsistent approach of the 
international community towards negotiations, alongside the entrenched political 
positions‟ within local Bosnian political factions, after 2003 police reform led to a 
number of consequences, some of which are examined here. The marathon police 
reform process officially ended in 2008, but the challenges and complexity re-
mained. The Head of EUPM General Vincenzo Coppola admitted that „in terms 
of police reform, it is not a secret that we did not reach our goals entirely‟320, 
blaming the top-down approach of the international community in BiH, which 
had its limitations, and admitting that bottom-up approaches would have been 
more beneficial. In general, the April 2008 package of laws approved, which sig-
nified the end of police reform, continues to be partially implemented and police 
agencies at the state level remain weak and ineffective.321 The outcome of the re-
form ran against the EU's three principles set in 2006, as there is no state level 
chain of command, nor state level police budget, and police operations are not 
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free from political interference. Regarding functionality, police forces continue to 
be bound to entity government control. Police structures do not cooperate effec-
tively with each other, which hinder the fight against organized crime at the lo-
cal, regional and international level. Therefore, the spectrum of consequences 
that have emerged from the protracted, complex, and partially successful police 
reform process include: 
 
1. Nurturing of inter- and within-entity political confrontation and exclu-
sionary politics; 
2. A fragile rule of law and widespread organized crime and corruption; and  
3. Loss of popular trust in local and international institutions.  
 
Each of these consequences is treated individually below. 
 
Nurturing of inter- and intra-entity political confrontation and exclusionary politics 
 
The police reform process kept political discourse and the political environment 
in BiH within a confrontational logic, which encouraged the preservation of eth-
nically-based political life, further securitizing and entrenching exclusionary and 
ethnic identity. When the first phase of negotiations concluded, the parties 
agreed to establish a Police Reform Directorate, which would address most of the 
reform aspects outlined in the PRC final report. However, an unintended and 
unanticipated problem occurred, when the newly-appointed Prime Minister of 
RS Milorad Dodik started questioning the decision-making capacity and compe-
tences of the Directorate. The parallel processes of police reform and constitu-
tional reform nurtured further political confrontation and disagreement. Follow-
ing the constitutional court decision on discriminatory provisions of Bosnian 
constitution, the Venice Commission critique, and increased pressure from the 
European institutions, in early 2005 a constitutional reform process was initiated 
in BiH.322  
 
The constitutional reform agenda aimed at finding alternative arrangements for 
the state and entity level institutions and to move BiH towards a more central-
ized, harmonized and efficient state administration. In particular, the constitu-
tional reform aimed at establishing a new format for electing the president, ex-
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panding the competences and powers to state level institutions, creating two new 
ministries, strengthening the powers of the Council of Ministers, and increasing 
the number of parliamentarians in both chambers.323 Dodik and other RS political 
structures rejected the constitutional reform by radicalizing further their political 
discourse and threatening to call a referendum on independence following the 
separation of Montenegro from Serbia in 2006. In this political stalemate, Dodik 
argued that he would choose preserving the RS Ministry of Interior ahead of Eu-
ropean integration.324 After 2006, the political confrontation between Bosniak and 
Serb leadership intensified, whereby Bosnians renewed the debate about the 
crimes committed by the Serbs, and the Serbs reaffirmed their resistance to abol-
ishing entities.  
 
Another unintended consequence of police reform in BiH was the radicalization 
of the political atmosphere, which discouraged cooperation and promoted ethnic 
exclusion. The most relevant example is the transformation of the Milorad Dodik 
and his party SNSD (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats) from cooperative 
politicians into radical nationalists who rejected and obstructed the police reform 
after 2005. The early involvement of RS President Dragan Cavic and the Prime 
Minister Terzic in police reform caused them and their party SDS (Serb Demo-
cratic Party) to be burned politically and excluded on the grounds of being trai-
tors and compromisers, who acted against the interests of Serbs in Bosnia.325 
Their political withdrawal occurred when the RSNA challenged the October 2005 
agreement, opening the path for Dodik to take power. This social and political 
dynamic enabled the previously moderate opposition to exploit the reform, 
change their political discourse, and gain political power by radicalizing and re-
jecting the police restructuring. While Cavic's intention behind changing the gov-
ernment in RS was to delay accepting the agreement and avoid political respon-
sibility, it damaged political pluralism, which was essential for the overall pro-
gress in BiH.  
 
The international community did not anticipate this dynamic and did not intend 
to arrive at such a situation, as they genuinely believed that Dodik would over-
come the institutional problems and stalemates caused by SDS.326 In this regard, 
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the international community strongly supported the change in government, hop-
ing to overcome the stalemate. However, they did not realise that Dodik would 
become a radical politician and preserve power for nearly ten years. The nature 
of police reform in BiH created a political dynamic whereby people supported 
politicians according to the extent of their non-cooperation with the international 
community and their ability to defend the interests of their entities. Such dynam-
ics overshadowed all other aspects of governance, political responsibility to serve 
the public good, and provide employment and social services. Moreover, local 
support from the electorate and RS politicians remained very low for Bosnia‟s EU 
integration, as it was seen as an acceptable condition for abolishing the entities. 
Hence, the protracted police reform process politically exhausted all the willing 
reformist politicians with the unintended consequence of boosting the legitimacy 
and popular support for antagonistic and nationalist politicians. 
 
While police reform had intended to reform the Dayton agreement, weaken na-
tionalist factions, and free the police from political interference, its failure pro-
duced the opposite effect. For the Serbs, the perception that the deal between HR 
Ashdown and EU Commissioner Patten made police reform a criterion for BiH's 
eventual entry to the EU, triggered negative reactions and empowered Serb fac-
tions to criticise the transformation of this deal into an official policy.327 Moreo-
ver, several EU ambassadors in BiH were discouraging Serb politicians to follow 
the police reform dynamics set by HR Ashdown. Former BiH Prime Minister 
Adnan Terzic testified that several ambassadors were against the EU principles, 
especially the Ambassadors of France, Spain and Luxembourg.328 Ultimately the 
failure of police reform strengthened Serb nationalist parties as it provided them 
with an opportunity to unify against international pressure, gain political and 
popular legitimacy and support for resisting the centralization of police struc-
tures. Police forces remained decentralized, politicized, and affected by corrup-
tion. Thus failed police reform delayed the political moderation of BiH. This was 
also confirmed by a EUPM official who argues that „The police reform lead to an 
enhancement and strengthening of the RS political establishment and resolve to 
maintain itself…‟329 
 
                                                        
327
 ‘Bosnian Police Reform: A Troubled Process Comes Down To The Wire, Agreement Not Likely 
Soon’, US Embassy in Sarajevo Cable, 27 November 2007. Available at: 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06SARAJEVO2999.html 
328
 Daniel Lindvall, ‘The Limits of the European Vision in Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Analysis of the 
Police Reform Investigations’, PhD Thesis, Stockholm University, 2009, p. 114. 
329
 Interview by author with a EUPM officer, Sarajevo, 24 May 2012. 
 107 
A fragile rule of law and widespread organized crime and corruption  
 
One of the unintended consequences of the prolonged and mismanaged police 
reform process has been a fragile rule of law and widespread organized crime, 
corruption and informal economic practices whereby police forces, in coopera-
tion with ethnic elites, have been involved in criminal activity. The attempt to es-
tablish the rule of law through police reform resulted in accommodating the rule 
of deals and reinforcing ethnic divisions. While nationalism remained an under-
lining issue in BiH, the problem of criminality, corruption and unemployment 
represented major security concerns in the country. Numerous examples point 
out the direct connection between failed police reform and organized crime. As 
the international agenda focused on terrorism after 2001, the international civil-
ian and military forces systematically ignored organized crime in Bosnia. A for-
mer EUPM officer admitted that there was a direct connection between traffick-
ers, local police and the judicial system.330 Similarly, reports from US Embassy in 
Sarajevo revealed that there was „overlap between the Serbian war criminal sup-
port network, nationalist Serbian politician, RS police, SDS party and Serbian or-
ganized crime‟.331 The politicization of police during the Bosnian war and their 
collusion with organized crime followed after the war. The IPTF screening and 
certification process was insufficient to reduce police involvement in hidden and 
complex networks of organized crime.332 The transformation of ex-combatants 
that had been excluded from the new police and defense structures were mobi-
lized by private security companies, which were used by undemocratic regimes 
and transformed into international organized crime groups. 333 
 
As early as 2000, various reports illustrated that „criminal leaders, many of whom 
are closely linked to ruling political parties, are ready to threaten judges, prosecu-
tors, police officers, lawyers, or witnesses with violence, even death, to act in a 
particular way. Such influence over the courts often prevents cases involving or-
ganized crime and corruption from being heard.‟334 In 2003, it was estimated that 
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almost 50% of the Bosnian economy was based on the black market.335 The deep-
ly fragmented, uncoordinated, and decentralized national police forces were di-
rectly involved in numerous criminal networks that smuggled narcotics, petrole-
um, and people. Weak institutional structures and a politicized judicial system 
left police forces vulnerable if they investigated the involvement of political elites 
in organized crime.336  The politicized police forces remained depended on ethnic 
elites who had not invested in the professional development of police, or in de-
veloping internal disciplinary mechanisms or effective investigative capacity. Ac-
cordingly, the police had no capacity to control the situation and tackle organized 
crime systematically. Police reform was not in the interest of key political parties, 
who were deeply connected with organized crime groups and the unreformed 
police force played an important role in maintaining these power structures. 
Consequently, the political dependency of police on the key nationalist leaders 
facilitated a flourishing of organized crime and illegal economic activity in BiH. 
 
The inability of IPTF and EUPM to create a single police force due to local politi-
cal resistance reduced the ability of the state security apparatus to exercise its 
constitutional and legal obligations of enforcing the law and justice in the coun-
try. The lack of institutional cooperation between security forces made the efforts 
for law enforcement weak and incapable of tackling the problem of organized 
crime. Delays in establishing joint border police left the territory of BiH vulnera-
ble to cross-border illegal activity. BiH is considered a major route for organized 
crime in the Balkans. There is evidence that many police in BiH accepted that „the 
current structure of policing agencies within BiH limits the capacity for close co-
operation‟.337 Lack of cooperation between police, judiciary and prosecutors 
played a role in this situation, which is directly linked to the failure of BiH's in-
ternational administrators to reform police structures.338 In 1997, Transparency 
International's National Integrity System for BiH reported that communication and 
cooperation between different police structures in the country has „inhibited sub-
stantial systemic reforms‟.339 This clearly suggests that inadequate police reform 
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and restructuring has resulted in an ineffective police system that protects crimi-
nals and undermines the rule of law. 
 
The failure to reform the police system meant that the harmonization of legisla-
tion and criminal codes was impossible and police cooperation remained unregu-
lated. This significantly reduced the ability of law enforcers to undertake appro-
priate measures to combat organized crime. Difficulties in fighting corruption 
also arose from „the collapse of anti- corruption laws, lack of final convictions for 
offenses of corruption and lack of implementation of strategic documents for the 
fight against corruption‟.340 For several years, EU reports on BiH revealed evi-
dence of weakness in the judicial system and the hampering of police in investi-
gating cases of organized crime. For example, the 2012 EU progress Report found 
that „Bosnia and Herzegovina is still at an early stage in the fight against corrup-
tion‟, and little progress was achieved in fighting organised crime.341 The report 
also highlighted that law enforcement agencies needed to improve systematic 
cooperation among themselves and with prosecutors and the wider judicial sys-
tem. The presence of organized crime directly affected societal security, foreign 
investments and economic development, as well as BiH's EU integration dynam-
ics. 
 
Failure to reform the police structures and make the police more accountable has 
unintentionally resulted in the police engaging in bribery and corruption. A re-
cent World Bank report showed that an overwhelming majority of Bosnians „be-
lieve that corruption is endangering the security of the BiH government, limiting 
foreign investment, causing rising inequality, and leading to increases in 
crime‟.342 Between 1998 and 2013 HR has taken around 200 decisions for remov-
ing and suspending from office governmental officials many of which were on 
grounds for corruption and bad governance. Although the international adminis-
trators have used corrupt practises as discursive justifications to delegitimize lo-
cal political factions and simultaneously legitimize its political interference, the 
discourse of anti-corruption and good governance have unintentionally strength-
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ened the popular support for nationalist factions.343 The inability to create depo-
liticized police structures unintentionally left room for entity governments to ap-
point loyalist persons from the ruling political parties to key policing positions.344 
Structural and legal impediments to tackling corruption and organized crimes 
are directly linked with the dysfunctional reform of police structures where the 
state level police have limited powers, there are multiple police agencies with no 
hierarchical subordination but only based on loose and ineffective coordination 
and information sharing.345 
 
Loss of popular trust in local and international institutions  
 
The prolonged and failed police reform process in BiH led to the unintended con-
sequences of losing popular trust in the local and international institutions pre-
sent in the country. A recent World Bank report on public trust in Bosnian insti-
tutions showed that a large number of people considered the „[p]olice service … 
as having low quality‟.346 In 2013 Transparency International showed that around 
30% of people have paid bribes to police for their services.347 The same report 
shows that public confidence in police and other public institutions has fallen, 
considering political and public authorities incapable and ineffective in combat-
ing corruption.348 The HR and the wider international community also lost trust 
in local politicians due to protracted political infighting since the war ended. The 
international community used various measures to discourage the political agen-
cy of the entrenched political elites by undertaking media campaigns, encourag-
ing the electorate to vote against them, using the HR's executive powers, as well 
as EU enlargement and developmental conditionality. On the occasion of the re-
moval of Croat member of Bosnian Presidency by HR Ashdown in 2005, he stat-
ed that: „… BiH‟s institutions still have to win the trust of their citizens. And one 
of the reasons for that distrust, as every citizen knows, is the dangerously close 
connection between criminality and politics, as well as the high levels of corrup-
tion in BiH‟s political structures and governmental institutions.‟349  
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Although the HR removed many senior politicians on the grounds that they were 
obstructing the implementation of peace arrangements, an unintended  conse-
quence of this interventionist policy was that nationalist representatives in the 
legislative body continued the practice of blocking legislation, delaying reforms 
knowing that the HR's executive powers would implement the laws anyway.350 
These fragments of international interference affected negatively the dynamics of 
legislating, electing representatives, and building trust between state and society. 
The failure of international and local actors involved in the police reform process 
to consult the citizens of BiH directly affected public support for political struc-
tures in the country, as well as their participation in elections and other public 
deliberations.351  
 
The spectrum of consequences traced by looking critically at multiple practices 
represents the most pressing issues facing BiH for the last decade. The mistakes 
made by the international administrators during the two critical turning points 
have haunted Bosnian society for many years. The makers of stability became the 
unmakers of sustainable peace. In the second round of police reform, the de-
clared intentions were not realised, and a whole new process emerged with polit-
ical confrontation between nationalist parties, dysfunctional law enforcement 
agencies, increased organized crime and corruption, and a loss of public trust. 
Seen from an outsider's perspective, police reform also failed due to the deviant 
behaviour of nationalist factions. However, from an insider's perspective the lo-
cal institutional agency could be portrayed as prevailing over international con-
ditionality and interference. Despite these incompatible intentions, the unintend-
ed consequences that have emerged from decisions and actions during both criti-
cal turning points show that citizens of BiH are the main victims, as they were 
subjugated to a power struggle between insider and outsider agents. As the years 
pass, the political exploitation of the police force are less pronounced, they con-
tinue playing a role within criminal networks, protecting war criminals, obstruct-
ing inter-ethnic reconciliation, and nurturing ethnic insecurity – thereby repro-
ducing subversive violence. In particular, non-dominant minorities, displaced 
persons, and women have been the main victims of this social and political ine-
quality. 
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Responsibility for unintended consequences  
The declared intentions of international peacebuilders in BiH has been the refor-
mation and restructuring of police forces that would enforce the law impartially, 
be independent from political interference, and operate effectively and accounta-
bly in service of citizens, peace, and democracy in the country. The discussion of 
two critical turning points reveals that these declared intentions were not accom-
plished to any significant degree. Hence, the two stages of attempts to reform po-
lice structures in BiH resulted in a number of unintended consequences, which 
were discussed earlier in this chapter. Therefore, congruent with the conceptual 
framework introduced in the previous chapter, the question of responsibility for 
unintended consequences needs to be examined.  
 
At the outset, it is important to highlight that the international presence in BiH 
was one of the most extreme examples of post-conflict international governance, 
which had an executive mandate without appropriate responsibility mecha-
nisms.352 Despite its supreme and executive authority, the international commu-
nity in BiH has not developed any political or legal mechanism for allocating re-
sponsibility for the outcomes and consequences of their decisions and actions. 
The OHR continues to be the leading entity that was established to implement 
the civilian aspects of the DPA. The OHR is headed by the High Representative 
(HR), who bears the main responsibility for interpreting the DPA on the civilian 
implementation of the peace settlement. As the scope of civilian aspects of the 
DPA are extensive and complex, so are the authorities designated to HR. In terms 
of responsibility, OHR is directly accountable and answerable to the Peace Im-
plementation Council (PIC), which consists of 55 countries and agencies that 
support the peace process. The OHR is not held responsible to any of the Bosnian 
institutions, including the Constitutional Court. Concerning the HR's power, the 
Constitutional Court of BiH rejected all appellations that were brought to the 
Court to reconsider the decisions taken by the High Representative related to re-
moving people from office and prohibiting them from performing public func-
tions. In such cases, the Constitutional Court has no appellate jurisdiction in rela-
tion to the HR‟s decisions.353 On several occasions, the democratically elected 
representatives in BiH boycotted the institutions in response to actions and deci-
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sions imposed by the HR. Several European institutions have raised concerns 
about the lack of international accountability in Bosnia.354 
 
In the case of UNMIBH and IPTF there was no independent and credible respon-
sibility mechanism in place. The EUPM also lacked such a mechanism. The only 
system of responsibility was internal answerability mechanisms with rules and 
regulations varying between organizations, with different degrees of effective-
ness and efficiency. During the police reform process, local counterparts had no 
appeals mechanism to scrutinize the decisions and actions of IPTF, apart from 
making a personal appeal to the IPTF Commission or other senior international 
officials. Cases when international police used excessive force, resulting in death, 
injury or human rights abuses were not investigated properly due to the lack of 
independent accountability mechanisms.355 The EUPM only operated with inter-
nal accountability mechanisms. The EUPM Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) 
regulated the accountability of line managers on the basis of command responsi-
bility, which meant that „in order to ensure that all line managers fulfil their role 
and responsibilities as supervisors and managers, it is necessary for them to be 
responsible and accountable for the actions of EUPM staff members under their 
command‟.356 At a senior level, the Head of Mission who also acted as Police 
Commissioner reported to the Secretary General/High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (SG/HR) through the European Union 
Special Representative (EUSR) in BiH. Notwithstanding this, the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) between the EU and Bosnian authorities reveals that the 
EUPM performed an element of answerability to the Bosnian institutions by in-
forming them about the activities and actions undertaken by the EUPM. 357 
 
Accordingly, there is a strong case to assign particular types of responsibility to 
particular agents for particular consequences. The first unintended consequence 
of police reform under UN and IPTF was the entrenchment of a decentralized, 
ineffective, and politicized police structure. Although the architects of Dayton 
intentionally agreed to leave the police competences to entity governments, they 
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did not intend to entrench an ineffective and politicized policing system. Accord-
ingly, the key American and European partners who took the decision on polic-
ing structures in post-war Bosnia can be blamed for this negative consequence. 
This leading international group of states failed to provide IPTF with the neces-
sary authority and explicit mandate to reform the police. The IPTF was not allo-
cated sufficient resources, and explicit provisions for cooperation with interna-
tional military forces. While international stakeholders indirectly admitted guilt, 
the responsibility for negative consequences was never properly addressed or 
imputed. Hence, there is a case for the international community, in particular 
those actors responsible for the harmful effects of their actions, to apologise to the 
Bosnian people, and provide sufficient answers regarding the reasoning behind 
such choices. Nevertheless, the primary responsibility for this unintended conse-
quence lies with three nationalist parties in each of the entities who intentionally 
exploited the police to advance their political and nationalist agendas. The police 
officers that engaged in violence and crime need to be blamed and made ac-
countable for their wrongdoings. The decision of the HR to avail of the Bonn 
powers to fire senior politicians can be considered as a measure of accountability 
for the obstructionist practices of nationalist leaders. But there was no accounta-
bility mechanism to hold the guardians of accountability responsible for their ex-
ecutive powers. 
 
The IPTF, IFOR/SFOR (NATO) and the peacebuilding organizations in BiH that 
had executive mandates need to take responsibility for failing to prevent and 
avoid the emergence of informal policing practices and collusion with criminal 
gangs. The IPTF should be held answerable for their flawed screening and certifi-
cation process, which allowed many police officers with criminal records to join 
the new police structures, which indirectly led to criminalising the police service. 
Avoiding international responsibility to enforce the law and maintain overall se-
curity also contributed to this unintended consequence. The involvement of IPTF 
police in human trafficking also needs to be addressed through attributive and 
answerability mechanisms. Last but not least, the primary responsibility for this 
consequence lies with Bosnian political structures that controlled local police and 
cooperated with criminal networks, as well with individual police officers for 
their wrongdoings. Although time has elapsed since these wrongdoings, attrib-
uting blame and failure to both local and international actors facilitates the allo-
cation of responsibility. In an ideal scenario, an answerability mechanism would 
be the most suitable way to shed light on the many aspects discussed here. 
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The second unintended consequence discussed in this chapter was the exploita-
tion of police forces to protect war criminals, obstruct inter-ethnic reconciliation, 
and delay transitional justice. While the primarily responsibility for this unin-
tended consequence lies with nationalist leaders and senior police commanders, 
IPTF and OHR bear a degree of responsibility-as-attribution for certifying police 
officers who were involved in war crimes and protected fugitives after the war, 
as well as to IFOR for unwilling to provide security during the hunt for war crim-
inals. Most importantly, one of the main reasons why the police served war crim-
inals was that institutional arrangements were conductive to such practices. Nev-
ertheless, there are clear examples of the HR enforcing accountability in several 
cases where senior ministers and police officers were removed from their post for 
not cooperating in prosecuting war criminals. An answerability inquiry would be 
desirable to shed light on the responsibilities and failures of the international 
community related to transitional justice and war crimes.  
 
The third unintended consequence was the failure to provide sufficient human 
security to the population, especially to minorities, vulnerable and displaced per-
sons and women. The primary responsibility for this rests with RS political struc-
tures that intentionally obstructed the return of displaced persons, free move-
ment of people and eventual reconciliation, due to the primary goal of enforcing 
their policy of ethnic separation. The IPTF and UN should be blamed for allow-
ing the formation of mono-ethnic police forces, which were the main threat to 
post-war human security. For several years, the IPTF and local police failed to 
deal with crimes against minority returns. The IPTF and IFOR also bear respon-
sibility and should be blamed for unintentionally exacerbating ethnic segregation 
and division in BiH through their failure to support the return of refugees. 
UNHCR also bears a portion of blame for failing to deal properly with refugee 
returns.  
 
Following the partially successful reform of police structures under the IPTF, af-
ter 2003 the primarily responsibility for police reform was passed to the EUPM, 
under the political guidance of the OHR. As elaborated earlier in this chapter, the 
prolonged process of police restructuring in BiH, which ended in 2008 triggered a 
number of unintended consequences. As with the consequences of previous criti-
cal turning point, there is a strong case to assign responsibility to the relevant ac-
tors for particular actions and consequences. The first unintended consequence 
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that derived from this round was nurturing intra- and inter-entity confrontation. 
In relation to this and the overall failure of the police restructuring process, there 
is a strong case for holding the HR answerable for his intrusive policy regarding 
the nature, mandate, and process of police restructuring, which failed to have the 
intended effect. Although there are many examples of the HR justifying his deci-
sions through public statements, there has not been any appropriate answerabil-
ity process on this matter. The EU's shifting conditionality is also responsible for 
the failure of several rounds of police restructuring negotiations. Regarding local 
actors, Serb nationalist leaders bear responsibility for entrenching an ineffective 
and fragile police system. The destructive behaviour of entity parliaments also 
needs to be attributed as a strong trigger of obstructionist practices that delayed 
police restructuring.  
 
After 2003, the overarching unintended consequence was the failure to establish 
the rule of law and the associated flourishing of organized crime and corruption. 
While primary responsibility lies with law-enforcing agencies who failed to up-
hold the rule of law, the protracted police restructuring process can be attributed 
to the EUPM and other international actors who failed to strengthen the capacity 
of police forces to fight corruption and organized crimes, failed to make the po-
lice structures more efficient, accountable, and transparent, and above all failed 
to develop appropriate institutional mechanisms to reduce the effects of orga-
nized crime and corruption in the country. So far there has been no appropriate 
attribution of the responsibility to the EU for these consequences, nor any ade-
quate external answerability mechanisms. Local media, civil society groups, and 
other social groups have raised the attributability of responsibility for unintend-
ed consequences of police reform in Bosnia.358 However, the disparate nature of 
consequences and their dislocation in space and time complicated the appropri-
ate attribution of responsibility. 
 
So what can be concluded from this discussion? So far the responsibility for these 
consequences has been loosely addressed, mainly by disparate actors, such as 
critical civil society and excluded social groups. The responsible agents (collec-
tive and individual) are not held responsible for the unintentional consequences 
of their intentional actions. Imputing responsibility is almost impossible in this 
complex web of multiple actors, dislocated decision-making, organizations with 
high personnel turnovers, and the passage of time. However, it is necessary to 
                                                        
358
 See for example: Sheelagh Brady, Organized Crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 117 
assign responsibility in the form of attributability and answerability for unin-
tended consequences and this could potentially still be possible. The multi-
directional dimension of actions, events, and consequences complicates the as-
signment of specific responsibilities to appropriate agents. It would be possible to 
attribute collective responsibility to particular organizations and agents. Mecha-
nisms of answerability would also be desirable to bring clarity and transparency 
to past actions and non-actions, which produced unintended consequences so 
that important lessons are drawn, and corrective measures are taken for future 
similar encounters. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the unintended consequences of police reform in BiH. 
Due to the complex context of the conflict in BiH, the bloody conflict was ended 
with a complex peace settlement. While the Dayton Peace Accords were designed 
as a deal to end the war, they had the unintended consequence of becoming the 
structural obstacle to rebuilding a functional state and a stable peace. Although 
the declared intentions for police reform have changed slightly over the course of 
events, in general the international community has intended to reform the police 
forces in the direction of democratic policing and compatibility with international 
policing standards where police are depoliticized, publically accountable, and 
enforce the rule of law. To enact these declared intentions, it was necessary to re-
form and restrict the existing police forces.  
 
This chapter has examined two critical turning points relevant to the police re-
form process in BiH. During the first phase and as dictated by the DPA, the UN 
and IPTF left the police structures under the control of multiple interior minis-
tries at the entity and cantonal level, with weak state-level cooperation and coor-
dination. The resulting police forces were fragmented, overstaffed, and subject to 
structural political interference and control. The rushed process for certifying po-
lice officers failed to exclude police officers with criminal records and illegal ac-
tivities. Instances where the HR removed local police from their positions led to 
the unintended consequence of breeding informal policing at the local level, 
whereby dismissed officers continued their extensive influence from the side-
lines, and threatened the successor police, blurring and overlapping the lines of 
command and authority. Regarding war crimes, police structures in Republika 
Srpska and the Federation followed political orders to protect and hide war in-
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dictees. A major shortcoming of the IPTF was their failure to provide communi-
ty-level order and security. This consequently led to chronic local insecurity, an 
unsatisfactory election process, inter-ethnic fear and provocation, delayed minor-
ity return, and the failure to protect human rights. Providing policing services 
based on ethnic affiliation resulted in multiple cases where local police implicitly 
tolerated harassment, intimidation, and violence and the failure to prosecute the 
post-war crimes against minorities. 
 
When the IPTF ended its mission in 2002, it was the largest UN police mission in 
a post-conflict society and was deemed a success. However, the anomalies of 
UN-led police reform became the main obstacles for EU-led police reform, which 
marked the second critical turning point. Since the EUPM inherited many prob-
lems from the IPTF, this haunted the EU‟s first crisis management mission 
abroad. With its non-executive mandate, the EUPM was unable to make the po-
lice more accountable, better structured, and compliant with European policing 
practices. Consequently, the main challenge for EUPM and OHR was the attempt 
to make multiple police forces more centralized and unified under state-level in-
stitutions, and less dependent on nationalist leaders and ethnic political factions. 
It took nearly four years of constant negotiations to finally reach a partially solu-
tion for police reform. In this context, the merging of police reform with Bosnia‟s 
European integration process might have been effective in the short run, but in 
the end it did not reach the intended goals. The lack of a single EU interlocutor 
complicated the police reform negotiations as different sources sent mismatching 
messages. Consequently, this prolonged process led to the unintended conse-
quence of strengthening destructive and nationalist discourses within the enti-
ties, delaying constitutional reform, stalling the European integration of Bosnia, 
and finally enabling the entrenchment of organized crime and corruption in the 
country.  
 
The responsibility for these consequences spreads across international and local 
actors and it can be assigned only in the form of attribution for failures and 
anomalies, as well as in the form of answerability to clarify why certain decisions 
and actions were taken by particular actor in particular time. The case of BiH il-
lustrates the emergence of unintended consequences as a result of incompatibility 
of intentions among the interacting actors and the limits of shifting declared in-
tentions over time. This deviation of intentionality alongside with the conflicting 
agenda of local actors resulted in weakening the bargaining power and credibil-
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ity of the international community in Bosnia. The spectrum of consequences that 
emerged in BiH has not only undermined the declared intentions, but it has pro-
longed, complicated, and delayed the consolidation of peace. 
 120 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Unprevented Consequences of Peacebuilding 
in Kosovo 
 
 
 
“When it starts in the beginning in the wrong 
way it is very difficult afterwards. So, the longer the 
situation was not changing, the more difficult it be-
came to change the situation. What was possible in 
1999 was not possible in 2002, what was possible in 
2002 was not possible in 2004, and so on.” 
 
                         (Yves de Kermabon, Former Commander of NATO/KFOR, 2013)359 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Following the break-up of Yugoslavia, the conflict in Kosovo intensified after the 
peace was brokered in Dayton in 1995. After nearly two years of intensive con-
flict in Kosovo and the failure of peace talks in Ramboulliet, NATO's humanitari-
an intervention opened the path for a fragile peace to be built in Kosovo.360 In de-
fiance of the international intervention and post-conflict governance of Kosovo, 
Serb community gradually organized a structured resistance against the peace-
building and statebuilding project in Kosovo. These structures consisted of a 
chain of entities within sectors such as security, education, health and public ser-
vices that were maintained and controlled politically and financially by the Ser-
bian Government. These structures were created initially to boycott UNMIK, 
their main function became to resist the UN-created, Albanian-led self-governing 
local institutions. They were motivated by the 1990s Kosovo Albanian institu-
tional parallelism in defiance of Milosevic regime and abolishment of autono-
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my.361 The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO's 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) did not acknowledge explicitly and openly the activity of 
Serb parallel structures until October 2001, two and a half years after their de-
ployment in Kosovo.362 However, they are considered illegal entities by UNMIK 
and KFOR as they operated outside the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 
(1999). In terms of timespan, these structures emerged gradually, but by 2001 
their influence and network expanded though the Serb-inhabited enclaves in Ko-
sovo. As of 2014, these Serb parallel structures are gradually being dismantled as 
part of the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Prishtina Dialogue on the normalization of 
inter-state relations.363   
 
While international and local actors in Kosovo have articulated multiple declared 
intentions, this chapter explores how the declared intentions of establishing a 
stable peace and the rule of law has been compromised in Kosovo, by examining 
how Serb parallel structures have shaped peace in Kosovo. Most significantly, the 
chapter illustrates how the emergence and development of Serb parallel struc-
tures in the north of Kosovo is a significant case of the occurrence of an unpre-
vented consequence arising from international peacebuilding in Kosovo. The 
chapter argues that the main consequence of ineffective security provision by 
KFOR and UNMIK was the failure to extend security and the rule of law to the 
north of Kosovo. Despite their self-established legitimate concerns, the emer-
gence and development of Serb parallel structures to control these parts of Koso-
vo with the support of the Serbian government, challenged international authori-
ty, constrained Kosovo institutions and sovereignty, prevented the integration of 
the Serb community within Kosovo's society, nurtured organized crime and in-
formality, and challenged the overall peace and stability in the country. By mak-
ing this argument, the analysis in this chapter do not seek to portray in general 
Serb community as being negative and destructive and romanticize the Albanian 
community as constructive and peaceful. Rather, congruent with the typological 
framework, it seeks to take a critical stance and examine how international and 
local political processes shaped and impeded peacebuilding in Kosovo and illus-
trate empirically a case of unprevented consequences of peacebuilding.  
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The chapter focuses the analysis in two critical turning points that shaped peace-
building in Kosovo and looks at the particular unprevented consequences that 
have emerged thereafter. The first critical turning point in the formation and de-
velopment of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo was the period between June 
1999, when NATO and UNMIK deployed their military and civilian presence in 
Kosovo and 2001 when the emergency phase ended and the capacity and institu-
tion building started. This chapter argues that incompatibility of intentions, 
agenda, and actions among the international and local actors facilitated the 
emergence of Serb parallel structures and their spill-over effects by increasing 
insecurity, hindering ethnic reconciliation, obstructing institutional development, 
and delaying social peace in Kosovo. The second critical turning point for dis-
mantling Serb parallel structures in Kosovo and preventing the spectrum of con-
sequences that this institutional parallelism was creating in Kosovo arose during 
the process of negotiating Kosovo's final status and the subsequent implementa-
tion of the Ahtisaari proposal, which occurred between 2006 and 2008. Although 
the north was implicitly part of the final status negotiations, Serb parallel struc-
tures were not explicitly discussed during this process, which later proved to be a 
mistake with multiple consequences. It was hoped that these parallel structures 
would be dismantled as part of a decentralization process and upon reaching 
agreement with Serbia during the status negotiations. However, no such agree-
ment was reached during the status talks and Kosovo declared its independence 
on 17 February 2008, in coordination with its Western allies. Thereafter, the Serb 
parallel structures institutionalized their activity, proactively obstructed the im-
plementation of the Ahtisaari proposal, challenged Kosovo‟s empirical sovereign-
ty, and constrained Serb participation in Kosovo, and promoted informality, 
criminality, and economic damage for Kosovo.  
 
The impact of the failure of the international community and Kosovo authorities 
to handle Serb resistance in Kosovo has been significant, opening space for the 
creation of a frozen conflict in the north, and regionalizing the conflict to the 
neighbouring states. In 2004, the situation in the north provoked a violent reac-
tion from Kosovo-Albanians, who were increasingly losing patience with the de-
layed status negotiations and inability of the international and local authorities to 
assert control over the whole territory of Kosovo.364 Although preventative 
measures and actions are at the heart of UN diplomacy and responses to con-
flicts, in the case of Kosovo we can see the presence of intermeshed factors, struc-
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tures, actors, and events that have led to unprevented consequences, namely the 
emergence and development of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo. The evidence 
suggests that both NATO and UNMIK were well aware of the potential emer-
gence and eventual development and operation of these parallel structures, as 
well as the challenges they would pose to building sustainable peace. However, 
no adequate and decisive measures were taken to dismantle these structures 
when the opportunity arose at different stages after 1999.  
 
Declared intentions, rule of law and peacebuilding in Kosovo 
The declared intentions of international peacebuilding organizations in Kosovo 
after the 1999 conflict are widely influenced by the contextual circumstances 
combined with the broader conceptual and prescriptive framework of post-
conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction.365 The basis of the declared intentions 
in Kosovo is UN Security Resolution 1244 (1999), which served as a legal justifica-
tion for UN involvement and outlined a detailed peacebuilding agenda. The core 
declared intentions of international peacebuilding in Kosovo are: restoring public 
security, establishing the rule of law, and demilitarizing armed forces; organizing 
and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and 
autonomous self-government pending a political settlement; facilitating a politi-
cal process designed to determine Kosovo‟s future status; supporting economic 
reconstruction; and promoting and protecting human rights, and facilitating the 
return of refugees and IDPs.366 When formulating these intentions, local actors 
were not consulted. The content of the peacebuilding mandate in Kosovo was 
negotiated in a short period of time towards the end of the NATO military cam-
paign against Serbia in spring 1999. So, at the outset, the Serb community and 
they leadership did not welcome these intentions as they were affiliated with the 
NATO‟s intervention and removal of Serbia‟s sovereignty over Kosovo.367 
 
One of the main declared intentions of the international presence in Kosovo was 
the restoration of public security, security sector reform, and the development of 
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functional democratic institutions and an effective rule of law system.368 In 
providing public security, KFOR (NATO) established a military presence in Ko-
sovo, a UN civilian police contingent was deployed, alongside a local police force 
that was established afterwards. Security sector reform entailed the demilitariza-
tion of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) forces and the formation of civilian pro-
tection corps, called the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Other measures in-
volved the removal of Serb military and police forces from Kosovo as agreed in 
the Kumanovo Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and Serbia.369 Re-
garding institution building, UNMIK organized elections, created new political 
institutions, and developed basic legislation in Kosovo. It is widely assessed that 
the engagement of NATO and UNMIK in Kosovo produced peace and stability, 
which is measured against the absence of relative ethnic confrontation, and over-
all institutional stability. Similarly, the institution-building component of 
UNMIK in Kosovo is praised for its overall success in establishing functional in-
stitutions in the executive, legislative and judiciary sectors.370 However, most no-
tably and undoubtedly the main consequence of security provision by KFOR and 
UNMIK was the failure to extend security and the rule of law to the north of Ko-
sovo, and the emergence and development of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo. 
 
There is evidence that these declared intentions had been formulated during a 
political-military planning process between the UN and NATO during spring 
1999, several months before deployment. At the heart of this process was the 
identification and definition of intentions (expressed in the form of objectives, 
tasks, areas, and desired ends), clarification and forecast of issues that would 
emerge during the process. This process also included an outline of broad strate-
gies and viable options for taking action, including preventive measures, the 
harmonization of inter-agency tasks, and mobilizing international support for the 
desired action.371 Although this advanced policy planning might tackle the prob-
lem of unintended consequences as an anticipatory exercise, they were not ex-
plicitly mentioned or incorporated in the planning process. In this regard, there 
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was no plan on how to deal with the north of Kosovo in case Serb forces would 
concentrate there, due to its geographical and demographical closeness to Serbia.  
 
Although it is difficult to retrace the actual internal decision-making process 
within UNMIK, several testimonies from UNMIK senior political officials indi-
cate that UNMIK operated in a complex environment wherein the necessary 
space for defining intentions, analysing key actions, and anticipating and pre-
venting the potential consequences of actions was almost non-existent. In his 
memoirs on Kosovo, the first deputy SRSG of UNMIK Jock Covey, reveals that 
UNMIK had to adjust to a „little country‟ policy, as they had to build and manage 
relationships with major international organizations involved in Kosovo, power-
ful states at the UN Security Council, and States that seconded most of the 
UNMIK senior personnel.372 Covey also reveals that each State and organization 
involved in Kosovo tried to advance their national interests either through fund-
ing conditionality, or indirectly through their people that were part of UNMIK 
structures. Covey reveals an interesting practice that emerged in UNMIK, which 
could be formulated as „actions precede intentions‟. He confessed that:  
 
We would shape actions based on our instincts of where the peace process 
ought to be headed rather than determine the policy up front. In some in-
stances, we may have had only an inchoate sense of what the guiding pol-
icy should be… We began to articulate a policy that described the actions 
we had already taken, distilling the policy after the fact. This was una-
voidable in the UN system because seeking the policy at the outset would 
have created paralyzing opposition before we could even get started.373 
 
This is an indication of complex, multiple, and often conflicting intentions, as 
well as self-interested motives behind the actions of UNMIK in Kosovo. In this 
lacunae of complexity, local needs and perspective have largely been ignored, 
especially those among Serb community who have been perceived as supporters 
of the previous regime.   
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Critical turning point I: The deployment of NATO and UNMIK in Kosovo 
The first critical turning point in the formation and development of Serb parallel 
structures in Kosovo was the period between June 1999, when NATO and 
UNMIK deployed their military and civilian presence in Kosovo, and 2001 when 
the emergency phase was over and the capacity and institution-building phase 
started. Immediately after the war, ethnic violence erupted in the northern region 
of Mitrovica and the policy of international military and civilian presence was to 
keep both groups apart, and contain the situation by physically dividing Mitrovi-
ca, with the River Iber/Ibar marking the border between the northern and south-
ern sides of the city.374 Acts of ethnic violence occurred throughout Kosovo dur-
ing these early days after the war.375 During February 2000 there were a number 
of demonstrations and confrontations between Albanians and Serbs in Mitrovica, 
which resulted in eight deaths and over thirty people were seriously injured. 
These riots were triggered by an attack against a humanitarian shuttle bus carry-
ing 49 Kosovo-Serbs, resulting in the death of two persons and the injury of three 
others.376 These events triggered the expulsion of 1,650 Kosovo-Albanians from 
northern Mitrovica, the isolation of Serbs into enclaves, and attacks against KFOR 
soldiers and UNMIK police.377 The extremist violence nurtured on both sides 
triggered the de facto partition of Mitrovica. In light of these events, the Serb par-
allel security structures started to emerge, such as Bridge Watchers, and Serb se-
cret police forces. The division was driven by a small group of nationalists who 
pressured Albanians to leave the north and threatened the local Serb population 
not to cooperate with Albanians.378 Later, they expanded their activity to the 
fields of justice, education, healthcare, welfare, and public services. These struc-
tures operated under the stewardship of the Coordination Centre for Kosovo and 
Metohija (CCK) as part of the Government of Serbia.  
 
The parallel security structures in the north of Kosovo consisted of an informal 
structure called „Bridge Watchers‟, and the Serbian Ministry of Interior Affairs 
(MUP), who are considered the main enforcers of decisions and policies of paral-
lel structures in Kosovo. The role of bridge watchers was to prevent Kosovo-
                                                        
374
 Ray Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. 
375
 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. 
376
 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’, 
UN Doc. S/2000/177, 03 March 2000, p. 5-6. 
377
 NATO, Statement by the Secretary General, Press Release, PR/CP(2001)021, 16 February 2001. 
Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-021e.htm 
378
 Interview by author with a former Commander of KFOR in Kosovo, Brussels, 15 October 2013. 
 127 
Albanians from entering the north of Kosovo, gather information on KFOR and 
to gather information on Kosovo-Albanian living in the north.379 They also en-
gaged in criminal activities, organized crime, smuggling, trafficking of people 
and goods.380 The Serb police has engaged mainly in secret intelligence activity, 
and issued Serb passports and identity documents. They also organized protests 
against Kosovo-Albanians and international troops, but could maintain order 
whenever it suited their interests.381 The inclusion of former MUP officers into 
Kosovo's police service provided opportunities and risks for transforming securi-
ty structures in the north. Serb police officials kept a low profile, and some of 
them have included in the Kosovo police service. Some measures were taken to 
include members of bridge-watchers in the Kosovo police service; however, due 
to vetting and recruitment criteria many of them eventually did not join the po-
lice force.382  
 
Seen from a critical and pluralist point of view, the emergence of Serb parallel 
structures in Kosovo came as a result of a number of inter-related and interde-
pendent factors. First of all, the imposed nature of UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1244 (1999) and the NATO intervention in Kosovo resulted in hidden and 
open resistance by Serb population in Kosovo. As Serb military and police forces 
were obliged to leave Kosovo, local Serb population went from being a powerful, 
victorious community to humiliated and excluded minority in Kosovo. For Serbs 
the appearance of their parallel structures signified the continuation of pre-war 
state structures in Kosovo, disregarding thus new political reality after the 
placement of Kosovo under UN governance. This served as a structural precursor 
for the local Serbs to resist UN and NATO peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo. In 
addition, Milosevic regime that existed until late 2000 fuelled destructive and de-
viant factions and structures within Kosovo to hinder the success of NATO and 
UN in Kosovo. Moreover, the power-shift in Kosovo gave Kosovo-Serb power-
holders the inconvenience of needing to integrate into Kosovo‟s new institutions.  
 
However, the leveraging aspects of Serbs' pre-war power and on-going criminal 
and informal networks sustained the efforts of the Kosovo-Serb leadership to re-
sist the international peacebuilding agenda in Kosovo. Through these structures, 
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the Kosovo-Serb community envisaged a temporary peace and the gradual re-
turn of their influence in Kosovo through return of refugees and the eventual re-
incorporation of Kosovo within Serbia.383 This frustrated the Kosovo-Albanians 
who emerged from a conflict as victims demanding independence, who conse-
quently undertook violent acts against minorities in revenge for their losses and 
suffering during the conflict. In between these two polarized agendas, UNMIK 
and KFOR pursued a policy of containment through fragile stability, prioritizing 
immediate and short-sighted developments and ignoring the underlining struc-
tural processes that were undermining their efforts to establish the rule of law 
and democratic authority in Kosovo.  
 
While incompatible intentionality provides a strong explanation for non-action, 
there were also strategic and operational weaknesses that impeded UNMIK and 
KFOR from responding effectively to the emergence of Serb parallel structures in 
the north of Kosovo. The early strategy invoked by UNMIK to tackle ethnic vio-
lence in the north and the non-cooperation of Serb parallel structures was a com-
bination of confidence-building measures: providing justice through internation-
al police, prosecutors, and judges to fill the vacuum of distrust between Albani-
ans and Serbs in the justice system; and the creation of local and national institu-
tions to resolve the political conflict among local factions.384 During its first two 
years, UNMIK had insufficient police, judges, and prosecutors to establish the 
rule of law across the whole territory of Kosovo. This was delayed by the slow 
recruitment of police, the reluctance of troop-sending states, bureaucratic proce-
dures, and donors' slow financial support.385 UNMIK was not operating at full 
capacity until 2002 and could not handle effectively the continuing unrest in Ko-
sovo and the threat posed to the peace process by extremist groups.386  
 
UNMIK police and KFOR had no contingency plan on how to respond to wide-
spread civil disorder and interethnic violence.387 At the political level, UNMIK 
was faced with incompatible priorities: maintaining peace and stability, and es-
tablishing justice and the rule of law. They did not anticipate the emergence of 
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Serb parallel structures, and for the sake of neutrality and stability UNMIK toler-
ated their operation. Moreover, UNMIK tolerated Serb parallel structures due to 
sporadic ethnic violence committed by Kosovo-Albanians, the hesitancy of the 
Kosovo-Albanian leadership to integrate Serbs before resolving Kosovo's final 
status Kosovo-Albanian, and the lack of security and space for joint co-existence 
and integration.388 
 
Immediately after the deployment of its troops in Kosovo, NATO declared that it 
was committed to providing human security in Kosovo, to protect the rule of 
law, and to support the international civilian presence in fulfilling its mandate.389 
In addition, NATO expected that all Serb military and police forces would with-
draw from Kosovo, and that the KLA would demilitarize and restrain from vio-
lent acts of revenge against Serb populations. KFOR had the primary responsibil-
ity to provide security and maintain the rule of law in Mitrovica region in the ear-
ly days after its deployment in Kosovo. Even after September 2000, KFOR con-
tinued to retain the primary responsibility for civilian protection and ensuring 
security in Mitrovica, showing the inability of UNMIK to take on responsibilities 
for criminal investigations and law enforcement throughout Kosovo. KFOR had 
around 57,000 troops in Kosovo in September 1999 and by 2005 they reduced to 
16,600.390 For example, the total cost of operating KFOR in 2003, was around $22 
billion, which represented over 80 percent of all international and domestic pub-
lic spending in Kosovo during that period.391 NATO Secretary-General rushed to 
pronounce KFOR's mission a success despite sporadic ethnic violence and the 
emergence of Serb parallel structures in early 2000.392 This is important because 
even if UNMIK lacked resources to control the north of Kosovo in terms of police 
and civil administration, KFOR did not lack resources but it lacked political will 
to act. In many instances, KFOR supported the political goals of UNMIK, but it 
also obstructed them, especially with its strategy of non-action in Mitrovica, 
which tolerated the emergence and development of illegal and violent Serb par-
amilitary factions in the north of Kosovo. 
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UNMIK and KFOR had a vague strategic vision of how to handle the situation in 
the north of Kosovo, particularly in Mitrovica. This is evident in the periodic re-
port of UN Secretary-General of September 2000, which highlights the need for 
UNMIK and KFOR to develop a comprehensive strategy to reinforce the influ-
ence of the international community in this part of Kosovo.393 Three months later, 
UNMIK reported that it had progressed in its strategy for confidence-building in 
the north of Kosovo through its security activities and efforts to build public ad-
ministration and services in Mitrovica.394 This strategy was not particularly effec-
tive, despite the good intentions of UNMIK to restore the rule of law and lay the 
foundations for democratic governance and the normalization of ethnic relations 
in the north of Kosovo.  
 
Beyond this, UNMIK attempted to address the issue of political conflict and eth-
nic division after the conflict by establishing local and national consultative insti-
tutions and by incorporating local ownership and participation in the UNMIK 
decision-making processes.395 As part of joint administrative structures, UNMIK 
managed to bring Kosovo-Albanian and Serb leaders together in a transitional 
council. However, the hostile ethnic relations within Kosovo obstructed the oper-
ation of joint schools, hospitals, and public services. The formation of Interim 
Administrative Council and the Joint Interim Administrative Structures divided 
the Serb leadership in Kosovo, whereby some groups joined these structures, 
others initiated the creation of parallel structures.396 Following the 28 October 
2000 municipal elections, UNMIK failed to establish local government in the 
north of Kosovo due to negligible voter turnout and widespread boycotts by Serb 
political structures there.397 One of the challenges faced by UNMIK was the crea-
tion of municipal structures in Mitrovica. Kosovo-Serbs refused to serve along-
side Albanian members who constitute the overall majority in the town. 398   
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After 2001, the attempts of UNMIK and KFOR to deal with Serb parallel struc-
tures consisted of insufficient measures and attention focused on efforts to con-
solidate the Kosovo's state institutions and the pressure to open negotiations for 
resolving Kosovo‟s future status. Initial conditions dictated subsequent develop-
ments. However, an opportunity to dismantle and integrate Serb parallel struc-
tures in Kosovo arose in November 2001 when UNMIK and Serb authorities 
signed a common document, which highlighted that the implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) required: joint coordination between Ko-
sovo and Serbia; reaffirmed the supremacy of UNMIK authority in Kosovo; em-
phasized the need for human rights protection; and specified UNMIK‟s responsi-
bility and role in protecting property rights, facilitating the return of refugees and 
IDP‟s, and resolving the fate of missing persons.399 However, dismantling Serb 
parallel structures was not explicitly discussed in this common document. De-
spite this, the follow-up efforts of UNMIK were inadequate and insufficient to 
address the issue. Belgrade withdrew its cooperation with UNMIK on the 
grounds that the latter had not made sufficient progress on Serb returnees and on 
ensuring security for Serb minorities in Kosovo.400 Meanwhile, UNMIK was 
overwhelmed with multiple processes of institution-building and transferring 
local ownership to Kosovo institutions, while trying to facilitate the needs and 
interests of Serb communities in constrained conditions, where Serb parallel 
structures obstructed these processes.  
 
Later on, several windows of opportunity arose to address the problem of Serb 
parallel structures in Kosovo, but they were unsuccessful and conditioned by the 
initial conditions of UN and NATO failure to prevent their emergence and for-
mation in the first place.401 First, the arrest of Serb President Slobodan Milosevic 
and the democratic transition in Serbia under Vojislav Kostunica brought hopes 
and fears to ethnic relations in Kosovo. In 2000, Kosovo's former President Ibra-
him Rugova rejected a call from Serbian President Vojislav Kostunica to discuss 
Kosovo's political status. Rugova demanded to have negotiations with Serbia on-
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ly as two independent states.402 President Rugova further emphasized that en-
claves were the best solution for Kosovo-Serb minorities, as the conditions for 
multi-ethnicity and reconciliation were not yet present only three years after the 
war.403 A less attractive opportunity to dismantle Serb parallel structures arose as 
part of UNMIK‟s attempt to transfer governance authority to Kosovo's institu-
tions through the benchmarks known as „Standards for Kosovo‟ and later „Stand-
ard before Status‟. These benchmarks clearly stated that, as part of establishing 
functioning democratic institutions in Kosovo, UNMIK and the Provisional Insti-
tutions for Self Governance (PISG) should „develop a strategy to reduce demand 
for and dismantle parallel structures and integrate them into PISG structures; to 
start implementation of a strategy and negotiate with Belgrade on technical is-
sues‟404  
 
However, the overwhelming and ambitious agenda of Standards for Kosovo and 
later Standards before Status overshadowed the success of activities undertaken 
by UNMIK and Kosovo's government in integrating Serb parallel structures. Be-
tween 2004 and 2006, UNMIK and Kosovo's authorities focused their efforts on 
trying to address Serb parallel structures through the decentralization of power 
to local authorities, which aimed in return to integrate Serb communities within 
Kosovo's institutional system.405 However, no explicit goal or plan to deal with 
Serb structures in the north of Kosovo was evident during this period. After 2006, 
UNMIK started to include reports about the obstructionist activity of Serb paral-
lel structures in Kosovo, while not being able to undertake any effective measure 
to integrate them, as Serbia and its international allies saw this as an intrusive 
way of suppressing Kosovo Serbs.  
 
Accordingly, the failure to prevent the emergence and development of Serb par-
allel structures signifies the international acceptance of these structures, despite 
the fact that activities of these Serb parallel structures undermined the authority 
of the UN and NATO in Kosovo. Driven by a 'conflict reduction and stability' 
paradigm, UNMIK tolerated the operation of these illegal structures in breach of 
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UNSC Resolution 1244 and the Technical Agreement between NATO and Serbia, 
which called for the immediate withdrawal of all Serb police, military and para-
military forces from Kosovo. There is no doubt that UNMIK and KFOR were 
aware of the existence and activities of Serb parallel structures. However, the 
concerns with immediate stability and also multiple constraints within domestic 
and international spheres pushed UNMIK and KFOR to pursue a policy of non-
confrontation and incremental attempts to deal with these parallel structures. 
 
Spectrum of unprevented consequences I 
So far, it has been established that the emergence of parallel structures in Kosovo 
originate in Serb resistance against NATO and UN governance of Kosovo, which 
intended to undermine prospects for statebuilding in Kosovo in a hope to pre-
serve Kosovo within Serbia and avoid popular claims for independence. In this 
regard, the UN and NATO were unwilling, incapable, and incoherent in provid-
ing security to Serb community and prevent the de facto partition of the north of 
Kosovo. Finally the Kosovo-Albanian leadership, driven by the desire to gain 
power and build an independent state of Kosovo ignored, underestimated, and 
neglected the emergence of these structures, while implicitly contributed to their 
emergence through negative examples of ethnic violence after the conflict. Be-
yond revealing the factors that enabled the emergence of Serb parallel structures, 
it is crucial to explore the spectrum of consequences that occurred subsequently. 
Related to this, there are at least three unprevented consequences, which were 
neither intended, nor anticipated or prevented by the international community in 
Kosovo. These include: 
 
1. Creation of a frozen conflict in the north of Kosovo; 
2. Obstruction of Serb integration in Kosovo institutions and society 
3. Creation of a malfunctioning legal and administrative environment, per-
sistence of informality and organized crime. 
 
Each of these consequences is treated individually below. 
 
Creation of frozen conflict in the north of Kosovo 
 
The formation of Serb parallel structures consequently created the conditions for 
a frozen conflict in Kosovo, with the desire to obtain a certain form of partition 
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from Kosovo, or to gain special political status.406 Beyond providing basic assis-
tance, the political aim of these structures was to distance Kosovo-Serbs from Ko-
sovo's institutions and to serve Belgrade's goal of obstructing Kosovo's path to-
wards independent statehood.407 During the early post-war years, UNMIK and 
local police were disturbed by Serb parallel structures when enforcing the rule of 
law and pursuing criminals in the north of Kosovo. For example, as a result of the 
re-emergence of violence and physical threats against international police, in June 
2001 the UNMIK police temporarily stopped patrolling in north of Mitrovica.408 
KFOR had to take on police tasks, in spite of fact that it was not equipped or pre-
pared to perform such a role. The slow deployment of international police, judges 
and prosecutors hindered significantly the security situation in the north and 
provided a lawlessness environment that facilitated the emergence of Serb paral-
lel structures. Parallel security structures effectively replaced the ineffective and 
irregular presence of UNMIK police in that part of Kosovo between 1999 and 
2001.409 They created an embryonic microstate within what was to become the 
independent state of Kosovo. These structures exploited the occurrence of spo-
radic violence, which was branded as ethnically-motivated and deeply en-
trenched the conviction of Serbs regarding the necessity to be protected by these 
parallel security forces as opposed to KFOR, UNMIK police, or Kosovo's police. 
410  
 
A confidential UNMIK report sent to the UN Assistant Secretary for Peacekeep-
ing Operations in October 2007 admits that „the spread of parallel structures con-
travenes UNMIK‟s authority to implement its mandate, thereby violating SCR 
1244 and establishing preconditions for a de facto partition of Kosovo‟.411 The con-
fidential report further states that „[a]ccelerating partition prejudices on-going 
political developments by creating a fait accompli where the K-Serbian-inhabited 
areas of Kosovo are both separate from the rest of Kosovo and made increasingly 
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reliant on Belgrade‟.412 The same report confesses that Serb parallel structures are 
undermining the rule of law in Kosovo, but „UNMIK‟s ability to respond to this 
situation is limited due in large part to our reliance on the willingness of KFOR 
participating states to utilize force to achieve objectives beyond providing a safe 
and secure environment‟.413 Most importantly, the report states that „[t]o prevent 
further deterioration of both the factual and the political situation on the ground, 
as well as to avoid prejudicing political developments in the status process, 
UNMIK believes that effective action should be taken against the offending com-
panies‟.414 Although this refers to the desire to undertake preventive measures, 
no concrete action, plan or strategy was taken afterwards to prevent the further 
worsening of the situation regarding Serb parallel structures in Kosovo.  
 
Conflicting narratives by key international, Albanian and Serb actors in Kosovo 
provide multiple perspectives on the reasoning behind the creation of a de facto 
frozen conflict in the north of Kosovo by Serb parallel structures. At the internal 
level, the first deputy SRSG Jock Covey blames policy disagreement within 
UNMIK, which could not tackle the issue due to the involvement of numerous 
agencies (EU, OSCE, UN civilians, UNHCR, and KFOR) with diverse and multi-
ple intentions and goals, who would argue endlessly about the options regarding 
the north of Kosovo.415 In his memoirs on Kosovo, the first SRSG of UNMIK Ber-
nard Kouchner, blames the KFOR troops for not assisting and securing UNMIK 
deployment in the north of Kosovo. Kouchner acknowledges that such a political 
mistake has led to the division of Kosovo, triggered reciprocal population dis-
placement, and provided Serbs with an unexpected territory of their own on the 
border with Serbia, which was still ruled by Milosevic.416 A former Regional Ad-
ministrator of UNMIK in Mitrovica reflected that the reason why the French in-
sisted on setting a de facto boundary in Mitrovica was to prevent the further ex-
pulsion of Kosovo-Serbs and create a situation of reverse ethnic cleansing, which 
would defeat the whole purpose of NATO‟s humanitarian intervention earlier 
that year.417 He considers that the French approach was correct strategically but 
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tactically it contravened the entire purpose of UNMIK to establish the rule of law, 
security and justice throughout Kosovo.418  
 
In early 2013, a former KFOR Commander who served during 1999 and 2000, 
General Klaus Reinhardt, revealed for Kosovo media that „the partition of Mi-
trovica came as a consequence of international politics‟419 while stating that he - a 
military officer - was powerless to prevent it. General Reinhardt admitted that 
the north was intentionally divided, leaving the puzzle unsolved when he stated 
that „unfortunately it was a state that obstructed the greater presence in the north 
of Kosovo, and for this reason we have missed the opportunity to improve the 
situation there, and I think it won‟t be resolved for a long period of time nei-
ther‟.420 In the same vein, Wesley Clark, a former US Army General, attributed 
this failure to political problems and disagreements within NATO and the EU on 
how to approach parallel structures in Kosovo.421 The former head of KFOR and 
later of EULEX in Kosovo, French Army General Yves de Kermabon admits that 
„[t]he KFOR, UN and the entire community was aware of the illegal and criminal 
activity of Serb parallel structures in the north of Kosovo, and the usage of local 
population as a hostage‟.422 He confessed that Belgrade was supporting the paral-
lel structures, so this made it difficult to deal with them, with multiple police, 
where parallel to the UN and local police, there were also Serb police forces.423 
However, de Kermabon considers the persistence of these structures for over 13 
years because „the international community was not sufficiently strong to say 
that we will never accept the partition of Kosovo‟.424 He accepts that „from very 
beginning there was some ambiguity to this. Serbs always were thinking about 
partition and it was always on the table. So this created the illusive intention, for 
which they fought all these years‟.425 What these credible sources reveal is the 
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unwillingness of the international community to deal with the north of Koso-
vo.426  
 
Albanian political leaders suspect that the international community intentionally 
divided the north of Kosovo and subsequently tolerated the operation of Serb 
parallel structures there as a control mechanism against possible local resistance 
and also as an act to rebalance Serbia‟s lost sovereignty over Kosovo. The Speaker 
of Kosovo's Parliament, Jakup Krasniqi blamed the international community for 
lacking the commitment to integrate this part of Kosovo initially within the insti-
tutions ran by UNMIK and later by Kosovo institutions.427 Deputy Prime Minis-
ter of Kosovo, Hajredin Kuçi blamed the international community's strategy to 
portray the problem of the north as a political problem, to delay political solu-
tions and satisfy Serbia‟s desire for status quo, and not see the problem in the 
north as a technical problem related to the absence of the rule of law and jus-
tice.428 A former senior Kosovo government official thinks that one of the reasons 
why UNMIK and KFOR tolerated the emergence and operation of Serb parallel 
structures in Kosovo immediately after the conflict was the fear that dismantling 
these illegal structures would be perceived as an attempt to strengthen the cause 
of Kosovo-Albanians for independence and their dominance of political life in 
Kosovo.429 Consequently, in an attempt to maintain political neutrality, UNMIK 
and KFOR tolerated Serb parallel structures on the grounds that they were seen 
as local organizations, which emerged as a response to ethnic violence orches-
trated by Kosovo-Albanians. 
 
Seen from a Serb perspective, the emergence and development of Serb institu-
tions structures came as a response of NATO‟s and UNMIK‟s inability to provide 
human, political, economic, and social security to Serb population in Kosovo, 
which was exposed to ethnic revenge and social isolation in the post-war Koso-
vo.430 Justifying reference is provided to the displacement of Serbs from Kosovo 
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and their organization in mono-ethnic enclaves, which required self-regulatory 
system of governance, much similar as the Albanian civil resistance during 1990s 
in Kosovo. Another justification for the emergence of Serb parallel structures had 
to do with the return to politics in Kosovo of the former KLA political and mili-
tary leaders, which were not seen by Serbs as suitable for building a multi-ethnic 
and tolerant Kosovo.431 Thus, from Serbian perspective, their parallel institutions 
in Kosovo primarily served to protect the national existence of Serb people in 
post-conflict Kosovo. In this regard, extensive criticism was directed by Serb 
leadership against NATO and UNMIK for failing to protect Serbs and for work-
ing in the interest of Kosovo Albanians.432 Nevertheless, beyond these justifica-
tions, preserving Serb parallel structures in Kosovo was part of a political project 
in Serbia which was revealed by former prime minister Vojislav Kostunica in 
2004, who explicitly proposed to use Serb institutions in Kosovo for creating an 
„autonomy-within-autonomy‟, which would provide Serbs with substantial au-
tonomy within Kosovo, while granting Kosovo as a whole a territorial autonomy 
within Serbia. 433 This plan aimed at dividing Kosovo into regional cantons with 
extensive political, economic, and cultural autonomy for Serbs within and out-
side these regions.434  
 
Thus far, the discussion indicates that this unprevented consequence was inten-
tionally not prevented, despite the availability of knowledge and awareness that 
the de-facto division of the north of Kosovo ran contradicted the international 
community's declared intentions. This also brings into question whether declared 
intentions are the guiding principles for peacebuilding actions, the relevance of 
the availability of knowledge for preventive action, and the revelation that pre-
ventive potential is not guided by precautionary principles and the pre-emption 
of harmful consequences. Even though the international peacebuilding organiza-
tions did not intend the de facto division of Kosovo, through their non-preventive-
action they contributed to this unprevented consequence. This also brings into 
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question the consistency of intentionality, as well as the trustworthiness of inten-
tionality as a basis for measuring the actions and consequences.  
 
Obstruction of Serb integration in Kosovo's institutions and society  
 
While Serb parallel structures were created as a response to the lack of Serb early 
benefiting from post-conflict peacebuilding and institutional-building in Kosovo, 
by default their existence undermined international efforts to build inclusive po-
litical institutions, to enable minority integration, and eventually to achieve eth-
nic reconciliation in Kosovo. Throughout the years, the Serb parallel structures 
have kept local Serb population hostage to their political agenda, thereby creating 
extensive dissatisfaction with local public and social services.435 The presence of 
UNMIK administration alongside Serb structures created confusion among the 
local population regarding the responsible authority for running local affairs. 
Most importantly, political agency of Serb population in Kosovo was centralized 
and controlled by Serbia‟s government, which intentionally prevented the activi-
ty of more moderate political factions within Serb communities, and obstructed 
their activity within the newly-established institutions that resulted from a new 
constitutional framework and subsequent democratic elections, which provided 
power-sharing and reserved privileges for minorities. For instance, the northern 
factions of the Serb National Council (SNC) have constantly challenged the work 
of Serb groups in Gracanica and other Serb areas within Kosovo. The formation 
of Interim Administrative Council and the Joint Interim Administrative Struc-
tures, divided the Serb leadership in Kosovo, with some groups joining these 
structures and others initiated the creation of parallel structures.436  
 
Beyond Belgrade‟s interference, sporadic and (un)orchestrated acts of violence on 
the ground against Serbs have contributed to this consequence. For example, the 
recurrence of ethnic violence in Mitrovica in early 2000 discouraged Serb partici-
pation in UNMIK‟s joint administrative structures. In June 2000, UNMIK signed 
an agreement with SNC, which conditioned Serb participation as observers in 
joint structures on KFOR and UNMIK police protecting Serb populated areas of 
Kosovo, including Serb judges in district and local courts, assisting the return of 
Serb refugees, resolving the fate of missing persons, and providing public ser-
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vices for the Serb population in Kosovo.437 In response, Serb authorities in Bel-
grade have also openly criticized SNC agreement to cooperate with UNMIK.438 
On the other hand, Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the main party that 
emerged from KLA's transformation also boycotted temporarily UNMIK's joint 
structures with local representatives on the grounds that the provision of munic-
ipal self-government for Serbs was an attempt to divide Kosovo on an ethnic ba-
sis.439 
 
Following the first post-conflict local elections, which were held on 28 October 
2000, UNMIK failed to establish local government in the north of Kosovo due to 
negligible voter turnout and widespread boycotts by Serb political structures 
there.440 While UNMIK created favourable power-sharing and representative 
space for Serb minorities throughout Kosovo's municipal structures, such institu-
tional opportunities were increasingly boycotted by Serb local leadership, who 
illegally created parallel municipal structures, thereby challenging UNMIK's at-
tempts to build institutions in Kosovo. In 2001, Kosovo-Albanians living in Mi-
trovica region committed to peace and security, but the Serb community in north 
Mitrovica rejected this and issued a statement of non-compliance with UNMIK‟s 
call for respecting its authority, ensuring the freedom of movement, returning 
displaced people, and establishing functioning political structures.441 One of the 
challenges faced by UNMIK was the creation of municipal structures in Mitrovi-
ca. Kosovo-Serbs refused to serve alongside Albanian members who constitute 
the overall majority in the town. They invoked ethnic violence as a pretext for 
such reluctance to engage in inter-ethnic cooperation.  
 
However, there are reports that such resistance arose from the fear that cooperat-
ing with UNMIK and Kosovo-Albanians could affect their social benefits provid-
ed by Serb government, and also from threats received by Serb hardliners, who 
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participated in the emerging parallel structures.442 Later on, when the new local 
authorities administered by UNMIK were established in the north, Serb struc-
tures were effectively incorporated into these new structures, but continued to 
use Serbian law as the basis for their administrative activity.443 UNMIK was 
aware of this and subsequently did nothing to prevent this practice at a prevent-
able stage. As these examples illustrate, the cost of unprevented consequences 
was gradually becoming greater, starting to undermine the entire international 
peacebuilding effort in Kosovo. Although with the previous unprevented conse-
quence, the intentionality of international community was rightly questioned, in 
this consequence there is no doubt that international community did not antici-
pate or intended to encounter such resistance and obstruction in fulfilling their 
declared intentions, which were constantly undermined intentionally and unin-
tentionally.   
 
Creation of a malfunctioning legal and administrative environment, persistence of infor-
mality and organized crime 
 
The Serb parallel structures undermined the functionality and integrity of inter-
national and local institutions in Kosovo, which fragmented the exercise of au-
thority for over a decade, and facilitated the persistence of informality and orga-
nized crime. By default, Serbia‟s support for its institutions in Kosovo under-
mined the capacity of UN and Kosovar authorities to build local stable institu-
tions. The institutional parallelism in the field of public administration, judiciary, 
education and healthcare further nurtured social divisions, undermining any 
chance for conflict transformation and societal healing. However, Serb govern-
ment justified this support to Serbs in Kosovo with the failure of UN and Kosovo 
authorities to provide the socio-economic conditions, freedom of movement, and 
political space for Serbs to exercise their rights in Kosovo.444  
 
The Serb government nurtured the activities of the Serb parallel structures by 
providing salaries and benefits to the Serb civil servants in the north, which were 
highly attractive and convenient, when compared to the lower salaries provided 
                                                        
442
 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’, 
UN Doc. S/2000/538, 06 June 2000, p. 3. 
443
 OSCE, Serb Parallel Structures in Kosovo, p. 25. 
444 
See: Statement by Dr Nebojsa Covic at the session of the National Assembly of the Republic of Ser-
bia Belgrade, 27 August 2003. http://www.arhiva.serbia.gov.rs/news/2003-08/28/330616.html  
 142 
by the UNMIK and Kosovo institutions.445 This incentivizing mechanism proved 
to be effective for many years, but undermined prospects for peace and stability 
in Kosovo. With approximately €200 million spent annually by the Government 
of Serbia to maintain its parallel structures in the north of Kosovo, supplemen-
tary and alternative offers provided by the Kosovo Government to Serbs in the 
north remained poor and unattractive.446 Serbia‟s funding of parallel structures 
served three purposes: „to encourage them to remain in Kosovo; to provide visi-
ble evidence of the Serbian state‟s continued presence; and for politicians to 
maintain control through patronage networks‟.447 There was no transparency re-
garding how such aid sent from Serbia to Kosovo was spent, and whom the ben-
eficiaries were. Indeed, the funds given by the governments in Prishtina and Bel-
grade empowered a group of Serb leaders who were controlled entirely neither 
by Serbia nor Kosovo.  
 
Gradually, Serb factions in Kosovo consolidated their parallel justice system, us-
ing the Serbian legal framework and receiving administrative and financial sup-
port from them.448 Due to UNMIK's delay in establishing local courts in the north, 
the local population was forced to use Serb parallel courts.449 Consequently, the 
operation of multiple courts in Kosovo led to confusion, whereby the same crim-
inal and civil cases were prosecuted and dealt with by Serb parallel courts and 
UNMIK courts at different times.450 The multiple courts caused confusion and 
effectively regenerated interpersonal disputes due to ineffective resolutions by 
incompatible and mutually unrecognizable court decisions. UNMIK‟s legitimacy 
and popular support was further damaged by such irresponsible inactions to 
prevent the judicial complexity in Kosovo. Other overlapping administrative ac-
tivities raised problems regarding the legal validity of their decisions and the 
way in which they undermined the efforts of the international community to 
build legitimate and legal administrative structures. For example, the cadastral 
activity of parallel structures also had a negative impact and property disputes 
                                                        
445
 European Stability Initiative, ‘Post-Industrial Future? Economy and Society in Mitrovica and 
Zvecan’, Berlin/Prishtina: ESI, January 2004. 
446
 Crisis Group, ‘Serb Integration in Kosovo: Taking the Plunge’, Europe Report No.200, Brussels: ICG, 
12 May 2009, p. 15. 
447
 Ibid. p. 15. 
448
 See for example the presence of Serb District Court in Mitrovica which appears even nowadays as 
part of Serb court system: http://www.portal.sud.rs/code/navigate.aspx?Id=815 
449
 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Forth Annual Report (2003-2004), Prishtina: OIK, 12 July 
2004, p. 12. 
450
 OSCE, Parallel Structures in Kosovo, 2003. 
 143 
arose when two conflicting decisions were issued by Serb parallel structure and 
those issued by UNMIK and Kosovo authorities.451  
 
The Serb parallel schooling system operated separately from the internationally-
supported and Kosovo-run education system.452 The Serb parallel education sys-
tem used Serbian textbooks and began issuing diplomas. They were formed as a 
response to the immediate insecurity prevalent in Kosovo and the lack of toler-
ance for arranging mixed or joint education systems.453 The lack of protection for 
minority communities and inadequate social conditions for teaching minority 
languages and distinct cultural aspects were also invoked as legitimate reasons 
for forming an alternative education system among the Serb population.454 An-
other reason for parallel education was the higher financial incentives offered by 
Serb government, with Serb teachers earning double the salary offered by the Ko-
sovo system. A segregated education system with unrecognized diplomas cer-
tainly affected negatively the process of learning each other‟s languages, and se-
verely affected cross-community communication and employment. Similarly, in 
the healthcare sector, Serb parallel structures operated in Serb-populated regions 
of Kosovo, mainly in the north, and relied on medical supplies and financial sup-
port from the Serb authorities in Belgrade.455 Medical staff receives double sala-
ries and often have little confidence in Kosovo's health system. UNMIK and Ko-
sovo authorities have not shown any attempt to integrate Serb medical staff into 
facilities administered by the Kosovo government. While in relation to the Koso-
vo political system these structures represented institutional parallelism, from 
Belgrade's perspective these institutions were part of Serbia‟s legal and adminis-
trative system, operated based on the principles of legality, accountability, and 
legitimacy.456  
 
Nevertheless, the northern side of Mitrovica was characterized by lawlessness 
during the post-war decade. With a backlog of between 100,000 and 140,000 cas-
es, the court system in north has not been responsive to bring justice to the de-
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fendants.457 Reconciliation of inter-ethnic organized crime groups was facilitated 
by ethnic division among Albanians and Serbs. A former head of KFOR in Koso-
vo admitted, „behind [Serb] nationalists, was a network of organized crime, 
which cooperated also with the Albanians in the south of Kosovo‟.458 A large per-
cent of Serb citizens living in the north of Kosovo considered that organized 
crime networks were in charge of running local affairs.459 
 
The Serb parallel structures also exercised control over non-dominant minorities 
in the north of Kosovo, such as Roma, who were forcefully stationed in IDP 
camps in a region with high levels of pollution, inhumane living conditions, and 
constant insecurity. The level of lead found in the IDP camps in the north of Ko-
sovo was several times higher than acceptable levels of exposure, raising serious 
risks for a potential health catastrophe in an UN-administered refugee camp.460 
While criticising UNMIK for failing to provide basic conditions for the return of 
IDPs to their new accommodation, the Serb parallel structures threatened camp 
leaders to force them to reject the international proposal for a better location.461 
The Serb parallel structures feared that such resettlement would provide the op-
portunity for UNMIK and Kosovo institutions to extend their authority in the 
north and take hold of strategic locations around the divided zones of the city of 
Mitrovica. In addition, resolving the issue of minorities within minorities would 
complete international standards before determining Kosovo‟s final status. A 
source indicated that UNMIK did not understand what was going on. In reality, 
Serbian pressure could prevent Roma communities from moving. Serbian pres-
sure was based on viewing these IDP camps as a former army base, which would 
have geographically represented a salient into their territory if held by Kosovo 
institutions (or vice versa).462 
 
The inability of the international community to effectively create conditions to 
integrate Serb communities in Kosovo, alongside the unwillingness of the Koso-
vo-Albanian political leadership to accept a multi-ethnic Kosovo prior to inde-
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pendence, provided the Serb parallel structures with a convenient window of 
opportunity to extend their institutional parallelism and hinder new institutions 
in Kosovo. The early inaction of UNMIK in Kosovo later became the main barrier 
to international statebuilding in Kosovo. The persistence of these structures led to 
the naturalization, co-existence and normalization of institutional parallelism. 
The transformative nature of international intentionality moved towards accept-
ing these structures and seeing them as community partners in minority popula-
tion areas. While such compromises bought a fragile peace in Kosovo, they ran 
against the basic purpose of international community engagement, and the na-
ture of consequences expanded to deviate from the peacebuilding agenda, pro-
long the international presence and redefine the limits of post-conflict peace-
building. Beyond this, the unprevented consequences show that the presence of 
authority, clear intentions, and knowledge without political will and strong over-
sight and accountability for peacebuilding missions tend to deviate, lose control, 
remain in permanent state of transformation, lose direction, fail to achieve their 
goals and above all cause bad consequences.  
 
Critical turning point II: Final status negotiations and the implemen-
tation of the Ahtisaari proposal  
Thus far, the analysis has illustrated how the declared intentions to establish the 
rule of law, order, and functional institutions throughout Kosovo have been hin-
dered by the Serb parallel structures, which provide an example of unprevented 
consequences of international peacebuilding in Kosovo. However, as time passed 
these structures began undermining international agendas in Kosovo and 
brought peacebuilding to an impasse as no consensus was reached on Kosovo's 
status, with the parallel structures posing a threat to basic security. Accordingly, 
it is important to explore other opportunities for dealing with these structures in 
order to understand better the presence and absence of international commitment 
to achieve declared intentions in Kosovo, to reduce the harmful effects of the ini-
tial mistakes of the international community, and to preserve their agential cred-
ibility. Therefore, a second major critical turning point for dismantling and inte-
grating Serb parallel structures in Kosovo arose during the process of negotiating 
Kosovo final status and the subsequent implementation of the Comprehensive 
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (Ahtisaari proposal), which occurred 
between 2006 and 2008.  
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The resolution of Kosovo's final status was also one of the core declared inten-
tions of international presence in Kosovo, as outlined in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999). Here, an opportunity arose for the north of Kosovo to be-
come one of the issues to be discussed in the future status talks between Kosovo 
and Serbia mediated by the UN special envoy, and closely followed by the US, 
EU, and Russia. However, despite OSCE suggestion to include parallel structures 
in the final talks, they were not explicitly mentioned or discussed during the final 
status negotiations, which later proved to be a mistake with multiple conse-
quences.463 In August 2006, the Contact Group on Kosovo464, an informal group 
of States interested in Kosovo, issued a statement highlighting the necessity of 
including the problem of the north of Kosovo in the negotiation process, acting to 
ensure the stability of the region and that Mitrovica would be re-united by decen-
tralizing local government, revitalizing the economy, protecting property rights, 
freedom of movement and the return of displaced persons, and re-establish the 
institutional functionality of Kosovo's authorities in that part of Kosovo.465 By 
achieving this desired and intended goal, the Contact Group warned that an in-
ternational presence would be necessary to ensure the implementation of these 
provisions for the north of Kosovo. This perspective was against Serbia‟s com-
mitment to ensure that Kosovo‟s future status would be a substantive autonomy 
within Serbia, which would provide both Kosovo Serbs and Albanians the 
framework for co-existence, while allowing Kosovo as a whole to have its auton-
omous institutions, and limited competencies in the area of international rela-
tions.466  
 
Hence, for foreign diplomats, it was expected that Serb parallel structures would 
be dismantled gradually and replaced by new Serb municipalities and extended 
decentralization.467 It was also expected that Serbia would stop supporting these 
structures once Kosovo's final status was resolved and a compromise solution 
was reached. On the contrary, Serbia kept the parallel structures active to assure 
the eventual partition of Kosovo, or to use as a bargaining chip to gain as much 
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as possible from the decentralization process by expanding the number of new 
Serb-dominated municipalities in Kosovo, which effectively meant converting 
villages into new municipal units.468 Effectively, the unprevented consequence of 
the previous stage analysed earlier provided Serbia with bargaining power dur-
ing the final status negotiations. During these negotiations, the Kosovo delega-
tion intentionally rejected discussing the Serb parallel structures and the north of 
Kosovo, despite Serbia‟s attempt to put those issues on the table.469 Prior to 2008, 
the Kosovo-Albanian political leadership feared raising these two issues, as they 
perceived them as a serious threat against which they did not have strong bar-
gaining power.470 Paradoxically, after Kosovo's declaration of independence in 
2008 and widespread recognition by major Western powers and the consolida-
tion of statehood, it became in the interest of Kosovo to dismantle and integrate 
these structures to Kosovo institutions.471  
 
The final status negotiations began in February 2006 and lasted for 14 months, 
with 17 rounds of direct talks between Kosovo and Serb delegations at the high-
est level, and 26 expert missions undertaken by the UNOSEK to Kosovo and Ser-
bia as part of shuttle diplomacy to facilitate the negotiations.472 Despite the in-
tense, detailed negotiations only modest progress was reached on decentraliza-
tion, religious and cultural heritage, minority rights and protection, economic 
and property issues, and security and justice system.473 However, both parties 
remained divided when it came to the overall political status of Kosovo. The de-
sired outcome for Serbia throughout the negotiations was extensive autonomy 
for Kosovo within Serbia with the possibility to re-negotiation after twenty 
years.474 On the other hand, Kosovo Albanians strongly advocated for full inde-
pendence from Serbia, with institutional safeguards for minorities, including ex-
tensive decentralization and local self-governance for Serb minority. The interna-
tional community was divided between those who supported Kosovo's inde-
pendence, those who were more neutral and open to a negotiated compromise, 
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and those who opposed Kosovo's independence due to their relationship with 
Serbia and/or the perceived repercussions that Kosovo could have on other se-
cessionist and contested territories around the world.475 However, the guiding 
principles of the Contact Group for Kosovo that set the broad framework for the 
final status negotiations, made it clear that „[t]here will be no changes in the cur-
rent territory of Kosovo, i.e. no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with 
any country or part of any country‟476, indicating support for a type of independ-
ence that would provide extensive rights and protection for minorities, ensure 
regional stability, and the sustainable development in Kosovo. 
 
Following the two years of negotiations, in March 2007 the UN Special Envoy 
leading the negotiations, former finish president Martti Ahtisaari, published the 
key provisions of his proposal concluding that „[i]ndependence is the only option 
for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Only in an independent 
Kosovo will its democratic institutions be fully responsible and accountable for 
their actions. This will be crucial to ensure respect for the rule of law and the ef-
fective protection of minorities‟. 477 In his final report to the UN Security Council, 
Ahtisaari stated that the violence against Serbs in 1999 and 2004 had left pro-
found legacies, indirectly acknowledging the spectrum of consequences that the-
se two critical events have had over the years in Kosovo. However, it was also 
stated that „Kosovo-Serbs need to engage actively in Kosovo‟s institutions. They 
must reverse their fundamental position of non-cooperation; only with an end to 
their boycott of Kosovo‟s institutions will they be able to protect effectively their 
rights and interests‟.478  
 
The Ahtisaari proposal sought to resolve the problem of Serb parallel structures, 
the inaccessibility of the north for Kosovo's authorities, and KFOR's inability to 
provide sufficient security through the extensive decentralization of local gov-
ernment, guaranteeing special rights and protection for Serb communities and 
other institutional and political privileges.479 The Ahtisaari proposal emphasized 
the importance of addressing the needs and concerns of Kosovo-Serbs through 
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extensive government decentralization. Among the international and local politi-
cians, it was largely accepted that decentralization and the creation of new Serb 
majority municipalities was essential for stabilizing and sustaining the Serb 
community within the new state and for breaking the status-quo in the north of 
Kosovo. According to the Ahtisaari proposal, Kosovo-Serbs would govern their 
own public affairs, including healthcare and higher education. Decentralized re-
gions with Serbian majorities, would: be given extensive financial autonomy; be 
allowed to accept transparent funding from Serbia; and participate in inter-
municipal partnerships and cross-border cooperation with Serbian institutions. 
 
However, Serbia rejected the Ahtisaari proposal on the grounds that Kosovo‟s 
independence breached Serbia‟s sovereignty, was against international law, 
would set a negative precedent, and above all represented a one-sided imposition 
by the UNOSEK, who was supposed to be a mediator rather than an arbitrator.480 
Subsequently, Serbia requested the continuation of negotiations with another 
neutral international mediator, which would find a mutually acceptable solution 
for Kosovo in line with their framework for giving Kosovo an autonomous status 
within Serbia. In an attempt to find a compromised solution to the Ahtisaari pro-
posal, the Contact Group for Kosovo proposed additional talks undertaken by a 
Troika of diplomatic representatives from the USA, EU and Russia.481 The pro-
posal was accepted by the UN Secretary General, however after four months of 
unsuccessful talks between the Serbian and Kosovo authorities, the Troika con-
cluded that „the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final status of 
Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental ques-
tion of sovereignty over Kosovo‟.482 During this short supplementary negotiation 
period, Serb parallel structures were not mentioned at all.  
 
Following the failure of two rounds of negotiations and Serbia‟s rejection of the 
Ahtisaari proposal, in close cooperation with the US and major European states, 
Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008 and began implementing 
the Ahtisaari proposal unilaterally. In the Declaration of Independence, demo-
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cratically elected representatives of the Assembly of Kosovo committed to estab-
lish a „democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of 
non-discrimination and equal protection under the law‟.483 They agreed to the 
obligations contained in the Ahtisaari proposal and welcomed the new interna-
tional presence. Serb legislators boycotted this historic event. One day after the 
Kosovo‟s coordinated declaration of independence; the Government of Serbia 
adopted a decision to annul the declaration of independence of Kosovo.484 The 
decision stated that the independence of Kosovo violated international law, Ser-
bia's Constitution, and jeopardized Serbia‟s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Consequently, it stated that the acts and decisions of Kosovo institutions would 
be nullified and therefore should not have any legal effect. This decision encour-
aged the intensification of the activities of Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo by 
stating that Serbs living in Kosovo did not have to obey the Kosovo authorities. 
Accordingly, Serbia was intending to continue implementing its laws in Kosovo, 
and demanded that all Serb public institutions continue their activities in Kosovo 
based on the Serbian constitution. Further to this, the decision of the Serbian 
Government also stated that, without the permission of Serbia and the UN, any 
new international presence in Kosovo would be considered invalid and unac-
ceptable.485   
 
Subsequent events were influenced by the logic of path dependence. Between 
2008 and 2011, Kosovo completed the formation of new Serb municipalities, ex-
cept in the north, thereby managing to effectively reduce ethnic tensions 
throughout Kosovo.486 Kosovo's government invested over €150 million within 
three years to implement the Ahtisaari proposal, including the creation of new 
municipalities and new mechanisms for minority protection.487 In the local and 
national elections organized in Kosovo in 2009, Serb participation was much 
higher than all previous elections held in Kosovo.488 In the newly-formed Serb 
municipalities, Serb parallel structures reduced their activity or merged slowly 
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with the new structures, while maintaining a hidden, shadow operation of their 
own.489 However, in the north of Kosovo the situation worsened and Serb parallel 
structures gained new momentum, strengthened and institutionalized their op-
erations, thereby creating serious challenges for the implementation of the 
Ahtisaari proposal. Serb leadership in the north of Kosovo strongly opposed the 
tendencies to implement the Ahtisaari proposal, claiming that they do not accept 
Kosovo‟s unilateral secession from Serbia.490 To ensure its implementation in the 
north, the proposal envisaged that it would be necessary to: establish a new mu-
nicipality in the north of Kosovo, which could not be completed under the stew-
ardship of the International Civilian Office (ICO); hold elections in the existing 
and new municipalities; dismantle parallel structures and establish the relevant 
Kosovo administrative and judicial institutions in the north; and deploy police 
and custom officers at border crossings.491 Until 2010, Kosovo's government did 
not provide a concrete strategy on how to implement the Ahtisaari proposal in 
the north. In vague and general terms, Kosovo's government emphasized its joint 
commitment and close cooperation with the international community to extend 
Kosovo‟s sovereignty in that part of Kosovo, to increase economic development, 
and to establish the rule of law and democratic order there.492  
 
By this stage, these parallel structures had become strong stakeholders that de-
termined and controlled the socio-economic and political life in the north of Ko-
sovo - often also challenging Belgrade‟s authority. They outmanoeuvred the in-
ternational community and became a Trojan horse for Serbia to undermine and 
influence independent Kosovo from within, the same purpose served by Repub-
lika Srpska in BiH. The opportunities for the UN and Kosovo government to 
dismantle these structures through peaceful means faded away due to changed 
circumstances after Kosovo‟s independence. Representing an unprevented con-
sequence of international peacebuilding in Kosovo, Serb parallel structures 
turned the peacebuilding project upside down and overruled international po-
tential for achieving their declared intentions with an unparalleled level of re-
sources and executive authority. The Serb structures obstructed the implementa-
tion of the Ahisaari proposal, but this was made possible due to the inadequacies 
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of the final status process, which left the resolution of this disputed issue unre-
solved.  
 
Spectrum of unprevented consequences II 
The prospects for dismantling Serb parallel structures after Kosovo‟s independ-
ence became even blurrier due to Serbia's contestation of Kosovo's independence, 
the fragmented and overlapping reconfigured international presence, and Ser-
bia's renewed interest in exploiting parallel structures to obstruct further Koso-
vo‟s statehood and eventually to renegotiate a more favourable special status for 
the north of Kosovo. In particular, the failure to resolve the issue of Serb parallel 
structures during the final status talks and the subsequent failure to implement 
the Ahtisaari proposal in the north of Kosovo led to the additional production 
and reproduction of the following unprevented consequences:  
 
1. Failure to implement the Ahtisaari proposal in the north of Kosovo;  
2. Contestation of Kosovo independence and empirical sovereignty in the 
north of Kosovo; and 
3. Solidification of ethnic division.  
 
Each of these consequences is treated individually below. 
 
Failure to implement the Ahtisaari proposal in the north of Kosovo  
 
The main unprevented consequences, which were certainly anticipated but unin-
tended, that have emerged as a result of the final status talks was the strengthen-
ing of the Serb parallel structures in the north of Kosovo, and the subsequent 
challenge to Kosovo's domestic security, institutional functionality, and social 
relations. Through its parallel structures in Kosovo, Serbia obstructed the imple-
mentation of the Ahtisaari proposal in the north. In other Serb populated regions, 
the Ahtisaari proposal was implemented effectively and successfully, resulting 
in: increased Serb participation in Kosovo's institutions and elections; the stabili-
zation of inter-ethnic relations; and improved socio-economic conditions, includ-
ing the return of refugees and protection of religious heritage.493 By contrast, in 
the north of Kosovo inter-ethnic violence increased, ethnic reconciliation thwart-
ed, return downsized, and overall security worsened. Practically, the failure to 
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establish the Mitrovica North municipality, the lack of local support, and the de-
fiance of Serb parallel structures towards Kosovo‟s statehood narrowed the op-
tions for either dismantling these structures either through Prishtina's unilateral 
actions or by entering a dialogue process with Kosovo-Serbs in the north and 
Serbia.494 A major reason for Serbia's rejection of the Ahtisaari proposal was their 
perception that the international community started expressing a preference for 
independence as the future status of Kosovo during the Vienna negotiations.495 
This subsequently formed the basis for Serbia's rejection of the proposed imple-
mentation of the Ahtisaari proposal in the north of Kosovo and Serbia's action to 
strengthen its activity through parallel institutions in Kosovo. Serb parallel struc-
tures also rejected the Ahtisaari proposal because it would weaken their power 
basis and their network of influence by establishing the municipality of north of 
Mitrovica, thereby extending the rule of law and integrating the Kosovo-Serb 
community into Kosovo's institutions.496 
 
The greatest challenge for ICO, which was given the responsibility to supervise 
the implementation of the Ahtisaari proposal, was the establishment of a new 
municipal unit in the northern part of Mitrovica. All other municipal units dedi-
cated to minority-populated regions within Kosovo were successfully established 
and functional, except for the one in the north of Kosovo. Practically speaking, 
local support for creating a new municipality was low, as administrative needs 
were already fulfilled by Serb parallel municipal structures in the north of Mi-
trovica. An additional complication arose as the ICO had difficulty finding ade-
quate, locally supported candidates that would run for municipal elections in the 
north. Serb political parties, such as SLS (Liberal Independent Party) that partici-
pated in Kosovo's government, did not have any presence in the north as their 
attempts to create branches had failed due to conflicting interests with the locals 
and Serb parallel structures.497  
 
The inability to implement the Ahtisaari proposal in the north of Kosovo was 
primarily impeded by Serb parallel structures, which emerged due to the failure 
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of UNMIK and KFOR to establish the rule of law and institutional order in that 
part of Kosovo and these parallel structures continued asserting their agency 
with Belgrade‟s support. However, the failure to resolve the fate of these struc-
tures during the final status talks played a role in radicalizing their activity. By 
this stage, the intentions and means of contentious politics that Serb parallel 
structures invoked to obstruct the extension of Kosovo's authority in the north 
became clear patterns that could have been anticipated by the international 
community. However, missed opportunities to dismantle these structures meant 
that this unprevented consequences would not be resolved through conventional 
means. Accordingly, at an early stage preventable consequences can became both 
unprevented and unpreventable consequences - signifying the limits of contem-
porary peacebuilding endeavours.  
 
Contestation of Kosovo's sovereignty in the north 
 
The presence of Serb parallel structures and the directive issued by the Serbian 
government rejecting the Ahtisaari proposal together profoundly shaped the atti-
tudes of Kosovo-Serbs towards integrating with Kosovo after its declaration of 
independence. There are strong indications that Serbs living in the north of Ko-
sovo never received adequate information about the benefits that the Ahtisaari 
proposal would bring to them in everyday life. They are largely unaware of the 
political and cultural rights they would enjoy at the local and central government 
levels that are included in the Ahtisaari proposal.498 However, the overall reasons 
that Serbs rejected the implementation of the Ahtisaari proposal in the north is 
related to Kosovo's independence, the lack of efforts within Kosovo's institutions 
to genuinely support Kosovo-Serbs, the fear of being treated and seen as minori-
ty, the fear of losing benefits from Serbian-funded public jobs in the north of Ko-
sovo, and fear of deterioration inter-ethnic relations when the international or-
ganizations leave the country.499 
 
To undermine and further constrain Kosovo's empirical sovereignty in the north 
of Kosovo, Serbia has increased financial support to its parallel structures in Ko-
sovo to weaken the attempts of Kosovo's government and the international 
community to integrate Serbs within Kosovo's political system. During 2010 
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alone, Serbia invested over €40 million in parallel structures in Kosovo.500 Serb 
parallel structures constrained the work of newly established Serb municipalities 
established after 2008, as a way to jeopardize the success of the Ahtisaari pro-
posal. There were cases where new Serb democratically-elected structures shared 
the same building as Serb parallel structures. Although sharing the same build-
ing, these two structures operated within different legal frameworks with no mu-
tual recognition.501 Furthermore, the new municipalities had insufficient human 
capacities due to a lack of experienced personnel and the stronger financial lever-
age provided by the Serbian government.  
 
Following Kosovo's declaration of independence, Serb parallel structures with-
drew their support for Serbs working within Kosovo institutions, thereby creat-
ing institutional fragmentation and crises, particularly in relation to the police 
force and the judiciary. The district court in Mitrovica ceased operations as the 
Serbs working there boycotted Kosovo's new institutions. During 2008, Serb 
members of the Kosovo police suspended their cooperation with the Kosovo Po-
lice commanders in Prishtina. One of the reasons why the Kosovo-Serb commu-
nity continues to utilize the services provided by Serb parallel structures is their 
lack of trust in Kosovo institutions, including courts, public administration, and 
municipal authorities.502 The situation was exacerbated by spontaneous inter-
ethnic violence and non-ethnic social conflict, which were intentionally politi-
cized to nurture fear and inter-ethnic distrust. After independence, Serbia in-
creased the presence of its undercovered police forces in Kosovo to over 200 se-
curity officers, who operated mainly in the north of Kosovo and are involved in 
organizing crowds, orchestrating attacks and harassing those who attempt to co-
operate with Kosovo authorities, EULEX, KFOR and ICO.503 The Serbian secret 
police also obstruct proactively the attempts of law enforcement agencies in Ko-
sovo (KFOR, EULEX, and Kosovo Police) to extend the rule of law and justice to 
the north of Kosovo. These actions had a spill-over effect, producing other conse-
quences, such as: impeding the normalization of inter-ethnic relations; impeding 
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freedom of movement in the north of Kosovo, promoting economic informality 
and tax evasion; and contributing to the persistence of human insecurity.  
 
Solidification of ethnic division  
 
The Serb parallel structures have not contributed to improving inter-ethnic rela-
tions, co-existence, and reconciliation in Kosovo. Instead, they have often rein-
forced fear, mistrust, and misconceived prejudices, as well as entrenched in-
group pressure and control.504 The sporadic, organized, and unorganized threats, 
incidents, and violent acts have also hindered ethnic confidence and discouraged 
political participation and dialogue.505 It is observed that „most inter-ethnic con-
tacts occur in private individual relations as well as in business and trade‟.506 
More significant levels of cooperation occur between Albanians and Serbs work-
ing for local and international NGO‟s, as well as those who engage with joint civil 
society activities or illegal businesses. Broader forms of interaction are often ob-
structed by Serb parallel structures.507   
 
Serb parallel structures consolidated their operations in the political field by cre-
ating joint associations, organizing elections in Kosovo, and acting as consolidat-
ed political representatives of Serbs in Kosovo. They consistently obstructed Serb 
participation in Kosovo institutions, orchestrated violence against Albanian mi-
norities in the north, and resisted the work of EULEX and KFOR regarding the 
rule of law, justice, customs, and public order. Following Kosovo‟s declaration of 
independence, Serb parallel structures strengthened their united structure by 
creating in June 2008 an „Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of the 
Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija‟, which consisted mainly of Serb-
dominated municipalities in the north, as well as representatives of Serb parallel 
structures that operate throughout Kosovo. The primary purpose of this re-
configuration of Serb parallel political structures was to strengthen their ties and 
representation in opposition to Kosovo's independence. Serbia's government 
openly supported this action.508 The extension of Serb parallel administrative 
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structures into the political field effectively entrenched further the separation of 
the north from the rest of Kosovo.509 An OSCE report highlights that „[s]ince 17 
February 2008, the separation of the Kosovo Serb community increased through 
the establishment of parallel political institutions and the strengthening of paral-
lel social institutions such as education, health care, social welfare and pen-
sions‟.510 The same report submits that „[w]hile the Kosovo government showed 
some effort to integrate Kosovo Serbs in the civil service, overall there has been 
no significant progress in socially integrating the Kosovo Serb community‟.511 
 
The political economy of informally-structured anarchy in the north of Kosovo 
was maintained by Serb parallel structures that also hosted multiple networks of 
organized crime, which harmed Kosovo's economy and undermined internation-
al financial and political support for Kosovo. It is estimated that half of products 
that enter Kosovo reach the country through informal and illegal routes.512 Ex-
perts estimate that around 35% of Kosovo's economic activity belongs to informal 
and illegal practices, and the main reason for this was the fragile security situa-
tion and the absence of the rule of law in the north of Kosovo.513 According to the 
European Agency for Reconstruction, between 2004 and 2007 the informal econ-
omy represented an annual value of between €600 and €700 million; equivalent to 
almost one-third of Kosovo‟s total GDP.514 Lack of control over the border in the 
north of Kosovo was a major concern for the business environment in Kosovo. 
Serbia's non-recognition of Kosovo has led to an arrangement whereby goods 
and capital that enter Kosovo from Serbia were not taxed on either side of the 
boarder. This lack of regulation provided a safe haven for smugglers and illegal 
traders, who benefited from the informality that prevailed in this part of Kosovo. 
Following Kosovo's independence and the demolition of border points in the 
north, Serb parallel structures and their networks were effectively exploiting the 
systemic loopholes to nurture informality throughout the north of Kosovo.515  
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The spectrum of consequences that emerged after the definition of Kosovo's final 
status and declaration of independence represent the solidification of the non-
preventative measures that could have been taken earlier. After Kosovo's inde-
pendence, Serb parallel structures became the main obstacle to peace and stabil-
ity in Kosovo. The failure of the international presence to take early action em-
powered these structures to challenge international authority beyond anticipa-
tion. However, this arose from the fact that international non-action gave these 
structures the grounds and power to resist and defy peacebuilding and 
statebuilding in Kosovo. Failing to take adequate measures at an early stage has a 
spill-over effect and creates path dependence, where no matter how effective lat-
er efforts are their preventive power is constrained by new developments, trans-
formed intentions, and an acceptance of the new reality, which is not in line with 
the initially declared intentions.  
 
Responsibility for unprevented consequences  
One of the primary declared intentions of the international community for build-
ing peace in Kosovo was to establish security, stability, and the rule of law 
throughout Kosovo.516 The emergence and development of Serb parallel struc-
tures is an unprevented consequence of international governance in Kosovo. This 
was in fact a preventable consequence, but for the reasons outlined earlier in this 
chapter, there were incompatible intentions from multiple actors, inadequate ear-
ly actions, and a preference for promoting stability over justice and the rule of 
law, and co-existence with contested local authorities. The presence of authority, 
capacity, resources, and knowledge are key conditions for enabling and articulat-
ing agency – essential ingredients for the capacity to undertake preventive ac-
tions. So, the non-action of UNMIK and KFOR despite having the necessary con-
ditions to take preventative action means that the consequences discussed above 
were unprevented. Accordingly, there is a strong case and moral imperative to 
allocate the adequate aspects of responsibility. Although tracing personal respon-
sibility is very difficult, if not impossible, there is a strong case for pursuing col-
lective and institutional responsibility for the spectrum of unprevented conse-
quences that have occurred as a result of the operation of Serb parallel structures 
in Kosovo.  
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The typological framework elaborated in Chapter 3 suggests engaging three as-
pects of responsibility in cases of unprevented consequences. Contrary to the case 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the international community had extensive 
authority but no responsibility mechanism, in Kosovo there were two mecha-
nisms, which were quasi-judicial answerability mechanisms. UNMIK and KFOR 
enjoyed executive authority in their fields of responsibility. While UNMIK was 
the supreme authority on all matters concerning executive, legislative, and judi-
cial powers, KFOR enjoyed supreme authority in security-related areas. The Om-
budsperson Institution in Kosovo (OIK) was established in 2000 by UNMIK, and 
among other human rights related roles, this body was given „jurisdiction to re-
ceive and investigate complaints from any person or entity in Kosovo concerning 
human rights violations and actions constituting an abuse of authority by the in-
terim civil administration or any emerging central or local institution‟.517  
 
However, OIK only investigated limited complaints against UNMIK and KFOR, 
mainly concerning property issues, fair trial issues, and personal liberty and se-
curity issues. Despite this, OIK was largely ignored by UNMIK and KFOR and 
did not have any practical or legal potential to hold these institutions to account 
for their wrongdoings.518 At best, OIK was an attributability body and a weak an-
swerability body.519 In 2006, UNMIK established a Human Rights Advisory Panel 
(HRAP) as the first ever answerability mechanism within a UN transitional ad-
ministration in a post-conflict society.520 HRAP was tasked to attribute the allega-
tions for UNMIK‟s misconduct to the breaching of international human rights 
law, and seek answers from UNMIK on why certain actions were taken.521 No 
compensatory or reparation for negative consequences was foreseen in this pro-
cess. Notwithstanding the importance of these bodies, international peacebuild-
ing organizations in Kosovo have not taken responsibility for the unprevented 
consequences examined in this chapter, nor have they been held accountable by 
any institutionalized body at the local or international level. Therefore, it is im-
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portant to outline the responsibility of each organization for the consequences 
caused by their non-action to prevent the emergence and development of Serb 
parallel structures in Kosovo, which breached local and international laws for 
over a decade.  
  
The first critical turning point during which the international community had the 
opportunity to prevent the emergence of Serb parallel structures was the time 
surrounding the deployment of KFOR and UNMIK to Kosovo and the immediate 
developments related to post-conflict institution-building. Both international and 
local agents share responsibility for the emergence and development of Serb par-
allel structures in Kosovo. The first consequence after this failure-to-prevent was 
the creation of a frozen conflict and the de-facto division of the north of Kosovo. 
The primary responsibility for the formation and growth of Serb parallel struc-
tures lies with the Serb political leaders in Kosovo and the Serb government in 
Belgrade who orchestrated, financed, governed and oversaw these structures. 
While Serb political leaders in Kosovo who ran these structures need to face po-
litical and legal accountability, the political leadership in Belgrade also needs to 
be held accountable for breaching intentionally and openly the UNSC Resolution 
1244 (1999) and obstructing the path to peace in Kosovo.  
 
Equally, the international peacebuilding missions share responsibility for the 
consequences. Although KFOR had the primary authority and responsibility for 
security and the rule of law in the north of Kosovo, it failed to prevent the emer-
gence and growth of Serb parallel structures. Hence there is a strong case for 
KFOR and NATO structures to be held accountable for their unwillingness and 
intentional inaction to prevent the emergence and development of Serb security 
structures in the north, which operated illegally and in violation of the Kumano-
vo Technical-Military Agreement signed between NATO and FRY, as well as 
UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999). In addition to KFOR, there is a strong case for 
holding UN accountable for their inability and failure to extend their authority 
and establish effective local government in the north of Kosovo. UNMIK con-
stantly tolerated the operation of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo, which chal-
lenged Serb participation in UNMIK institutions, and threatened peace and sta-
bility in Kosovo. Although there is extensive criticism towards UNMIK‟s failures 
in the north of Kosovo, there is a strong case for seeking accountability through a 
more formalized mechanism. There are multiple cases sent to the OIK and HRAP 
mechanisms regarding human rights violations as a result of UNMIK‟s non-
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action or inadequate action towards Serb parallel structures in the north, espe-
cially related to property, court cases, documentation, and civil law issues.522 
However, UNMIK‟s response has been negligent and adequate remedial actions 
have not been taken. Indeed, these accountability mechanisms have served main-
ly as an empty shell to respond to and avoid international criticism of UNMIK‟s 
undemocratic governance in Kosovo.523  
 
A portion of responsibility for the emergence and development of Serb parallel 
structures must also be allocated to the Kosovo-Albanian political and military 
leadership. The orchestrated and sporadic acts of revenge and ethnically-
motivated violence have antagonized, stigmatized, and marginalized Serb and 
other non-dominant minorities to create enclaves, and to establish the north of 
Kosovo as a zone free from Kosovo-Albanian dominance. Nevertheless, key lead-
ers of political parties and former heads of key central institutions need to answer 
to a special mechanism about their activity and role during the early stage after 
the war, when the Serb parallel structures began consolidating their activity in 
Kosovo. 
 
The second unprevented consequence was the obstruction of Serb participation 
and integration in Kosovo institutions. While the primary responsibility for this 
lies with Serb parallel structures and the Serbian government more generally, 
UNMIK shared the responsibility for failing to integrate the Serb population in 
Kosovo. UNMIK's lack of investment in security and its failure to integrate the 
Serb community within Kosovo‟s education, healthcare, administrative, and legal 
system contributed to this second unprevented consequence. KFOR is also to be 
held answerable for its inability to provide effective security to minority commu-
nities in Kosovo. Both UNMIK and KFOR were aware of the physical location of 
these parallel structures and did nothing to prevent their illegal activity. The Ko-
sovo-Albanian leadership also shares the responsibility in the form of attributa-
bility and answerability for their failure to create sufficient social and political 
space for the integration of the Serb community in joint schools, healthcare facili-
ties, and judicial and administrative institutions. The failure to provide sufficient 
space and conditions to encourage participation contributed to ethnic distrust, 
the creation of alternative subsistence structures, and gradual alienation from 
Kosovo‟s consolidated institutions. 
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The third unprevented consequence that has emerged from Serb parallel struc-
tures activity was the creation of a malfunctioning legal and administrative envi-
ronment, persistence of informality, and organized crime. Serbia's government, 
along with its satellite network of nationalist leaders in Kosovo should be held 
accountable for running illegal activities in Kosovo in the fields of security, edu-
cation, healthcare, and public administration. There is a clear case for Serbia to be 
held accountable for the damages caused in the sphere of property, entitlements, 
and other damages caused to local populations. Serbian government is equally 
responsible for nurturing informality in the north of Kosovo. KFOR and UNMIK 
Police and civilian administration are responsible for not extending the rule of 
law to the north of Kosovo as they did throughout the country. They had the le-
gal authority, human and material resources, and above all the detailed 
knowledge regarding the criminal activity of Serb parallel structures in the north 
and yet did nothing to prevent their negative impact in post-conflict Kosovo.  
 
The second critical turning point in resolving the problem with Serb parallel 
structures was during Kosovo‟s final status negotiations and the subsequent im-
plementation of the Ahtisaari proposal. This resulted in the failure to implement 
the Ahtisaari proposal in the north of Kosovo and to extend democratic authority 
within that contested part of the territory. There is clear and strong evidence that 
Serbian government has backed Serb parallel structures throughout the years. 
There has been no accountability measure taken in this regard, except attribution 
of blame by Kosovo authorities and certain instance of European and interna-
tional community. Although Serb parallel structures are responsible for the failed 
implementation of the Ahrisaari proposal in the north of Kosovo, UNMIK and 
OSCE also bear a degree of responsibility for this not supporting this process. 
Through its regional office in Mitrovica, UNMIK has legitimized and defended 
the operation of Serb parallel structures, while using the budget from Kosovo's 
government that should have been used to develop a viable regional office in Mi-
trovica. Kosovo authorities should be attributed the blame for not trying to re-
solve the issue of parallel structures during the final status talks. Furthermore, 
Kosovo's authorities should be held answerable for not being able to attract the 
Serb community living in the north to participate in Kosovo's institutions. The 
criminal activity of Serb parallel structures after Kosovo‟s independence should 
not remain unaddressed. There is clear evidence for legal prosecution of respon-
sible people organizing riots, smuggling, and other illegal activities. 
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Conclusion  
This chapter argued that the emergence and development of Serb parallel struc-
tures in Kosovo constitutes an unprevented consequence of international peace-
building in Kosovo. One of the primary goals of international presence in Kosovo 
after 1999 was the establishment of security, justice, order and stability through-
out Kosovo as a precondition for establishing and nurturing a stable peace in the 
country. The activity of Serb parallel structures has essentially undermined inter-
national and domestic efforts to build peace, consolidate state institutions, and 
find common grounds for ethnic reconciliation in Kosovo after 1999. Between 
1999 and 2012, there were multiple missed opportunities to dismantle these struc-
tures. The discussion of two critical turning points, where the international com-
munity had the opportunity to dismantle them clearly illustrates how the lack of 
sensitivity for the consequences, despite the availability of authority, resources, 
and knowledge, created a mess and ultimately failed to achieve their declared 
intentions. While the first critical turning point for preventing the development 
of Serb parallel structures arose immediately after the deployment of UN and 
NATO civilian and military forces, the second critical turning point emerged dur-
ing the definition of Kosovo‟s final status after 2006.  
 
In each phase examined here, the spectrum of consequences varied from conse-
quences that could be expected and anticipated, but were not prevented before 
and after their occurrence. The failure to prevent the emergence and develop-
ment of Serb parallel structures during 1999 and 2001 led to the creation of a fro-
zen conflict in the north, where the UNMIK failed to extend the rule of law and 
KFOR was unable to maintain security and ensure freedom of movement. The 
return of refugees to this part of Kosovo also became impossible, and the partici-
pation and integration of Kosovo-Serbs in newly established institutions was ob-
structed. Furthermore, the emergence of Serb parallel structures led to the crea-
tion of institutional and legal parallelism, which created social confusion and 
chaos, social disobedience and disorder, and informality. These consequences 
shaped significantly the political developments in Kosovo – becoming obstacles 
that led to other consequences, thereby creating a predictable pattern of processes 
where the key agents become in many instances mere spectators of their own do-
ing and undoings. 
 
The second critical turning point, which was less influential than the initial turn-
ing point arose during the definition of Kosovo‟s final status and the subsequent 
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implementation of the Ahtisaari proposal following Kosovo's declaration of in-
dependence in 2008. By the time the final status negotiations had started, Serb 
parallel structures were well consolidated and the north of Kosovo was under 
their control. The internationally set agenda and principles for the final status ne-
gotiations explicitly excluded the discussion of Serb parallel structures, as they 
meant to address this problem through the question of the status of Serbs in Ko-
sovo and by pursuing extensive decentralization. However, the failure to reach a 
mutually agreed settlement resulted in the failure to implement the Ahtisaari 
proposal in the north of Kosovo, and led to the institutionalization and radicali-
zation of Serb parallel structures. In other instances, these structures again ob-
structed the integration of Serbs into Kosovo‟s political life, divided the interna-
tional presence, and expanded lawlessness, criminality, and informality in the 
north of Kosovo. So the previous non-actions created a new chain of consequenc-
es, which multiplied, complicated, and reduced the prospects for considering in-
ternational peacebuilding in Kosovo a success. 
 
Finally, the question of the responsibility of international and local actors for the 
spectrum of consequences has remained largely unaddressed and ignored. In 
terms of responsibility for the spectrum of unprevented consequences, this chap-
ter has argued that there is a case to hold responsible both local and international 
actors for the emergence and development of Serb parallel structures. Equally, 
the Kosovo-Albanian leadership and relevant institutions should be attributed 
the role for failing to create the conditions for a multi-ethnic Kosovo, which 
would have indirectly reduced the destructive agency of Serb parallel structures.  
 
In sum, the unprevented consequences examined in this chapter have effectively 
prolonged the international presence in Kosovo and undermined their authority 
and legitimacy, delayed the establishment of effective and functional institutions, 
hindered the establishment of civic peace and ethnic reconciliation, and under-
mined socio-economic development. The emergence of these consequences was 
unintentionally unprevented revealing the morale and seriousness of peacebuild-
ing as well as the weak agency of the UN, NATO, and EU to remain loyal to the 
declared intentions and the obligations taken on behalf of the international com-
munity and the local population. It shows „the triumph of the lack of will‟ to take 
timely and appropriate measures to prevent negative consequences in their field 
of responsibility. While the UN might have chosen non-action to prevent any 
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larger scale conflict, it has counter-intuitively prevented peace in the long-run. In 
this case, post-conflict „conflict prevention‟ has become „peace prevention‟.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Unanticipated Consequences of Security Sector 
Reform in Timor-Leste 
 
 
 
“Let me be clear: it is my opinion that 
UNTAET was a success – relative, for sure, and I 
have always been the first to point out its shortcom-
ings – but a success nonetheless… but no success is 
total and we should be equally clear on that: mis-
takes were made, things could have been done bet-
ter, and opportunities were missed.  
We should acknowledge these.” 
 
           (Sergio Vieira de Mello, SRSG-UNTAET, 2002)524  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Timor-Leste has endured a long history of colonization by Portugal and violent 
occupation by Indonesia, which left the territory in a state of insecurity and de-
stabilization, with social and clannish divisions emerging under conditions of ex-
treme poverty and economic exploitation.525 UN involvement in Timor-Leste 
dates back to 1999 when almost three decades of Indonesian repression and sys-
tematic human rights abuses against the Timorese people ended as a result of a 
humanitarian intervention led by Australia and neighbouring countries. In order 
to establish a liberal peace and state institutions, this small island territory has 
hosted six UN successive peacebuilding missions in an intense period of thirteen 
years, one of the most intense UN engagements with any post-conflict country. 
The UN's main goal in Timor-Leste was to build a new state, and to establish po-
litical institutions, rules, and practices to govern the new country in a democratic 
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manner. A central aspect of international peacebuilding in Timor-Leste was secu-
rity sector development and reform, namely the defence and police forces. Until 
the outbreak of unanticipated violence in 2006, Timor-Leste was the definitive 
UN success story of peacebuilding, which was propagated all over multilateral 
forums. The UN leadership went as far as to consider that „[i]n peacekeeping an-
thologies there is no doubt that UNTAET (The United Nations Transitional Ad-
ministration in East Timor) will be recorded in the column of the most successful 
peacekeeping operations ever‟.526 In 2005 the Annual Review of Global Peace Opera-
tions argued that „Timor-Leste is rightly seen as a UN success story‟.527  
 
While the overall UN peacebuilding project in Timor-Leste provides valuable in-
sights into the impact of peacebuilding, the process of security sector develop-
ment and reform stands out as an exemplary case that illustrates how unantici-
pated consequences can be produced by initial decisions and the on-going failure 
to address shortcomings in successive UN missions. Securitizing Timor-Leste 
through developing new police and defence forces was seen as a major compo-
nent of the UN peacebuilding project, a gradual exit strategy for international po-
lice and military forces, and a means to consolidate Timor-Leste as a viable post-
conflict state. This chapter examines the spectrum of unanticipated consequences 
that emerged as a result of UN-led security sector reform and development in 
post-conflict and post-independence Timor-Leste, with reference to two critical 
turning points. It explores how UN‟s good intention to bring security and long-
term stability to post-conflict Timor-Leste by developing the defence and police 
forces produced multiple unanticipated consequences that adversely contributed 
to the prolongation of instability and insecurity, the creation of unaccountable 
and authoritarian police and defence forces, and the development of institution-
alized sources of conflict.  
 
The analysis in this chapter reveals that each UN peacebuilding mission has ex-
perienced particular shortfalls, and almost all of them were unable to anticipate 
the consequences of their actions.528 The first half of this chapter examines the 
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critical turning point that occurred while the defence and police forces were be-
ing established, and explores the key developments until the sudden outbreak of 
violence in April/May 2006, which represented a major failure for international 
peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. During this stage, UNTAET led the process of de-
veloping a new police and defence force from scratch and attempted to build an 
institutional and legal architecture for their operation. However, the recruitment 
process of police and defence forces, alongside inappropriate capacity building 
for new security forces and undefined institutional framework and democratic 
oversight of security forces led to a number of unanticipated consequences. The 
critical process tracing of the key events illustrate that these anomalies led to the 
unanticipated state failure in 2006, it triggered impunity, unaccountability, and 
human security among the security forces, and it stimulated the expansion of 
spoiler groups.   
 
The second half of the chapter examines another critical turning point that 
emerged after 2006, when the international community had the opportunity to 
review and reconstruct the whole security system within Timor-Leste. The anal-
yses look at the attempts of UN to reform and review the security sector after the 
unanticipated violence of 2006. In doing this, a UN Integrated Mission in Timor-
Leste (UNMIT) was established to reform the security system, which undertook a 
restructuring of police forces, mentoring of police, and reviewing the institutional 
security system. However, the post-2006 security sector reform in Timor-Leste 
did not succeed in reaching its intended goals as the UN did not manage to im-
plement its mandate entirely and the local counterparts rejected cooperating fully 
in reforming security institutions. As a result of these developments it was not 
unanticipated that the police and defence forces will continue to operate with 
blurred lines of responsibility, the police forces became deeply politicized, and 
the entire process damaged the relations between UN and local authorities. 
 
Accordingly, evidence in this chapter shows that the UN was unprepared to un-
dertake sufficient actions and decisions informed by strategic and anticipatory 
systems in order to ensure that its endeavours do not create multiple adverse 
consequences. The chapter argues that the UN is inappropriately equipped to ex-
ploit the narrow windows of opportunity to change the course of events, pro-
cesses, and structures in post-conflict societies before local power is reshuffled. 
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Consequently, missed opportunities often become obstacles for successive UN 
missions and become limited by the logic of path dependence. Accordingly, it 
would be necessary to trace such processes in order to attempt to reduce and cor-
rect the harm arising from misguided policies. 
 
Declared intentions, security sector reform, and peacebuilding in Timor-
Leste 
When the international military and civilian presence was established in 1999 in 
Timor-Leste, the country did not have the rudimentary state, administrative and 
security institutions. An atmosphere of chaos and disorder dominated the public 
sphere with widespread criminality, the destruction and occupation of property, 
an informal economy and no functioning public service.529 Following the inde-
pendence ballot in 1999, the unexpected violence that occurred during the sum-
mer left the UN with a very short time period to plan the UNTAET mission and 
to envisage the potential challenges they would encounter during the transitional 
path to independence.530 The UN formulated the declared intentions for Timor-
Leste largely according to 'template logic', drawing on UNMIK structure in Ko-
sovo and under internal tensions of short time for preparing the mission, short-
age of staff within UN Secretariat, and disagreements between UN-DPKO and 
UN-DPA over the internal responsibilities within UN. Consequently, UNTAET 
suffered from inadequate strategic planning prior to its establishment in Timor-
Leste, and particularly lacked the necessary anticipatory context-driven under-
standing of how to handle security sector reform and how best to accommodate 
ex-combatants within Timor-Leste.531 Despite these anomalies in the early stage, a 
major priority for the international community in Timor-Leste was to develop 
stable security institutions that would contribute to the new country‟s stability, 
promote security, enforce the rule of law, and protect democratic institutions.  
 
Driven by good intentions to bring stability and develop a solid security struc-
ture, the UN worked to establish and strengthen the police and defence forces in 
Timor-Leste. However, in formulating these intentions, local actors were exten-
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sively excluded from the planning and decision-making process.532 UNTAET in-
tentionally decided to keep local stakeholders away from the mission planning 
process and the formulation of declared intentions because they wanted to avoid 
being influenced by local political dynamics, which they feared would compli-
cate the decision-making process and also lead to a time-consuming consultative 
process, which would delay the immediate deployment of the international mili-
tary and civilian troops.533 However, lack of participatory processes later trig-
gered strong local resentment and unanticipated consequences.  
 
Four UN Security Council resolutions outline the declared intentions for devel-
oping and reforming security institutions in Timor-Leste. UN Security Council 
Resolution 1272 (1999) gave UNTAET the primary role „to provide security and 
maintain the law and order throughout the territory of East Timor‟.534 In January 
2001, UNTAET established the Defence Force for Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), which 
was tasked with providing military defence for Timor-Leste's people and territo-
ry, as well as to provide „assistance to the civilian community at the request of the 
civilian authorities during natural disasters and other emergencies‟.535 Parallel to 
establishing defence forces, UNTAET established the Timor-Leste Police Service 
(PNTL) in August 2001 for the purpose of „maintaining law and order in the terri-
tory of Timor-Leste‟.536 In more precise terms, the UN's ultimate goal was to de-
velop a police service that would reduce crime, maintain public order and im-
prove the safety of Timorese people, while remaining efficient, accountable to the 
public and free from political interference.537 Although national defence and po-
lice forces were established, the UN Police and the International Forces 
(INTERFET) preserved executive authority over the provision of public security 
and law enforcement. For many Timorese military leaders, the development of 
the defence force served to ensure the survival of the FALENTIL (The Armed 
Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste), while the internationals saw 
the new defence force as an opportunity to transform and reintegrate ex-
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combatants. Equally, for the international presence, developing local police and 
defence forces served the purpose of tackling the illegal and cross-border vio-
lence, smuggling, and provocation emanating from Western Timor, where a large 
number of pro-Indonesian refugees, ex-militia, and spoiler groups were placed in 
refugee camps.538  
 
After Timor-Leste's independence, the primary intention of the United Nations 
Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) outlined in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1410 (2002) was to „provide interim law enforcement and public secu-
rity and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East 
Timor‟.539 Subsequently, the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) main role was 
to strengthen the rule of law, including justice and human rights, and providing 
support for the Timor-Leste police.540 For both of these missions, the intention 
was to strengthen capacities to prepare for the UN‟s successful exit from the 
country after creating stable and functioning institutions. Following the April 
2006 events, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was 
given primary responsibility for reforming the police and defence forces.541 Dur-
ing this second stage of security sector reform, the UN entered into a complex 
arrangement with the government, which involved screening and certifying all 
police officers to address potential past misconduct, to restructure PNTL com-
mand and control structures, and to provide a comprehensive review of the secu-
rity situation in the country. The UNMIT Mandate Implementation Plan set out 
six related tasks involving: a comprehensive review of the security sector; moni-
toring and analysis of developments in PNTL and F-FDTL; liaison with bilateral 
donors; coordinating advisers placed within the institutions.542 The mandate of 
UNMIT was extended on an annual basis, but its goals and underlying intentions 
remained the same. Towards the end, the discourse shifted more towards invok-
ing normalcy and self-sufficiency as an indicative benchmark of progress and to 
prepare an exit strategy.  
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Critical turning point I: The establishment of F-FDTL and PNTL  
Following the 1999 referendum for independence, the military intervention, and 
the deployment of UN civilian administration, the first important moment in 
shaping the nature of security architecture in Timor-Leste occurred between 1999 
and 2001. This was the critical time during which the fate of the security sector, 
namely the defence forces and the police, was determined. The designated offi-
cial in UN-DPKO instructed the UN Transitional Administrator to treat all local 
leaders and factions equally to avoid alienating anyone in the country.543 This be-
nevolent ignorance later triggered local resistance and resentment towards UN‟s 
declared intentions. During its short planning activity, UNTAET did not have a 
clear idea on how to handle FALINTIL. When the INTERFET arrived in Timor-
Leste in 1999, one third of the FALINTIL forces (around 500) were interned in 
Aileu region outside the capital city and treated as potential peace spoilers, while 
the rest were disarmed and sent back to their home communities to reintegrate 
into civilian life.544 UN Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999), mandated 
INTERFET to enforce a ceasefire in the territory but it did not clarify the role of 
INTERFET regarding the disarmament of FALINTIL. However, INTERFET justi-
fied disarmament by identifying FALINTIL as a militia and an illegitimate group 
of armed civilians.545 During the containment of FALINTIL, the UN reported that 
„difficult living conditions, lack of supplies and lack of clarity about their current 
and future role have recently led to concerns over discipline and morale‟.546 This 
critical turning point started to create negative perceptions among the local 
stakeholders regarding the true intentions of the international presence, shifting 
their image from liberators to overlords.547   
 
While UNTAET was not keen to build an armed force and rather intended to fo-
cus on developing a new police service, the persistence of key local leaders 
obliged UNTAET to find a solution for the ex-combatants. The situation of dis-
parity regarding the interned FALINTIL forces, together with the fragile situation 
along the border with West Timor caused by militia elements located in refugee 
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camps and lack of security across the borderline, created a new political consen-
sus among the international and local actors that it was necessary to reform the 
defence and security structure of Timor-Leste after the restoration of independ-
ence and withdrawal of international presence. 548 Although the UN did not orig-
inally have a mandate to develop the defence forces, the UN Transitional Admin-
istrator took the decision to establish the defence forces, following consultations 
with Timorese political elites.549 Timor-Leste's Transitional Cabinet endorsed an 
option for an armed force comprised of 1,500 soldiers and 1,500 volunteer reserv-
ists, where priority was given to FALINTIL as the core force.550 However, during 
the early stage of discussions a number of important Timorese leaders were not 
consulted. When the decision was taken, UNTAET had no clear operational plan 
of how to functionalize the formation of armed forces, nor did they have any le-
gal basis or political strategy to deal with them.551 They only envisaged that the 
budgetary responsibility would lie with Timor-Leste's government and that 
UNTAET would be in charge of the process.  
 
On January 2001, UNTAET established the Defence Force for Timor-Leste552, 
which was tasked to provide military defence for Timor-Leste's people and terri-
tory, and provide „assistance to the civilian community at the request of the civil-
ian authorities during natural disasters and other emergencies‟.553 The UN Secre-
tary General considered the act as „[a]nother innovation is the involvement of 
UNTAET in the creation of the Timor-Leste Defence Force as a consequence of its 
responsibility to prepare Timor-Leste for independence‟.554 Significantly, the 
UNTAET regulation did not allow for F-FDTL to be mobilized for internal public 
order, police issues, or social conflicts, but rather envisaged that the Defence 
Force would act in accordance with international human rights law. The Defence 
Force was placed under the direct control of the UNTAET Transitional Adminis-
trator who acted as the supreme command, control and administrative authori-
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ty.555 However, the UNTAET Regulation failed to establish civilian oversight 
mechanisms within the new Timorese defence structures.556 This would later 
have serious consequences. 
 
The selection process for both the defence forces and police was problematic and 
later triggered multiple unanticipated consequences. Edward Rees explains that 
UNTAET intentionally „agreed that the FDTL selection process would remain an 
internal FALINTIL matter‟.557 UNTAET left the selection process to locals due to 
the desire to build local legitimacy of and their dependency on Timor-Leste's po-
litical elite not to defy UN transitional rule over the territory, especially the 
FRETELIN party, who had the majority in the government and parliament.558 As 
most of the FRETELIN military commanders were from the eastern part of the 
country, when the F-FDTL was formed the main senior positions were given to 
eastern commanders while low-ranking positions were left for the westerners.559 
Concerns were also raised that the formation and recruitment of the armed forces 
was carried out confidentially from interned FALINTIL members who were ex-
cluded from the decision-making process. The lack of a participatory and inclu-
sive process when planning and forming Timor-Leste's armed forces later created 
discrepancies and dissatisfaction among the veteran groups regarding the non-
recognition of their contribution in the liberation of the country.560 
 
The central problems facing the defence force was the three-track operational ap-
proach and a lack of inter-agency cooperation, whereby Timor-Leste's govern-
ment was in charge of administering the force, while the funding was provided 
by bilateral assistance and donor contributions, and the practical authority and 
leadership in developing the force was under the control of UNTAET's civilian 
and military components. The bilateral donor assistance provided to the defence 
and security sector in Timor-Leste left the sector institutionally weak and lacking 
a clear political framework.561 No ministry of defence was established during the 
first three years, which significantly affected the administrative and institutional 
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development of F-FDTL as well as its political responsibility and obligation to be 
subject to civilian oversight. Furthermore, each donor country had different bu-
reaucratic procedures and there was lack of coordination, leading to the duplica-
tion of trainings.562 Little was done to transform the F-FDTL logic of guerrilla op-
erations into the mentality of a modern army, which adheres to the law and re-
spects civilian command.563 
 
The second major dimension of security sector reform was the police forces. In 
August 2001, UNTAET also established the Timor-Leste Police Service (PNTL) 
for the purpose of maintaining law and order in the territory of Timor-Leste, out-
lining a broad list of general duties and competences in line with international 
democratic policing standards.564 The responsibility of leading the PNTL was 
placed on an international police commissioner. While UNTAET left the recruit-
ment and selection of defence troops to the locals, it did not coordinate the re-
cruitment of police with the leaders of the resistance movement in Timor-Leste, 
nor with the first transitional government. During the first round, UN recruited 
former police officers that served under the Indonesian regime. The recruitment 
criteria were not compatible with the context of Timor-Leste. Setting professional 
experience as a criterion ultimately meant that the former Indonesian police 
would be more qualified than other applicants.565 The UN ignored the fact that 
some of these police had committed serious human rights abuses, were widely 
rejected by the local communities, and often served as double agents during the 
Indonesian occupation.566 Former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri confessed that 
„the UN was partially successful in building the security sector in Timor-Leste, as 
they started from the wrong basis taking the former Indonesian police on 
board.‟567 The UN was not aware and did not anticipate the multiple problems 
that this controversial recruitment process would bring.568 This and the employ-
ment of former Indonesian police marked the beginning of fragmentation within 
                                                        
562
 Human Rights Watch, Tortured Beginnings: Police Violence and the Beginnings of Impunity in Ti-
mor-Leste, Vol. 18, No. 2 (c), April 2006, p. 53. 
563
 Interview by author with a civil society activist, Dili, 09 September 2013 
564
 UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/22, On the Establishment of the Timor-Leste Police Service, UN Doc. 
UNTAET/REG/2001/22, 10 August 2001, Sec. 6 & 7. 
565
 Interview by author with former Chief of Intelligence in Timor-Leste’s Government, Dili, 10 Sep-
tember 2013. 
566
 Ibid. 
567
 Interview by author with Mari Alkatiri, former Prime Minister of Timor Leste, Dili, 13 September 
2013. 
568
 Interview by author with a director of local think-tank, Dili, 10 September 2013.  
 176 
PNTL, between those who supported independence and those who remained in 
favour of autonomy under Indonesia.  
 
The PNTL remained institutionally weak and under-resourced largely due to the 
inadequate planning and deficient mission design of UNTAET, weak and inade-
quate UN Police leadership, and the UN's failure to involve the local stakeholders 
in building an effective police service. 569 The UN did not have a strategic plan on 
how to build a new police service from scratch, nor it did develop a police de-
partment within its mission. It did not ensure that the UN civilian police recruit-
ed to serve in Timor-Leste had appropriate experience and were committed to 
developing an indigenous police service in the country. The weak UN leadership 
and inadequate UN Police commissioners were unable to develop the institu-
tional aspects of police in Timor-Leste. For almost two years, UNTAET delayed 
developing legislation on police and the entire local police structures were under 
the direct control of CIVPOL Commissioner and the UNTAET Deputy SRSG. 
When the country gained independence in 2002, a Ministry of Interior was estab-
lished that gradually began playing a role in police management and oversight.  
 
For many years, the UN's main mechanism to build the capacity of local police 
forces consisted of short basic trainings on conflict management, human rights, 
and domestic violence, as well as the dissemination of leaflets and learning mate-
rials.570 However, for Timor-Leste, this was the wrong approach. While the Ti-
mor-Leste police service mainly needed the resources to carry out their mandate, 
such as transportation, communication and other equipment, the UN only pro-
vided them with training and non-material assistance. This failed to achieve the 
goal of building a police force capable of reaching out to communities, providing 
public safety throughout the country, and gaining the respect of the local popula-
tion.571 The UN retained most policing responsibilities until late 2004 with the jus-
tification that the local police forces had not reached the standards of accredita-
tion and certification.572 Even after 2004, the PNTL continued to operate under 
                                                        
569
 Ludovic Hood, ‘Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste, 1999 – 2004’, International Peacekeeping, 
Vol.13, No.1, 2006, p. 70. 
570
 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste’, 
UN Doc. S/2002/80, 17 January 2002, p.4. 
571
 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor’, UN Doc. 
S/2002/1223, 06 November 2002, p.7. 
572
 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste’, 
UN Doc. S/2002/80, 17 January 2002, p.12. 
 177 
the supervision of the UN Police Commissioner, together with 200 police advis-
ers who assisted the development of various aspects of police in the country.573  
 
Equally, after independence the Timorese government constantly failed to define 
the specific roles of PNTL and F-FDTL for internal security, and failed to develop 
a clear policy, legal framework and institutional mechanisms to coordinate activi-
ties among themselves. The UN failed to create inter-institutional cooperation as 
it pursued a strategy of working individually with the police, defence, and justice 
institutions.574 The absence of these necessary measures left the security sector 
vulnerable and exposed to confrontation. Timor-Leste's government passed de-
cree-laws for FDTL and PNTL in 2004. The government‟s lack of will to establish 
genuine accountability and civilian oversight mechanisms is demonstrated by the 
fact that the entire regulation of defence and police forces was done at the level of 
presidential decrees, which bypassed parliamentary debates and approvals.575 
Decree-Law No. 7/2004 of May 5 2004 on the Organic Structure of the F-FDTL 
tried to clarify the command structure and institutional communication mecha-
nisms. However, the issues of inter-institutional cooperation and the discipline of 
the armed forced were not sufficiently dealt with, and needed to be developed 
further through secondary legislation. 
 
Developments surrounding the establishment and development of defence and 
police forces provide strong ingredients to trigger unanticipated consequences. 
The lack of early communication between the UN and local leadership created 
mutual misunderstandings and reduced their ability to anticipate the outcomes 
of each action undertaken. UNTAET‟s strategic direction for developing the secu-
rity sector was flawed due to a lack of expertise regarding the local language, cul-
ture, context and local power dynamics. In particular, the short-sighted and dif-
ferentiated recruitment policy for defence and police personnel was not executed 
with adequate strategic foresight for potential consequences. Moreover, the fail-
ure to establish law and institutions for the police and defence was counterintui-
tive to the declared intentions and the priority given to preparing an exit strategy 
distracted from concerns about long-term consequences. Consequently, the UN 
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and other international peacebuilding organizations did not anticipate many later 
developments. 
 
Spectrum of unanticipated consequences I 
The process of security sector development in Timor-Leste reflects the clear fail-
ure of UN and Timorese institutions to maintain the rule of law and provide se-
curity. In particular, the UN failed to deliver on its declared intention of building 
„a credible, professional and impartial police service‟.576 The comprehensive, am-
bitious, and ambiguous mandate (reflecting declared intentions) of UNTAET and 
successive UN missions led to multiple unanticipated consequences. Equally, the 
local dynamics and political fragmentation contributed to the exacerbation of cy-
cles of violence and insecurity. While the sole purpose of creating defense and 
police forces was to provide security and order in post-conflict Timor-Leste, these 
two forces ultimately became sources of insecurity, destabilization, and violence 
culminating in the 2006 crisis and state failure. Key to the emergence of the spec-
trum of consequences was the low levels of local government involvement and 
local ownership of the security sector reform process. The key actions and deci-
sions explored above regarding the treatment of ex-FALINTIL combatants, the 
development of defense and police forces, the legal and institutional ambiguity, 
the absence of donor support, limited resources, and an unclear division of roles 
led to the following consequences:  
 
1. State failure and a recurrence of violence in April and May 2006; 
2. Police impunity, unaccountability and human insecurity; and  
3. Emergence of spoiler groups.  
 
Each of these consequences is treated individually below. 
 
State failure and the recurrence of violence in April and May 2006 
 
The most visible and influential unanticipated consequence that has emerged as a 
result of the security sector development was the violence in April and May 2006. 
Many international and local actors did not anticipate the sudden outbreak of vi-
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olence in the country.577 Prior to this, between 2002 and 2006 there were a number 
of confrontations between police and defence forces, which provided solid 
grounds for anticipating an eventual large-scale outbreak of violence in Timor-
Leste. However, as the Deputy UN Police Commissioner argued: „the UN rushed 
to consider UNTAET Police component as a success based on the absence of seri-
ous security incidents on the ground, development of local police forces, and 
hand-over process‟.578 Although low-level violence was on-going, the catalyst to 
widespread violence occurred when 594 soldiers from F-FDTL were dismissed 
for abandoning their service, and they then organized a number of anti-
government protests that turned into violent riots. The group known as the „peti-
tioners‟ consisted of soldiers coming mainly from the western part of Timor-Leste 
who claimed to suffer from long-standing discrimination, suppression and une-
qual treatment within FDTL.579  
 
The government's response was slow and the protesters' impatience was reflect-
ed on Dili's streets, with youths and gangs joining them. This dissatisfaction 
stems from the UN‟s decision to leave the recruitment of defence troops to one 
political faction, which favoured ex-combatants from the eastern regions of the 
island and marginalized the western regions. The Council of Ministers called in 
F-FDTL to restore public order, which on the contrary ignited more confronta-
tion, especially with the police forces that were already disintegrating. This trig-
gered a violent clash between factions within the army and police who remained 
loyal to the government and those who rebelled to express embedded grievances. 
The armed forces opened fire on the police, resulting in the death of eleven po-
licemen, who at that particular time were under the protection of UN police. This 
confrontation came as a result of overlapping roles of F-FDTL and PDTL, as well 
as differences regarding the legitimacy of Timor-Leste‟s leadership, and the role 
each force played during the protracted resistance under the Indonesian occupa-
tion.580 
 
The violence then spread as gang warfare between groups either loyal to the de-
serters or the F-FDTL, and a sporadic and highly fluid conflict emerged between 
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changing groups, with shifting alliances and locations, spreading beyond Dili to 
rural districts.581 In parallel, grievances regarding land and property disputes 
prompted people to attempt to reclaim their lost property, seek revenge, or to de-
stroy others' property.582 The violence spread all over the country and it contin-
ued for nearly six months, resulting in 38 fatalities, the burning of 1,650 houses 
and the internal displacement of around 150,000 people.583 The violence resulted 
in gang warfare between regional groups to gain control over economic resources 
and employment. As a consequence of the failed security sector reform in Timor-
Leste, the government fell after the 2006 crisis, leading to a change of government 
and a power shift in the subsequent elections. The society-wide violence under-
mined international investment in the country and marked a serious reversal in 
the post-conflict recovery, economic stability, and social reconciliation. 
 
A UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste concluded 
that the 2006 crisis came as a result of „the fragility of State institutions and the 
weakness of the rule of law‟.584 While the UN's entire purpose in Timor-Leste was 
to build self-sufficient state structures, these very structures nearly turned the 
state and society upside down. The crisis of April and May 2006 is primarily at-
tributed to a political conflict between state institutions and the police and de-
fence forces.585 The 2006 violence revealed the fragility of state institutions, evi-
denced by a lack of loyalty to the authority and hierarchy as well as the constitu-
tional rules. Solutions to manage the crisis were sought outside the legal and in-
stitutional framework. This was evident with the disagreement between the Pres-
ident and the Prime Minister, and also by the Minister of Defence and Internal 
Affairs who did not effectively coordinate the response in an appropriate man-
ner.586 For example, the order by the Council of Ministers led by the Prime Minis-
ter to mobilize the military and to restore public order after the failure of PNTL 
was not given in writing and no formal declaration of a state of crisis was 
made.587 A number of people who were struggling to preserve or regain govern-
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mental positions played a destructive role in fragmenting the defence forces and 
police, making them fight each other.  
 
The UN's failure to develop applicable and implementable legal frameworks and 
institutional mechanisms for the police and military between 2001 and 2005 
played a strong role in the occurrence of the violence in 2006. The early problems 
of F-FDTL related to recruitment and the exclusion of sectors of society, as well as 
limited resources were later exacerbated „by the failure to develop a legal frame-
work governing its activities, mechanisms for civilian oversight and an overarch-
ing national security policy‟.588 UNMISET and the Timorese Government failed to 
develop a legal framework for defense and police forces until 2005. This effective-
ly kept the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior underdeveloped; it 
prevented any opportunity for effective civilian institutional oversight; the insti-
tutional roles of police and defence remained unclear, leading to possible over-
lap, friction and disagreement; and left Timor-Leste without a clear national se-
curity policy to guide the conduct and the development of each force.589 Conse-
quently, the defence forces that were mobilized droning 2006 crisis took uncoor-
dinated and misinformed collateral actions and decisions against the police based 
on rumours that the police were shooting F-FDTL soldiers.590  
 
The Ministry of Interior failed to develop an institutional framework for PNTL 
and for itself, leaving its affairs to be governed by personal and situational cir-
cumstances without a legal framework or standardized procedures. A UN report 
clearly admits that  „the provision of international assistance to PNTL since 1999, 
although substantial, was insufficiently coordinated and not tailored to adequate-
ly support its institutional development in the longer term.‟591 These weaknesses 
played a negative role during the 2006 cycles of violence where police command-
ers gave inadequate orders and did not manage to keep the situation under con-
trol. The police structures dissolved and regrouped around certain cleavages de-
termined mainly by geographical identity, political affiliation with certain politi-
cal leaders and narrower material interests. Finally, the UN Commission of In-
quiry noted that „there were shortcomings in the preparedness and approach of 
UNOTIL to this intervention. No crisis management team was assembled to facil-
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itate the pooling of relevant information and the identification of a clear strategy, 
including a communication strategy with the domestic authorities. No collective 
plan was devised for the intervention. Sufficient channels of communication 
were not established prior to or during the intervention, which could have facili-
tated the exercise of effective control by the senior UNOTIL leadership.‟592 
 
The events of April and May 2006 were unanticipated consequences of early an-
ticipatable developments. Critical traces of key developments prior to the crisis 
provided sufficient evidence on the potential for violence as a result of circum-
stances including strong resentment regarding the composition of the police and 
defence forces, the poor resources and unprofessional conduct of police, as well 
as weak institutional mechanisms for civilian oversight and a depoliticized secu-
rity sector. Small-scale confrontations between police and defence forces were 
intentionally ignored and inadequately addressed by the UN and local authori-
ties.593 Although the 2006 crisis was neither intended nor intentionally produced 
through previous failures, it was a product of these developments that did not 
anticipate what could happen later and prevent their occurrence. It was also the 
product of a policy of short-sightedness and the short-term involvement of UN 
missions, which paid insufficient attention to the long-term consequences of their 
purposive actions.  
 
Police impunity, unaccountability and human insecurity  
 
One of the unanticipated consequences of security sector reform in Timor-Leste 
was the development of an ineffective police service, which did not perform their 
intended primary tasks but engaged in controversial, abusive and unaccountable 
practices. PNTL developed ineffective mechanisms for dealing with internal in-
spection and disciplinary measures, which significantly hindered the investiga-
tion of incidents of violence and abuse of authority committed by police.594 After 
May 2004, UN reports show that police misconduct increased, while the lack of 
police transparency and slow investigation of cases where the police abused their 
authority contributed to a lack of accountability, which in turn reduced public 
confidence in the reliability of the police service and in their ability to maintain-
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ing order and enforcing the law.595 Individual police offers were individually re-
sponsible for human rights abuses but in many cases were unaware that their 
misconduct constituted human rights abuses. Since the laws were written mainly 
in Portuguese, the police were often unfamiliar with the legislation.596 Police with 
no formal education and only three months of training were unable to compre-
hend what was expected of them.597  
 
One of the main unanticipated consequences of the failure to institutionalize and 
establish civilian oversight systems for the police was the presence of impunity 
and human rights abuses perpetrated by police officers on the civilian popula-
tion. In such cases, no sufficient measures to ensure accountability for miscon-
duct were taken either by the UN mission or Timorese authorities. The 2006 Hu-
man Rights Watch report provides an unquestionable testimony to police vio-
lence. The report examines in details how police abuse became a serious human 
rights problem in Timor-Leste, despite the UN's extensive governance authority 
and their leading role in creating the police service.598 Similarly, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights reported on human rights abuses in the country 
and the absence of adequate accountability mechanisms.599 Violent police practic-
es include arbitrary detention, excessive use of force and torture against suspects, 
unauthorized use of firearms, and impunity for rape.600 This situation arguably 
arises due to poor training provided by UNTAET and UNMISET, the failure to 
develop accountability and oversight mechanisms for police, the failure to im-
plement PNTL Code of Conduct, and the lack of institutionalized responses to 
police brutality even six years after the formation of the PNTL.601 This police vio-
lence significantly eroded public respect and support for the police and damaged 
public faith in Timor-Leste's state institutions.  
 
Equally, the persistence of police violence exacerbated the situation further 
where people feared reporting cases or registering complaints. Such instances of 
the police abusing their power and violating the constitution and laws guiding 
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their activity also undermined Timor-Leste‟s international human rights com-
mitments and obligations. Another irresponsible police practice included the cul-
ture of verbal orders, especially related to arrests, the authorization and dissemi-
nation of ammunition, which complicated arms control and facilitated potential 
misuse, as well as promoting a culture of unaccountability and inability to track 
down those responsible.602 Three UN missions in a row (UNTAET, UNMISET, 
and UNOTIL) failed to create a police force that observed democratic policing 
standards while serving the community, but rather created a police force that 
promoted fear and violence. The UN also failed to implement disciplinary 
measures for police and to prevent the emergence of violent practices within a 
police service over which it exercised executive authority. UNTAET also failed to 
create the conditions for sufficient civilian oversight of the F-FDTL, to avoid po-
liticizing the police and to prevent a single group of local actors from dominating 
the armed forces.603 Civilian oversight of the defence forces was never articulated 
clearly in the constitution of Timor-Leste. The institutional structure to oversee 
the security sector in Timor-Leste was poorly organized by the UN and the sub-
sequent Timorese governments.604 
 
Police impunity regarding misconduct, abuse of power and violations of human 
rights was related to cultural factors but also to the process of how the UN police 
trained and monitored these forces. The UN did not intend to create a violent and 
abusive police force nor did it anticipate that the police would abuse their posi-
tion.605 However, ignoring individual cases where the police violated human 
rights, as well as the UN's belief that the behaviour of the police would improve 
over time has been a costly endeavour. The trajectories of police performance 
based on their everyday conduct and institutional maturity provide a sufficient 
basis to anticipate future actions. The possible development of a violent and un-
ruly police force was certainly known to the UN, but steps were not taken to re-
direct this trajectory during a preventable stage of development. This signifies 
that anticipation without affirmative action is only partially useful and does not 
serve the purpose of preventing the harmful effects of purposive action.  
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The emergence of spoiler groups  
 
As a consequence of the exclusionary process of developing the defence and po-
lice forces, as well as the inappropriate provision of security and enforcement of 
the rule of law, a large number of spoiler groups emerged consisting of disaffect-
ed former FALENTIL fighters intermeshed with criminal and clandestine groups, 
which threatened everyday peace, undermined state institutions, and nurtured 
communal division and conflict.606 Enshrined in cultural and indigenous roots, 
martial arts groups in Timor-Leste played an important role in the public and 
community life. Various martial arts groups have over 40,000 members, some of 
whom were mobilized during the 2006 crisis and during prior incidents.607 The 
UN largely ignored them, while during 2005 the President engaged in a failed 
effort to unite these groups in a pledge to resolve conflicts peacefully and to es-
tablish a mediation mechanism to resolve disputes.608 The defence and police 
forces' poor management of weapons stockpiles, followed by a lack of political 
oversight regarding the procurement, storage and distribution of small arms re-
sulted in the armament of gangster groups who illegally created zones of insecu-
rity.609 This mismanagement is also directly linked to the UN's inability to control 
the possession of weaponry among the defence and police forces, as part of the 
local ownership process. It is rightly argued that the ability to access small arms 
resulted in the proliferation of martial arts groups and gangs. 610 
 
The first signs of the emergence of spoiler groups arose during the internment of 
FALINTIL troops. The UN and INTERFET did not anticipate the consequences 
that would arise from the removal of ex-combatants from public life. Many for-
mer combatants left Aileu, acquired weapons and began disregarding the rules 
and weakening their discipline. The radicalization of ex-combatants came as a 
result of UNTAET‟s exclusionary practices towards the former members of 
FALINTIL.611  The decision to delay establishing the defence forces came as a re-
sult of institutional ambiguity within the UN and shortages of qualified interna-
tional staff to continue developing the force. One study reveals that this delay 
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„had negative repercussions on the relationship with the Timor-Leste leadership 
and resulted in a loss of credibility of UNTAET‟.612 Furthermore, when the condi-
tions were in place, the process of establishing FDTL, including the registration 
and selection process, suffered several shortcomings leading to the unanticipated 
consequence of forming disenfranchised groups who constantly challenged the 
new defence force.  
 
The recruitment for F-FDTL ran against the cultural setting in Timor-Leste, which 
created social divisions and undermined the principle of national unity, which 
had guided the struggle for liberation. Furthermore, the re-integration pro-
gramme ran by IOM and World Bank did not help the process as the intended 
targets were not reached and inadequate assistance was provided to ex-
combatants, creating mounting frustration and anger among the unemployed 
demobilized groups.613 In particular, UNTAET did not sufficiently anticipate and 
prevent the emergence of independent security groups that operated in the rural 
areas, engaged in criminal and clandestine activities, posed continuous threats to 
public safety and challenged the state institutions.614 The IOM FALINTIL Rein-
sertion Assistance Programme and the establishment of an Office of Veteran Af-
fairs at the Timorese Government were insufficient measures to deal with these 
groups. A more transparent, socially acceptable, and accountable process would 
have created a greater sense of local ownership, and security sector reform that 
reflected consensual transformation and reconciliation in the country. Another 
unanticipated consequence of the closed process of recruiting the defence forces 
and involving ex-Indonesian police in the new police structures resulted in the 
denial of community-level support for new security forces by the excluded veter-
an groups organized around marital arts groups or gangs, who had close ties 
with community leaders that were the most trusted agents and main sources of 
information.615 The presence of several informal and parallel structures between 
the citizens and state security apparatus served as the main obstacle to the west-
ern-oriented logic of law enforcement and the rule of law over traditional forms 
of justice.   
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The UN and other international agencies involved in Timor-Leste did not antici-
pate sufficiently that their early choices on how to deal with ex-combatants and 
dissatisfied groups would contribute to strengthening of martial arts groups, 
which challenged the rule of law, order, and stability of the new nation. Inade-
quate small arms control also provoked the growth and expansion of these 
groups. Beyond this, most of the consequences that occurred as a result of securi-
ty sector reform in Timor-Leste were neither anticipated, nor intended and pre-
vented. The predominant reason for this was a lack of mature contingency plan-
ning, a mandate with inadequate resources, insufficient staff with the necessary 
skills and local knowledge, and inadequate communication and ineffective work-
ing relationships between local and international stakeholders. Even the UN Sec-
retary-General Kofi Annan admitted that „the number and quality of police offic-
ers in East Timor was far from adequate … there were different policing doc-
trines and procedures at work simultaneously, which hampered the unity and 
effectiveness of the force‟.616 Consequently, the good intentions to establish a se-
curity infrastructure in Timor-Leste were not translated into adequate actions, 
where the negative consequences were not anticipated and prevented during 
preventable stages. 
 
Critical turning point II: Security sector review and reform 
Following the 2006 crisis, the main concern in Timor-Leste was to restore security 
and reform the security institutions. This formed the bedrock for the declared in-
tentions, which were the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of PNTL and to 
conduct a comprehensive security sector review. After the 2006 crisis, UNMIT 
police reassumed the responsibility for restoring peace and enforcing public or-
der in Timor-Leste, although their authority was not extended to the sub-district 
level. A joint agreement between the Government of Timor-Leste and UNMIT 
outlined the executive policing task granted to UNMIT police.617 UNMIT was 
vested with „all police powers which are conferred on and enjoyed by PNTL po-
lice officers by and pursuant to the national laws of Timor-Leste‟ and were also 
granted the authority to for arrests, detention, entry, search, seizure, and investi-
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gations.618 Nevertheless, civil society considered the joint agreement illegal under 
the applicable Timorese law, as it was not ratified by the national parliament.619 
The UN took almost a year to deploy its police, who were located throughout the 
country. This delay left Timor-Leste without an effective law enforcement agency 
on the ground for nearly a year during which time crime and violence were 
widespread. Indeed the number of killings after 2006 was much higher than dur-
ing the peak of the April/May violence. Until 2008, Dili was the main battlefield 
for constant political, communal and gang violence. Multiple sources confirm 
that around 150 persons died as a result of this small-scale but repetitive cycle of 
violence. 
 
After 2006, F-FDTL developed its capacities alone without much involvement or 
assistance from UNMIT, mainly through bilateral military cooperation pro-
grammes. However, accountability for the 2006 violence instigated by F-FDTL 
members remained unresolved and ignored by the national and international ac-
tors. In 2007, F-FDTL developed its own defence strategy „Force 2020‟ where it 
outlined the key threats and its vision for military development.620 The document 
was highly criticized by the UN and other international stakeholders for failing to 
delineate and define the role of military forces within the state security infra-
structure. In 2011, the government produced a development plan for F-FDTL en-
visaging the recruitment of an additional 600 members.621 The support and con-
tribution of UNMIT military liaison officers was peripheral and insignificant.  
 
This initial assessment of PNTL revealed institutional, policy and capacity weak-
nesses, and even six-month trainings provided by UNMIT police did not help 
over half of the national police to pass the final certification test.622 The key chal-
lenges to the security sector, identified by UNMIT included „the need to improve 
relations between the security forces, strengthen the legal framework, increase 
operational capabilities and enhance civilian oversight‟.623 In January 2007, the 
UN Police completed an assessment of technical and administrative capacities of 
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the PNTL, including internal accountability mechanisms. However, the Timorese 
Minister for Interior rejected the assessment on the grounds that local actors were 
not consulted; the report contained considerable duplications, inconsistencies 
and weaknesses and was not oriented to the local context.624 Parallel to UNMIT's 
engagement in SSR, bilateral donors established their own programmes to assist 
the police and the defence forces, which were loosely coordinated among them.  
 
The screening and mentoring of PNTL occurred mainly during 2007 when 3,110 
police were registered and vetted for previous activities and criminal records. 
This was three-step process consisting of a background check on each police of-
ficer followed by issuing a provisional certification, attending a one-week train-
ing course and then a six months‟ probation phase under the mentorship of a UN 
police officer.625 However, the vetting process to screen for participation in crimes 
and violence in 2006 suffered from multiple challenges and ineffective manage-
ment. The mentoring process was also slow due to technical and human limita-
tions within UN Police, which frustrated the national police as well as govern-
mental officials. The mentoring was conducted according to multiple modes, 
standards, and criteria, which led to different assessments and incoherent certifi-
cation dynamics. The frequent rotation of UN Police further complicated the 
mentoring process, undermining institutional continuity, consistency, and coher-
ence. Frustrated with the process the Ministry of Interior of Timor-Leste had ini-
tiated in late 2006 its own parallel vetting process, which created conflicting, dual 
and overlapping outcomes. The UN Police rarely interacted with local police, as 
they could not communicate in local languages. Like in many post-conflict socie-
ties, international police antagonized local counterparts due to unequal working 
conditions, significant differences in salaries, power relations, and cultural differ-
ences. There were no joint patrols and community policing was very weak.626  
 
In 2008, a UN expert mission found multiple problems with the certification pro-
cess, criticizing the process for being „relatively unsystematic‟ and lacking a „clear 
certification strategy that outlined target numbers over a defined period of time 
and did not prioritize the certification of commanding officers‟.627 The expert 
mission also noted the absence of a „defined certification policy outlining the cer-
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tification process as well as detailed certification criteria and decision-making 
modalities‟.628 The screening and mentoring process did not have a corrective 
impact, as multiple cases illustrate police misconduct, abuse of power, and 
threats against civilians by the very same police that successfully underwent the 
reform process.629 The UN Police antagonized the PNTL by undertaking police 
screening for all districts, despite the fact that the 2006 crisis and police miscon-
duct was centred mainly on the Dili region. Accordingly, those who worked in 
peripheral districts felt that they were being punished.630 Another problem was 
that the local police who could understand English or/and Portuguese were 
passing the screening process more quickly, while those who were potentially 
more professional but only spoke Tetum faced a prolonged verification and certi-
fication process.631   
 
A major aspect of post-2006 developments in Timor-Leste was the comprehen-
sive review of the security sector, which was not implemented as expected. Alt-
hough the Timorese government formally led the process, UNMIT also claimed 
ownership of the process, while blaming the government for the delay.632 The re-
view process required finding ways to „improve inter-operationability between 
the security institutions, increase operational capabilities, strengthen legal 
frameworks, and enhance civilian oversight mechanisms‟.633 A major problem 
with the review process was a lack of clarity regarding what to review and how 
to do it. To establish how to handle the security sector review, UNMIT estab-
lished a Security Sector Review Unit (SSRU), which was not functional until Au-
gust 2007 due to delays in recruiting the international staff. By the time UNMIT-
SSRU managed to secure its presence toward the end of 2007 and to consolidate 
sufficient donations, the national actors no longer had sufficient interest to re-
view the security sector. For almost six years, the security sector in Timor-Leste 
was handled loosely through weak cooperation between the governmental min-
istries in charge of defence, police, and security, the F-FDTL, PNTL, and the in-
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ternational presence.634 The short, yet sequential extension of UNMIT's mandate 
left little room for policy planning and sustainable engagement, but rather led to 
short-term policies and perspectives.  
 
In December 2009, an internal UN audit revealed that the support provided by 
UNMIT to security sector review and reform in Timor-Leste has not been fully 
effective.635 The critical report found that there was lack of coordination between 
the other partners and no consolidated methodology, or a plan of action devel-
oped in conjunction with other national and local stakeholders.636 Due to unnec-
essary delays, UNMIT failed to involve PNTL in the early process of police re-
form, restructuring and rebuilding, which then resulted with the rejection of the 
latter‟s endorsement of UNMIT's plan and actions.637 Another deficiency was the 
recruitment of inadequate international advisers who were unable to provide 
support to the national government, while the latter had intentionally tried to 
keep them away from any consultative or joint collaborative process. Conse-
quently, in adverse circumstances, advisers were not involved in drafting the leg-
islative framework for the security sector.638 Another independent review of this 
project found numerous weaknesses and shortcomings regarding efforts to con-
duct the security sector review, starting from the lack of national ownership, the 
absence of baseline assessment, inappropriate staffing, and systematic disagree-
ments between UNDP and UNMIT (UN-DPKO).639  
 
Although security sector reform was a priority for UNMIT and Timor-Leste's 
Government, during a personal visit to Dili the Assistant Secretary-General 
Dmitry Titov admitted that the concept and activities were elusive, that the gov-
ernment did not have clarity on the need to undertake a comprehensive and ho-
listic security sector review, and that the undefined role between F-FDTL and 
PNTL „may present a long-term security danger‟.640 In 2010, a UN technical as-
sessment mission concluded that the comprehensive review of the security sector 
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had progressed slowly and there were insufficient results regarding civilian 
oversight, the formulation of national security policies, the delineation of roles 
between F-FDTL and PNTL, and institutional and logistical capacities remained 
weak.641 The Timorese did not appear to understand security sector reform and 
the UN failed to reform the security sector. 642 Most senior civilian personnel in 
the Timorese government still do not understand the meaning of a security sector 
review. Members of parliament understood little about security and defence af-
fairs, partially as they did not have security related backgrounds, and were ex-
cluded from the consultative processes by the UN and the Timorese government. 
While civilian oversight aims to reduce and address the abuse of power, this 
mechanism was not developed in the Timorese case.643  
 
Facing growing dissatisfaction regarding UNMIT's ineffective police reform pro-
cess and slow progress on security sector reform, UNMIT prematurely trans-
ferred responsibilities to PNTL between early 2009 and May 2011. To make the 
process look efficient, UNMIT outlined conditionality regarding the hand-over of 
the police responsibilities to PNTL based on three factors: completing the regis-
tration and certification of police in all districts; achieving PNTL reform, restruc-
turing, and rebuilding; and establishing general law and order in Timor-Leste.644 
The UN Secretary-General explicitly admitted that „the resumption of responsi-
bilities does not mean that the national police has successfully completed its de-
velopment nor that it is prepared to take on those responsibilities without con-
tinuing international assistance‟.645  
 
By 2012 when UNMIT ended its mission, the security sector review was incom-
plete and the civilian oversight of security forces remained ineffective, and the 
command and control structures remained highly politicized. Despite the fragile 
security institutions, a 2012 UN Security Council mission found national consen-
sus among all Timorese interlocutors that UNMIT should conclude its mandate 
and no longer needed to be on the UN Security Council agenda.646 From the 
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Timorese perspective, the country would have an unstable image as long as the 
UN was there. An adviser to the President admitted that „this is one of the rea-
sons why Timor-Leste's prime minister wanted to end UNMIT, although they 
asked to extend their mandate, and of course they did not get it‟.647 UNMIT pub-
licized their perceived successes including: stabilizing internal security; re-
establishing police activities; certifying PNTL members; transferring policing re-
sponsibilities; securing the 2007 electoral processes; and restructuring the PNTL 
in 2012.648 These highlights serve more as indicators of input rather than impact. 
They are not signifiers of positive legacies in the country. In a rather cynical dis-
course on the departure of UNMIT, UN Police Commissioner Luís Miguel Car-
rilho stated that PNTL officers are „confidently out on the streets, maintaining 
law and order, investigating crimes, controlling traffic, accompanying VIPs, pa-
trolling border areas and keeping communities safe‟.649 
 
The second critical turning point that provided an opportunity to deal effectively 
with security structures in Timor-Leste arose after the 2006 violence, when the 
need for a comprehensive security sector reform and review was widespread. 
However, as the evidence suggests here, this was another missed opportunity for 
the UN and the national authorities to reform, restructure and rebuild police and 
defence forces, and to undertake a compressive and holistic security sector re-
view. Although the Timorese government invited the UN and international pres-
ence and agreed upon comprehensive police reform and a security sector re-
view650, once the 2006 emergency phase concluded, the Timorese authorities were 
driven by a desire for national ownership and embedded distrust in the UN. 
They intentionally avoided their obligations and did not cooperate with the ef-
forts of UNMIT or the UN Police to reform the police and review the security sit-
uation. 651    
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Spectrum of unanticipated consequences II 
This analysis of the key actions and decisions taken by the international and do-
mestic actors to address the security situation after the 2006 violence and to re-
form the security sector has revealed numerous problems, failures and paradox-
es. After 2006, the UN was unable to fulfil its declared intention of reforming the 
security sector in Timor-Leste due to internal problems regarding a lack of capac-
ity, their failure to engage effectively with the Timorese government, and the 
domestic obstacles set by local actors who were reluctant to return temporary 
control over uniformed forces to the UN. On the other hand, while the national 
authorities required international support to restore peace and stability, they 
missed the opportunity to strengthen the police and defence forces, thereby en-
trenching political control and interference in the police and defence forces; they 
missed the opportunity to develop democratic and civilian oversight over the se-
curity sector, and to make these institutions sources of human security rather 
than catalysts for conflict. In this regard, three major unanticipated consequences 
emerged during this phase:  
 
1. Blurred lines of responsibility between the defence and police forces; 
2. The politicization and impunity of the police; and 
3. Damaged relations and distrust between the UN and Timorese authori-
ties.  
 
Each of these consequences is treated individually below. 
 
Blurred lines of responsibility between the defence and police forces 
 
The blurred lines of responsibility between the defence and police was one of the 
underlying causes of the 2006 violence and subsequently became a serious issue 
that needed to be addressed seriously by UNMIT during security sector reform. 
However, little was achieved and after twelve years of operation, PNTL and F-
FDTL continue to have blurred responsibilities, as each force has a unit within 
their structures that could fulfil the role of the other organization. To a large ex-
tent it was not anticipated and expected that police and defence would continue 
to suffer from undefined roles after extensive UN support for reforming police 
since 2006. While the police should deal primarily with maintaining public order 
and law enforcement, and the defence forces remain the entity responsible for 
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dealing with external threats, in Timor-Leste, the police continue to have special 
rapid response units, while the defence force has an active military police sec-
tions. A predominant view exists among the F-FDTL ranks that PNTL remains a 
threat to the army and to the wider Timorese society. 652 
 
After many delays, the national parliament of Timor-Leste passed three essential 
security laws: on internal security; on national defence, and on the police. Alt-
hough the lengthy law on national defence primarily attributed the defence func-
tions to F-FDTL, it also paid detailed attention to the national defence policy, ci-
vilian oversight, disciplinary measures, and the institutional structure of the sov-
ereign organs that are responsible for national defence, including civilian-
military cooperation. The Decree-Law No. 9/2009 of 2009 on the Organic Law of 
PNTL redefined the police as „a security force whose mission is to defend demo-
cratic legality, guarantee people‟s security and property, and safeguard citizens‟ 
rights in accordance with the Constitution and the Law‟.653 Although it explicitly 
referred to past mistakes, the decree-law holds that the PNTL „shall have the 
characteristics of a community police, its nature shall be identical to that of the 
military insofar as its organisation, discipline, training and personal status are 
concerned without however constituting a force of a military nature.‟654 The 
PNTL decree-law again authorizes PNTL to use force and weapons in self-
defence and in special circumstances when facing „illegitimate‟ public resistance. 
A Special Unit Force with military attributes was regulated to function as part of 
PNTL. However, the existence of this new body of security legislation is not of 
much use in practice as the PNTL's limited understanding of the new laws posed 
a serious challenge for implementing them in practice. The legislation was often 
drafted in Portuguese and English, while most national police only speak Tetum 
and Indonesian.  
 
Among the key security stakeholders, it is widely perceived that these unbal-
anced capabilities between the police and defence forces would raise new institu-
tional and security dilemmas.655 However, it was not anticipated that local stake-
holders would fail to define further security responsibilities in the country. Blur-
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ring lines between security institutions leaves room for confrontation and inter-
ference in each other's primary responsibilities. In December 2008, a confidential 
post-visit report of the UN Assistant Secretary General for the Rule of Law and 
Security Institutions concluded that „despite progress made recently, the country 
remains weak and a potential for rapid deterioration is still there‟.656 The report 
criticized the fact that the whole political landscape is controlled by four persons 
(President Ramos-Horta, Prime Minister Gusma, FALENTIL leader Alkatiri, and 
F-FDTL Commander Rauk), revealing the lack of influence of recently established 
laws and institutions, including the parliament. Regarding security institutions, 
the report concludes that „major underlying fault lines persist, albeit at a dimin-
ishing level‟, while highlighting that „the mistrust between the F-FTDL and the 
PNTL is still obvious, with the former claiming that the police are not yet ready 
to resume responsibility for law and order‟.657 PNTL suffers from „tremendous 
institutional gaps‟, including weak management and command, core investiga-
tive capacity, and the absence of logistics systems.658  
 
The slow progress in reforming the police was stalled further in February 2008, 
when the President and Prime Minister were attacked by an armed group led by 
fugitive Alfredo Reinado, the former Military Police Commander of the armed 
forces of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL).659 This was not anticipated nor effectively pre-
vented beforehand when the fugitive was operating illegally after 2006. The as-
sault resulted in the death of Reinado and serious injuries for the President. This 
constituted one of the gravest threats to peace and security since independence in 
2002. Following this, a state of siege was announced in the country, which limited 
the freedom of movement and imposed a widespread curfew. A joint command 
between F-FDTL and PNTL was established to restore peace and stability after 
the assassination attempt, which was largely considered effective. The handling 
of the situation was praised as a successful example of cooperation between secu-
rity forces and a positive indicator of resilience within Timorese institutions. 
However the state of siege resulted in violations of civilians' human rights. 
UNMIT human rights observers reported „excessive use of force and intimida-
tion, against civilians during operations by the Timor-Leste security forces in the 
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aftermath of the attacks‟.660 In this regard, the February 2008 Joint Command 
weakened the efforts to delineate the responsibilities between the police and de-
fence forces and adversely blurred further the lines of responsibility. However, it 
can be argued that due to UNPOL's lack of effective command and control over 
PNTL, the February 2008 Joint Military Police Command was formed without 
UNMIT permission. 
 
Almost twelve years after the establishment of security institutions in Timor-
Leste, the rules and protocols of cooperation and coordination between police 
and defence remain undefined in case crisis situations arise again. No secondary 
legislation was enacted to address these issues. Despite calls by local UN work-
ers, UNMIT resisted developing such rules of engagement. Although effective 
consultations are currently held between police and defence forces, this only 
takes place when there is a problem. Under normal circumstances, there is no 
consultation or information-sharing regarding security-related issues. The Vice 
Chief of F-FDTL admits that theoretically, the relationship between F-FDTL and 
PNTL is very good but accepted that the relationships need to improve further 
stating that „the original sin in the security sector in Timor-Leste is leaving un-
clear the responsibilities between police and defence forces‟.661 Blurred lines of 
responsibility between police and defence forces were exploited by local political 
leaders for political and instrumentalist purposes to safeguard their power and to 
ensure the presence of an armed wing to defend their interests. This is directly 
related to the early failure of the UN to divide effectively the roles and create in-
stitutional safeguards that would ensure effective operations to uphold the rule 
of law and democratic standards.  
 
The politicization and impunity of the police  
 
The incomplete security sector reform and the failed attempts to restructure 
PNTL unintentionally and with little foreign enabled the creation of embedded 
political influence over PNTL. Knowing the extensive UNMIT investment it was 
not anticipated after 2006 that police would continue to be politicized and unac-
countable. The legacy of unaccountability and politicization persists. Facing mul-
tiple problems with individual screening and certification, UNMIT and UNPOL 
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were unable to engage in institutional reform within PNTL structures. The disci-
plinary mechanisms within PNTL are still unsatisfactory and ad-hoc in nature. 
Diplomatic reports portrayed PNTL as having „an institutional culture in which 
accountability is less important than political and/or personal interests; a politi-
cized police force where commanders, particularly at the district level, are be-
holden to their political masters; and regional divisions that emerged last year as 
the destructive East versus West dynamic shows signs of becoming en-
trenched‟.662   
 
Due to multiple irregularities during the screening and certification process, a 
large number of PNTL officers were in service, which had not passed any proce-
dures, including officers with records of human rights abuses and criminal in-
volvement. The absence of a disciplinary system and a mechanism to remove 
PNTL members who were unsuitable undermined significantly the seriousness 
and integrity of the certification process. The UN did not anticipate this. On an-
other level, the UN police screening process was undermined when President 
Ramos-Horta nominated to senior positions two police inspectors who were con-
sidered unsuitable for certification due to previous records of human rights 
abuses. The former UN SRSG for Timor-Leste Atul Khare furiously considered 
this as negating several months of the certification process and drew attention to 
the „severe impact on morale of those PNTL officers who have been found suita-
ble to return to duty‟, as they could now „come under the command of individu-
als who have past cases against them‟.663 
 
Although UNMIT police conducted multiple trainings during the certification 
and reformation of PNTL, annual figures since 2007 catalogue thousands of cases 
of misconduct among 3,108 police officers that had passed the certification pro-
cess.664 This is a clear indication of the limited impact of UNMIT police on the 
impunity and culture of violence among local police forces. Between 2006 and 
2010, UNMIT human rights officers observed weak discipline and human rights 
violations in the ranks of F-FDTL and PNTL, as well as illegal use of firearms, 
cruel and degrading treatment of civilians and arbitrary arrests.665 Despite all this 
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explicit evidence, to date no effective accountability mechanism is in place to ad-
dress alleged cases of misconduct by F-FDTL and PNTL members. The work of 
an F-FDTL-PTNL Joint Command, F-FDTL Military Discipline Regulations, and 
the newly established Professional Ethics Office within PTNL have provided in-
sufficient accountability measures, because limited resources and insufficient in-
vestigative expertise hampered their intended goals.666 Furthermore, despite re-
cent attempts to reform the police service, including the certification and resump-
tion process and the approval of the Organic Law of the Police in 2009, there is 
still no clear division of tasks thereby leaving space for ambiguity and potentially 
conflicting duties between the police and armed forces.667 Weak civilian oversight 
does not provide incentives for police to obey the new laws. Consequently, the 
violent behaviour of police and armed forces has created distrust between the 
population and the security institutions. A 2010 investigative report on the situa-
tion of human rights in Timor-Leste observed that people declined to file official 
complaints, due to a „lack of confidence that their complaints would be taken se-
riously by PNTL, fear of repercussion, and a preference for resolving the case 
through informal mechanisms‟.668 
 
UNMIT was unsuccessful in its attempts to reform the police and the post-2006 
screening, training, and certification process of local police forces has been incon-
sistent, ineffective and unproductive. The handover process was premature and 
undermined the reforms initiated after 2006. These inadequacies have encour-
aged local police forces to continue abusing their police authority abuse the hu-
man rights of civilians. UNMIT failed to anticipate that their gradual handover of 
policing responsibilities after 2006 would not result in more effective and ac-
countable police forces and it missed the last opportunity to reform these struc-
tures before its exit in 2012. 
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Damaged relations and distrust between the UN and Timorese authorities  
 
Following the cycles of violence during 2006, the relationship between UNMIT 
and Timorese government, including here F-FDTL and PNTL were fragile and 
extensively damaged. This is largely due to the fact that a significant portion of 
responsibility for these persisting weaknesses within the police can be attributed 
to the UNMIT police, who lacked specialized police trainers and advisers. An 
unanticipated consequence of the prolonged process of police certification and 
reform was the increased resentment among local police commanders who con-
sidered that the related delay to their operational policing had weakened the 
public trust in the police.669 Due to the subordinated position of local police, the 
relationship between PNTL and UNMIT police remained fragile throughout the 
certification and reformation process. Such a fragile relationship weakened the 
impact of UNMIT police training, capacity building, and institutional develop-
ment.670 Equally, distrust at the highest political level intensified, where the entire 
political spectrum agreed to an early UN exit in spite of limited progress 
achieved after 2006. 
 
The UN Police lost credibility when interacting with the PNTL and national 
Timorese counterparts as a result of the lack of qualified police personnel and se-
rious concerns regarding their ability to assist and mentor the PNTL. Many 
UNPOL officers came from countries that suffer from poor policing capacity, had 
no training skills, and had no knowledge of English or other locally spoken lan-
guages.671 A significant number of UNPOL were deployed from countries with 
poor human rights records, which significantly reduced their leverage and ability 
to inculcate local police with democratic values and respect for human rights. 
National leaders openly acknowledged the limitations of UNPOL officers.672  
 
A direct consequence of the damaged relationship and distrust between UNMIT, 
UNPOL and Timorese authorities was the limited leverage and impact that UN 
advisers placed within these institutions could play in the long run. UNMIT staff 
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working on justice and security as well as human rights advisers, was not given 
sufficient access to Timorese institutions. A UN adviser admitted that after de-
parture of UNMIT in 2012, the remaining UN agencies suffered from the legacies 
of previous UN missions in Timor-Leste, as the national authorities do not coop-
erate sufficiently with them due to the distrust and antagonistic relationship de-
veloped with UNMIT.673 Consequently, the legacy of the decade of the UN's 
heavy footprint presence in Timor-Leste is local non-cooperation with the UN 
agencies. The locals claim that they know how to manage alone and that they 
don‟t need the UN.674 
 
The distrust also seems to be driven by a national consensus among the Timorese 
political, civil society and security leadership that the 2006 and 2008 crisis were 
overcome without support from the international community, which is not en-
tirely congruent with the facts on the ground - considering the renewed interna-
tional civilian and military presence in the country. Therefore, a sense of self-
sufficiency, normalcy, and resiliency is present among the key national leaders, 
who articulate it with pride but thereby undermine and downgrade the invest-
ment and agency of the international community in Timor-Leste.675 
 
The UN involvement in Timor-Leste after 2006 came as a result of unanticipated 
consequences caused by earlier decisions and other actions that followed within 
the police and defence sectors. After 2006, UNMIT did not seem to have learnt 
the lessons of previous UN failures. As examined in this chapter, security sector 
reform after 2006 ended before completion due to UNMIT's delays and inade-
quacies, and the lack of commitment for cooperation and change among the local 
leaders. Consequently, the process left the whole police and defence sectors with 
unclear responsibilities and with space for mutual disagreements. The issue of 
police impunity remains unresolved, and the UN's whole investment has been 
undermined as a result of distrust and antagonism developed over the years be-
tween the UN and local stakeholders. The permanent state of contingency within 
the UN and the constant pursuit of an exit strategy was the overarching problem 
in Timor-Leste after 2006. Consequently, the UN lacked anticipatory engagement 
to reduce the consequences of their actions.   
 
                                                        
673
 Interview by author with a UN officer, Dili, 12 September 2013. 
674
 Ibid. 
675
 Interview by author with Mari Alkatiri, former Prime Minister of Timor-Leste; Brigadier General 
Filomeno da Paixao de Jesus, Vice Chief of F-FDTL; and a civil society activist, Dili, September 2013. 
 202 
The above analysis of two critical turning points and their unanticipated conse-
quences in Timor-Leste illustrates that the UN and the broader international 
presence in Timor-Leste did not have effective and systematic anticipatory early 
warning systems. If internal analysis was conducted, it was not translated into 
effective action that would prevent deviations from the original declared inten-
tions. Some justify this by emphasizing that the UN did not have an intelligence 
or research office.676 Almost no policy, academic authority, or governmental enti-
ty conducted impact assessment in Timor-Leste. This is justified with the absence 
of sufficient knowledge and access to the beneficiary communities, as well as the 
necessity to observe the dynamics and changes over a long period of time.677 Fur-
thermore, the frequent extension of UNMIT's mandate left insufficient room for 
prediction, planning, and sustainable actions. Monitoring and evaluation systems 
across all these agents were weak, sporadic, unsystematic, and isolated from their 
programmes. 
 
Responsibility for unanticipated consequences  
One of the main declared intentions of international governance in Timor-Leste 
was to establish security, the rule of law and remove external threats through 
creating new police and defence forces. While the UN's first attempt to establish 
police services occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Timor-Leste represented the first 
time the UN led the process of creating an army for a territory that was to be-
come an independent state. In implementing these declared intentions, consecu-
tive UN missions have avoided taking responsibility for the unanticipated conse-
quences of their purposive actions, while exercising absolute authority, alongside 
the unsupportive local culture of tolerating impunity at the institutional level and 
prioritizing forgiveness at the societal level. In Timor-Leste the UN exercised au-
thority without a clearly defined mandate and without taking responsibility for 
their actions and the related consequences. On substance, the UN did not have a 
clear legal mandate to deal with the establishment of defence and police forces, 
but nonetheless took the key decisions concerning their establishment (through 
UNTAET regulations), the selection process and exercise of favouritism towards 
FALINTIL ex-combatants, as well as retaining direct control over the local police 
service through the UN Police Commissioner. 
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However in the performance of such duties, there were no sufficient institutional 
mechanisms in place, except for an ineffective and temporary Ombudsperson 
alongside several UN-led ad-hoc commissions and observation missions, which 
mainly carried attributability functions. The Ombudsperson, which was estab-
lished in 2001 as part of the UNTAET, had elements of an attributability mecha-
nism, whereby it could recommend „changes to any policies, procedures, regula-
tions, programs and institutional decisions that are unfair, discriminatory, and 
unjust or which violate human rights‟.678 However, due to a lack of support from 
the Transitional Administrator, the Office of the Ombudsperson remained largely 
ineffective, marginalized, and restricted to protecting human rights and holding 
the international presence responsible for their actions and decisions.679 It also 
remains unclear on what basis the Office of the Ombudsperson operated, as there 
was no formal legal document issued to regulate its operation and jurisdiction.680 
Parallel to this, UNTAET had a Human Rights Unit, which served as a mecha-
nism where the East Timorese could file complaints against UNTAET. However, 
in practice this body dealt more with capacity-building and trainings than serv-
ing as a remedial action mechanism for human rights abuses.681  
 
The first critical turning point examined in this chapter occurred immediately af-
ter the establishment of UNTAET in 1999 and continued until 2001 when the po-
lice and defence forces were established and gradually consolidated. As a result, 
a number of unanticipated consequences occurred. The first major unanticipated 
consequence of the inadequacies in recruiting and developing the capacities of 
police and defence forces was the violence in 2006, which resulted in widespread 
destruction. While the primary responsibility for these events falls with the local 
leaders, police and defence forces, the UN also shares a portion of responsibility. 
In practice, only attributability practices have been invoked for the 2006 violence. 
A UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste compiled a 
report on the facts that led to the 2006 violence and explicitly attributed various 
types and proportions of responsibility with particular local agents and institu-
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tions.682 The nature of crimes and injuries for which individual responsibility was 
ascribed varied from civilian fatalities, serious injuries from firearms and gre-
nades, attacks against public and private property, unlawful orders from senior 
officers, and non-action to prevent acts of collateral damage and violence, despite 
having the necessary knowledge.683  
 
Institutional responsibility is attributed for „acts and omissions of institutions 
which materially contributed to the events‟.684 Specific to the emergence and 
handling of the 2006 crisis, the report finds that the handling of the petition and 
subsequent dismissal of the petitioners contributed to the crisis since the gov-
ernment failed to address the demands of petitioners in a timely, inclusive and 
appropriate manner.685 Similarly the collective dismissal of almost one third of 
the defence forces was premature and did not anticipate the repercussions and 
consequences such a decision would produce. In relation to all these ascribed 
events and institutional failures, the UN report only attributes responsibility to 
particular political and institutional leaders. 
 
However, the UN commission of inquiry attributed only weak and vague re-
sponsibility to UNOTIL while entirely ignoring the role of UNTAET and 
UNMISET for the consequences that occurred as a result of their executive deci-
sions to establish and build the capacities of the police and defence forces. At-
tributability is articulated in the following format:  
 
…there were shortcomings in the preparedness and approach of UNOTIL 
to this intervention. No crisis management team was assembled to facili-
tate the pooling of relevant information and the identification of a clear 
strategy, including a communication strategy with domestic authorities. 
No collective plan was devised for the intervention. There do not appear 
to have been sufficient channels of communication established prior to or 
during the intervention to enable effective control to be exercised by the 
senior UNOTIL leadership. No specific directions were given to those 
who volunteered to intervene. Great reliance appears to have been placed 
on the personal military and police experience of certain individuals. A 
more coordinated approach might have permitted greater use of the col-
lective resources of UNOTIL in the intervention.686 
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The other unanticipated consequence of the poor development of police forces 
was the persistence of impunity, unaccountability and human rights abuses 
committed by police forces. These abuses occurred during the time UN had an 
extensive police presence and tolerated such misconduct. The failure of the UN in 
this regard needs to be attributed and the UN was not held answerable for these 
consequences. The UN is also responsible for failing to develop timely safeguards 
to ensure the clear delineation of roles between the police and defence forces. 
Equally, the UN should be held responsible for not establishing civilian oversight 
of security institutions, particularly for failing to strengthen parliamentary scru-
tiny over the police and defence forces. Nevertheless, there is a strong case to 
hold answerable local political leaders, who instrumentalized both the police and 
defence forces for political interests thereby threatening peace and stability dur-
ing Timor-Leste's transition to independence and subsequent consolidation of 
statehood. Equally, there is as strong case to attribute responsibility to the UN for 
failing to handle the expansion of martial arts groups due to inadequate reinte-
gration of former combatants along with an exclusionary recruitment policy that 
privileged a particular faction of local leaders.  
 
For the spectrum of consequences that has resulted from the failed security sector 
reform in 2006, the question of responsibility has remained almost entirely unex-
plored. Driven by their desire to end the UN presence in the country, local actors 
praised the success of UN in building self-sufficiency, normalcy, and resiliency in 
Timor-Leste. Equally, the UN was driven by a self-justificatory discourse and 
self-praising attitude which entirely ignored their responsibility for the conse-
quences that occurred after 2006. The first major consequence of the inadequate 
and incomplete security sector reform was the blurring of responsibilities be-
tween police and defence forces. While the primary responsibility for the fragility 
of security institutions remains with the Timorese political leaders, the UN also is 
guilty for its inability to develop a professional and successful security sector. 
The UN's failure to anticipate the consequences of handing over policing respon-
sibilities prematurely to local institutions also needs to be attributed. There is a 
linkage between police misconduct and weak training and mentoring by the UN 
in early stages when UNTAET exercised executive powers. The unanticipated 
deviation of police forces after 2006 is directly linked with UNMIT's inability to 
handle properly the restructuring of PNTL, the screening process, and incon-
sistent training and mentoring by UN police. The rush to complete UNMIT's 
mandate as early as possible did not leave room to anticipate the long-term con-
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sequences of their actions, which in turn contributed to the creation of a police 
service that was incapable of enforcing the law in accordance with democratic 
standards.  
 
In view of the above analysis, the UN in Timor-Leste and the local leadership 
have not treated adequately the question of responsibility for the unanticipated 
consequences of their purposive actions. Fragments of attributability seem to be 
evident through UN reporting, but no answerability or accountability aspects 
were assigned at any stage over the past 14 years. This signifies the nature of 
post-conflict governance where democracy is preached but not practiced by the 
international community and that authority is exercised without taking responsi-
bility for the consequences. The language of international reporting in Timor-
Leste was vague, multi-meaning, self-justificatory, confusing, and pitched mainly 
to external audiences and consumption. No space was given to reflexive report-
ing where the impunity of responsibility for consequences could be explored. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the unanticipated consequences and limitations of the 
UN's extensive and protracted governance in developing and reforming the secu-
rity sector in Timor-Leste. International peacebuilding in Timor-Leste had exten-
sive authority during a relatively short mission presence, with mandates under-
going constant reconfiguration and transformation. The UN's declared intention 
to build state institutions and establish the rule of law in Timor-Leste through the 
development of police and defence forces did not achieve the intended results. 
Instead, the security sector reform process and decisions taken by the UN during 
two critical turning points have adversely worsened the security situation, deep-
ened and broadened the confrontation between uniformed forces, and failed to 
develop the political and institutional framework for a security infrastructure 
that serves the safety of citizens and the rule of law, rather than serving power-
holders and clan-based groupings.  
 
The chapter explored two critical turning points that were crucial in shaping the 
security sector in Timor-Leste, with a particular emphasis on the spectrum of un-
anticipated consequences to which they contributed. The first critical turning 
point was the establishment of defence and police forces until 2005. The initial 
conditions under which the UN established the defence and police forces influ-
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enced the course of outcomes and subsequent decisions. For example, the key ac-
tions and decisions related to the treatment of ex-FALINTIL combatants, the pro-
cess of developing defense and police forces, the legal and institutional ambigui-
ty, the absence of donor support, limited resources and an unclear division of 
roles led to a numerous adverse and unanticipated consequences. The most sig-
nificant consequences include: state failure and violence in April and May 2006; 
impunity, unaccountability and human insecurity; and the emergence of spoiler 
groups. 
 
In order to anticipate, prevent and mitigate conflitual situations, it is important to 
have the ability to capture fragments of dislocated, yet inter-connected, and pat-
terned developments. The second critical turning point unavoidably arose after 
the 2006 crisis, when the UN needed to restructure and reform the security struc-
tures that it has created several years before. However, the problems created dur-
ing the first phase became unbreakable obstacles for security sector reform. The 
UN was unable to fulfil its post-2006 declared intention of reforming the security 
sector in Timor-Leste due to internal problems with the lack of capacity, the fail-
ure to engage effectively with the Timorese government, and the domestic obsta-
cles set by local actors who were reluctant to return temporary control over the 
armed forces to the UN. The local collective memory and consensus regarding 
the UN's failed peacebuilding between 1999 and 2005, as well as power politics 
and interests pushed them to resist the UN and reject their assistance to restruc-
ture the police and defence forces and to undertake a security sector review. As a 
result of this failed process of security sector reform, three major unanticipated 
consequences can be highlighted that emerged during this phase: blurred lines of 
responsibility between the defence and police forces; the politicization and im-
punity of the police; and damaged relations and distrust between the UN and 
Timorese authorities.  
 
This chapter has illustrated that the spectrum of unanticipated consequences that 
emerged in Timor-Leste was enabled by a number of factors. First, inadequate 
planning and performance during the early stages of involvement set the stage 
for path dependence and for anticipating the course of developments. Second, 
inconsistencies between intended outcomes, the implementation on the ground, 
and varied capabilities to achieve the mandate reduced the UN's ability to engage 
in anticipatory reasoning and to align its actions with strategic foresight. Third, 
focusing mainly on building state institutions without sufficient consideration for 
 208 
local needs, contexts, and cultural appropriateness reduced the UN‟s ability to 
assess realistically the situation on the ground and to anticipate potential conse-
quences. Finally, the structure of international governance where authority was 
exercised without democratic accountability reduced the urgency for peacebuild-
ing organizations to reach expected performance levels and avoid unanticipated 
consequences. A lack of anticipation reduced the practical and normative possi-
bility for peacebuilding in Timor-Leste, and undermined the credibility, authori-
ty, and legitimacy of the UN in general.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion: Peacebuilding in disguise?  
 
 
“Only the man who wills some-
thing strongly can identify the ele-
ments which are necessary to the reali-
sation of his will.” 
 
(Antonio Gramsci, 1971)687 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This thesis aimed to provide a critical assessment of peacebuilding impact in 
post-conflict societies by exploring the intentionality, consequences and respon-
sibility underlying current peacebuilding practices. To facilitate the theoretical 
and empirical understanding of peacebuilding impact, this thesis developed an 
original theoretical framework; a new integrated methodological approach; and 
generated new empirical perspectives from three in-depth cases studies of post-
conflict peacebuilding. Chapter 1 provided a critique to the dominant peace-
building theories, surveyed existing impact assessment approaches within the 
field, and deconstructed the discursive invocation of the different notions of con-
sequences. Chapter 2 developed the typological framework, outlined the new in-
tegrated methodological approach and explained the case selection, research de-
sign, and procedure of analysis. The second part of the thesis consisted of three 
chapters and provided a detailed examination of the unintended consequences of 
police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the unprevented consequences of the 
emergence of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo, and the unanticipated conse-
quences of securitization in Timor-Leste. To conclude the analysis, this chapter 
brings together in a thematic and conceptual fashion the key findings from the 
three case studies and draws a number of contingent conclusions.  
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Peacebuilding in disguise: intentionality, consequences, and responsibility 
The critical impact assessment of peacebuilding practices in post-conflict societies 
has shown that peacebuilding missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste were 
prematurely declared as successful missions, revealing the politics of impact in 
contemporary peacebuilding practices. The three post-conflict cases examined in 
this thesis clearly illustrated the mismatch between good intentions and bad con-
sequences. What were intended as liberal solutions to conflict outcomes gave rise 
to other problems and triggered new illiberal responses and dynamics.  
 
The inadequate engagement with the spectrum of unintended, unanticipated, 
and unprevented consequences is derived from the ontological politics of peace-
building organizations and the epistemological discontent of research in peace-
building. International peacebuilders try to avoid encountering the unintended 
and negative impacts of their actions. The ontological politics of ignoring the 
consequences of peacebuilding are related to the desire to preserve the unde-
served moral legitimacy of peacebuilding organizations while suppressing true 
encounters of failure, and the desire to exercise power, maintain dominant hier-
archies of order, and to achieve externally constructed intentions. This indeed 
constitutes the immorality of peacebuilding – a particular form of governing po-
litical affairs without care and self-constraint for the harm of their intentional 
conduct. Ignoring the registration of peacebuilding consequences leaves social 
events poorly explored, excludes impunity from responsibility, and dismisses the 
meaningful and corrective reformation of individual and collective agency. 
Moreover, peacebuilding consequences call into question the utilitarian good that 
liberal peacebuilding brings to post-conflict societies, revealing the dispropor-
tionality of good intentions and harmful consequences.  
 
In an attempt to overcome these contemporary practical and theoretical anoma-
lies, this thesis developed a new innovative conceptual and methodological 
framework, which critically traced different practices of peacebuilding, starting 
from the translation of declared intentions into actions, and then examining the 
consequences they produced, to finally be able to allocate different dimensions of 
responsibility. The discussion of intentionality, consequences, and responsibility 
as guiding conceptual devices for assessing the impact of peacebuilding has 
shown the complexity, multiplicity, non-linearity, contingency and limitations of 
human agency, rationality, and materiality. Notwithstanding these aspects, this 
thesis has illustrated that it is possible and, above all, necessary to tackle the most 
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ignored dimension of peacebuilding – the consequences of peacebuilding – in a 
systematic way, supported by a solid theoretical basis, new methodological ap-
proaches, and rich empirical evidence. Overall, the analyses in this thesis show 
that peacebuilding is a camouflaging enterprise, where intended outcomes are 
not pursued sufficiently, the potential pitfalls are not anticipated, the known ir-
regularities are not prevented, and responsibility for the consequences is evaded.   
 
Declared intentions as the 'original sin' of peacebuilding  
 
The first aspect analysed by this thesis was peacebuilding intentionality. In the 
context of post-conflict peacebuilding, intentions take on a central function to 
understand the motivation behind international engagement, the actions pursued 
to implement those intentions, and the consequences produced as a result of the 
combination of intentions and actions. In three case studies, declared intentions 
constituted the bedrock of international peacebuilding ideology and represented 
the reference point against which the state of peace was measured. The meaning, 
formation, and the transformation of declared intentions have serious implica-
tions for peacebuilding practices and the consequences they produce. They con-
stitute the hamartiology of peacebuilding – the 'original sin' for the occurrence of 
consequences. The declared intentions of international peacebuilding missions 
constitute the normativity of peace, which consists of values, beliefs, and purpos-
es that aim to be implanted, implemented, and sustained in post-conflict societies 
as foundations for new state structures, the rearrangement of social relations, and 
integration into broader global structures, process, and dynamics. Although the 
fabric of declared intentions belongs to liberal ideology, their tailoring and tex-
ture is contingent on local and contextual circumstances. Despite the potential 
utilitarian reach of the declared intentions to bypass political elites and reach lo-
cal communities directly, they are primarily directed towards fulfilling external 
interests and needs. 
 
The formation of intentions undergoes a complementary process between norma-
tive and practical aspects, incorporating multiple actors‟ interests, inputs, and 
compromises, as well as contextual factors that underline the state of fragility, 
destruction, and problems within the post-conflict recipient society. The formula-
tion of collective intentions for post-conflict Kosovo required a complex negotia-
tion process among the international community where disagreement was wide-
spread. Equally, local resistance profoundly shapes peacebuilding intentions 
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opening thus space for renegotiating and redefining the character of peace to re-
spond to local context. As much as declared intentions represent a collective will 
and desire to contribute to installing a liberal peace in a post-conflict society, they 
also represent the self-interest of outsider agents. The superficially consensual 
nature of declared intentions hides deeply rooted disagreement, which affects the 
political will, the adequacy of actions, and levels of concern for the consequences. 
However, declared intentions are often euphemisms, stating something that is 
neither truly intended nor expected to be achieved. Discourse on the rule of law, 
democratic policing, sustainable peace, and justice is often invoked broadly to 
leave space for manoeuvring and modifying the measurement of progress and 
success. They are more reflections of what is ought to be said rather than what 
was truly intended.  
 
The intentionality of declared intentions changes over time. While this is obvious, 
the evidence in this thesis shows that transcending the intentions of intentions 
can lead to multiple consequences, which defy, suffocate and have effects counter 
to the original declared intentions. Changing the declared intentions reduces the 
credibility of international peacebuilding organizations, while change and trans-
formation is essential for adapting to the evolving circumstances and preventing 
the spectrum of consequences. The exogenous and continuous transformation of 
declared intentions for police reform in BiH reduced the power of normativity of 
liberal peace, encouraged local resistance, and opened up avenues for contesting 
peacebuilding activities. The paradox of declared intentions in post-conflict socie-
ties is that it holds, in its textual articulation, elements not only of desired out-
comes but sometimes also of the pre-determined outcomes. The pathway of such 
intentions to outcomes without a processual pathway rarely manages to reach 
the intended outcome.  
 
The complexity of the spectrum of consequences  
 
The second and main contribution of this thesis was the examination of the spec-
trum of peacebuilding consequences. The discussion of the spectrum of conse-
quences in three case studies illustrated the complexity, non-linear linkage and 
hybridisation of issues, sources of consequences, as well as the multiple forms of 
consequences. The spectrum of unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented 
consequences is often triggered by the interaction of complex incompatibility be-
tween an extensive mandate and a large list of declared intentions. This is further 
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exacerbated by a short period of time to prepare the mission, limited advanced 
planning, the unavailability of resources, a lack of political willingness at various 
decision-making levels to implement the declared intentions, conflictions be-
tween self-interest and objective normativity, and the prevalence of short-term 
approaches to processes and outcomes coupled with an ignorance of long-term 
effects.  
 
The emergence of consequences shows the complex figuration and hybridization 
of peacebuilding processes. The spectrum of consequences occurs in a cascading 
logic of emergent features. They follow a non-linear pattern between the intend-
ed impact and the consequences that emerge, often transcending the social field 
and affecting other fields of social interactions. The processes are not only influ-
enced and driven by the international actors, but local actors and factors play an 
essential role in shaping the nature of processes. Nevertheless, the production of 
consequences is a symptom of powerlessness among the international peace-
builders. Often peacebuilding organizations witness the emergence of effects 
they don‟t want, don‟t have the ability to know, and they cannot prevent their 
occurrence. What we encounter as consequences are non-linearly assembled as-
pects of different fields. The spectrum of consequences reveals the hybridization 
process that occurs during critical moments. Hybridisation signifies the proces-
sual and relational interactions and practices between local and international 
agents with different ratios of power and agential positioning, but with mutually 
constitutive roles. This poses difficulties in understanding and explaining social 
events. Hybridisation practices challenge the very notion of intentionality and 
intended outcomes. The processual and interdependent nature of any social in-
teraction reveals the limits of bounded rationality and control over intended ac-
tions. This in turn makes the hybridisation process the mechanism that interposes 
itself and prevents the intended actions from achieving their intended outcomes. 
 
The three case studies examined here suggest that the spectrum of consequences 
contain elements of path dependence evident with the complex sequences, em-
bedded influence of early decisions and actions, and their influence over later 
developments and outcomes. The habitus of post-conflict societies immediately 
after the war provides multiple opportunities for changing the order of things, 
including social structure, power relations, and the dynamics of peacebuilding. 
The evidence suggests that the UN is inappropriately equipped to exploit the 
narrow windows of opportunity to change the course of events, processes, and 
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structures in post-conflict societies before the local power is reshuffled and en-
trenched. Missed opportunities for peacebuilding, which occur during critical 
turning points and initial conditions, have significant influence over the course of 
future actions and outcomes. Initial conditions, which set the course of develop-
ments in a negative trajectory, can include slow deployment, constrained authori-
ty, unclear intentions, as well as lack of inter-agency coordination and coopera-
tion. Failure to operate due to the initial conditions narrows down the window of 
opportunity to achieve the desired change, and offers the opportunity for local 
actors to exploit the weaknesses of the system to their advantage. The chain effect 
of missed opportunities that produces certain consequences creates yet another 
layer of consequences.  
 
Across three case studies it was possible to observe that incorrect policy choices 
during critical turning points undermined and delayed the prospects for building 
sustainable peace. As examined in the case of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo, 
the unprevented consequences from the first missed critical turning point became 
obstacles, shaped the next stage of political developments, and unavoidably be-
came influential factors in shaping the operationalization and modification of de-
clared intentions, which subsequently led to another layer of consequences, 
thereby creating an almost predictable pattern of processes where the key agents 
become in many instances mere spectators rather than true agential actors. In 
other words, firstly unprevented consequences had a spill-over effect on subse-
quent actions, which conditioned the nature of further decisions, ultimately lead-
ing to the emergence of new consequences.  
 
The examination of critical turning points in Bosnia and Herzegovina showed 
that the solution of one peacebuilding organization (UN) became the problems of 
the following organization (EU). The spectrum of consequences arising from the 
UN's actions became the foundations of EU intentionality in Bosnia. The evidence 
from the critical assessment of multiple and successive missions in Timor-Leste 
suggest that the UN was unaware and unprepared to undertake sufficient actions 
and decisions informed by strategic and anticipatory systems to ensure that its 
endeavours would not create multiple adversary consequences. Consequently, 
missed opportunities haunted successive UN missions and reflecting the logic of 
path dependence, the UN needed to try and correct the harm of its own earlier 
wrongdoings. Failing to learn lessons and translate them into corrective action 
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deepens further the failure of peacebuilding and makes it more difficult to antici-
pate the future course of events.  
 
The unintended consequences of peacebuilding were the first type of conse-
quences examined in this thesis. In  BiH, unintended consequences were those 
outcomes that arose from distinct political agendas and incompatible intentions 
between the local and international actors. A lack of consensus and compromise 
influenced the political antagonism and institutional struggle between the local 
and international stakeholders. Accordingly, the outcomes of such institutional 
hybridization were unintended consequences affecting all parties as nobody‟s 
intentions were completely realized. The outcomes of post-conflict peace pro-
cesses, negotiations, and confrontations are predominantly the unintended con-
sequences of individual actor‟s purposive actions. Accordingly, social elabora-
tions and structures are unintentionally produced by individual actions, illustrat-
ing the character of society influenced by everyone, yet by no one.  
 
One of the key issues explored in this thesis was how the notion of unintended 
consequences was mixed and confused discursively with unanticipated conse-
quences and arguably also unprevented consequences. The failure to prevent the 
emergence and development of Serb parallel structures between 1999 and 2001 
led to the creation of a frozen conflict in the north, where UNMIK failed to ex-
tend its authority and the rule of law, and KFOR was unable to maintain security 
and ensure the freedom of movement. Furthermore, the emergence of Serb paral-
lel structures led to the creation of institutional and legal parallelism, which cre-
ated social confusion, social disobedience, disorder, and informality. These con-
sequences shaped significantly the political developments in Kosovo after inde-
pendence. So, the previous non-actions created a new chain of consequences, 
which multiplied, complicated, and constrained further opportunities for build-
ing peace. Accordingly, unprevented consequences prevented peacebuilding in 
Kosovo. 
 
The Kosovo case illustrates that, in the quest for preventing consequences, the 
availability of early earning and anticipation systems are critical, but it is equally 
important for actors to be willing to take necessary preventive actions and re-
spond during a preventable stage. This calls into question the relevance of the 
availability of knowledge for preventive action, and the revelation that preven-
tive potential is not guided by the precautionary principle and pre-emption of 
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harmful consequences. Furthermore, the presence of multiple and incoherent in-
tentions complicates the possibility for undertaking preventive actions. Equally, 
the lack of legal and political authority, the contextual complexity, and disagree-
ments within peacebuilding structures reduces the ability to undertake preven-
tive acts. A particular formulation of declared intentions also limits the course of 
potentially preventable actions at a later stage.  
 
The third type of consequences examined in this thesis was the unanticipated 
consequences of security sector reform in Timor-Leste. The process of security 
sector development in Timor-Leste represents a clear failure of the UN and 
Timorese institutions to maintain the rule of law and provide security. The spec-
trum of consequences that emerged as a result of the UN's failed securitization 
process between 2001 and 2005 led to: state failure and a relapse into violence in 
2006 in April and May 2006; fragmentation and confrontation between the police 
and defence forces; police impunity and a lack of accountability; human insecuri-
ty; and the emergence of spoiler groups. After 2006, as a result of this failed pro-
cess of security sector reform, new consequences emerged, including: blurred 
lines of responsibility between the defence and police forces, the politicization 
and impunity of police, and damaged relations and distrust between the UN and 
Timorese authorities. What the three cases reveal is the banality of peacebuilding 
actualities and the striking absence of reflection on and reacting to the conse-
quences of peacebuilding. 
 
In Timor-Leste, unanticipated consequences occurred as a result of the lack of 
early communication and mutual understanding between local and international 
stakeholders regarding their intentions and political positions reduced the ability 
of peacebuilding organizations to anticipate the course of consequences arising 
from their purposive actions. Lack of engagement with the local context, lan-
guage, and culture reduced the UN‟s ability to capture local dynamics and orient 
strategically its actions towards the avenues that would produce intended re-
sults. Furthermore, the 'permanent temporality' of the UN presence reduced the 
desire and ability of agents to foresee the consequences of their actions. The 2006 
violence was not anticipated clearly by the UN‟s contingency planning and exit 
strategy. As the discussion of Timor-Leste illustrated, although most of the con-
sequences were not anticipated, there was evidence that early acts of violence 
and confrontation between the police and defence forces, as well as the poor in-
stitutional and operative performance of the police, left room for acts of violence 
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to be suspected. Ignoring these acts had detrimental effect on the state of peace in 
Timor-Leste.  
 
The critical practice tracing of peacebuilding practices in the case studies pro-
vides sufficient evidence to make contingent generalizations concerning the im-
pact of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies and the implications they have for 
the agency of peacebuilding organizations. First, timing plays a crucial role. The 
temporality of peacebuilding operations, short-term involvement of agents does 
not provide space for the clarity and stability that are essential for predictability, 
planning, and cautious operations. The contingency and short time frame of op-
erations in post-conflict societies gives insufficient attention to the spectrum of 
consequences, and especially for anticipation and prevention among peacebuild-
ing organizations. Against this background, short-term consequences are more 
important than the long-term impact. This logic is based on the need to provide 
evidence for good performance, which can be measured with reference to short-
term objectives and achievements. Consideration of long-term performance and 
quality assurance is compromised as a result of the need for results that can be 
measured immediately. Tomorrow‟s consequences are ignored. A pre-occupation 
with entry strategies and the establishment and maintenance of peacebuilding 
missions arguably overshadow concerns with long-term consequences. However, 
as this thesis has shown, ignoring the long-term impact and consequences of 
peacebuilding paves the way for the failure of peacebuilding efforts in post-
conflict societies and delays consolidation of peace at the expense of the local 
population. A preoccupation with stability led to accommodating spoiler groups 
in Kosovo, BiH and Timor-Leste, thereby undermining the declared intentions 
for establishing the rule of law, justice, and security. However, these short-term 
issues became the significant sources of instability and injustice. Making choices 
regarding long-term thinking is essential to avoid distractions from reaching in-
tended outcomes.  
 
The case studies illustrated that there is a dialectical relation between the dura-
tion of peacebuilding and the spectrum of consequences. The duration of UN 
peacebuilding operations has an impact on the willingness of international actors 
to care about the consequences of their actions, the establishment of relations 
with local political factions, and how they approach the local context, culture, 
and needs. The collateral scope of the spectrum of consequences prolongs the ef-
forts for peacebuilding and exhausts the constructive conflict resolution momen-
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tums. While the ambiguity and contingency of short missions produces certain 
consequences, a long-term presence creates consequences related to creating a 
culture of dependency, externally generated local political legitimacy, and the 
promotion of irresponsible politics. On the other hand, the spectrum of conse-
quences examined in this thesis have effectively prolonged the international 
presence, undermined their authority and legitimacy, delayed the establishment 
of effective and functional institutions, hindered the establishment of civic peace 
and ethnic reconciliation, and undermined socio-economic development. The 
longer the problems dragged on in BiH, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste the higher the 
costs became for the international presence in these countries. Equally the pro-
spects for overcoming state fragility and normalization became weaker, and it 
became harder to escape the cycles of conflict to reach economic stability and so-
cial peace.  
 
Peacebuilding organizations have largely ignored local knowledge arguing that it 
is primitive, illiberal, and not useful for building peace in post-conflict situations, 
as it is rooted in distinct cultures and ethnicities that were the source of conflict in 
first place. Accordingly, when peacebuilding organizations are far removed from 
the local communities, they have weaker local knowledge, lower capacity and 
less ability to anticipate, prevent, and reduce the harm of peacebuilding interven-
tions. Ignoring the consequences is a clear indicator and precondition for the pos-
sibility of the emergence of unanticipated consequences arising from non-action. 
In the case of Timor-Leste, a number of indicators pointed to the aggravation of 
dissatisfaction and troubles, which culminated in the outbreak of violence in 
2006. In Timor-Leste, the UN‟s failure to anticipate the complexity of issues they 
would need to address meant that they improvised their policy response and un-
dertook ad hoc actions without considering the consequences that they would 
later produce.  
 
Furthermore, the dislocated loyalty, absence of empathy with local people and 
their culture, as well as the primacy of materialism (concerns for career and high 
salaries), serve as distractions that undermine the potential of peacebuilding. 
Foreign workers see post-conflict societies as an attractive career move bringing 
high salaries, and diplomatic privileges and immunities. They often do not inter-
act with insider agents in an empathetic manner, but typically behave as privi-
leged individuals who believe themselves superior to insider agents, thereby un-
dermining local cultural practices and ignoring local knowledge. Foreign work-
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ers often create their own habitus in post-conflict societies, interact only among 
themselves, and avoid the everyday life and complex reality of post-conflict peo-
ple. Diplomats and senior officials of peacebuilding organizations are among the 
most influential agents that shape political processes in post-conflict places. They 
are primarily interested in advancing the interests and agenda of their respective 
institutions or seconding States, with little empathy for the legacies they leave 
behind in post-conflict societies. Under such conditions, consideration for the po-
tentially harmful effects of peacebuilding decisions and actions are virtually inex-
istent.  
 
The spectrum of consequences also emerges from short-sighted and historical 
routines of thinking and acting within the same repetitive dynamic for different 
types of situations and circumstances. The hierarchies of bureaucratic decision-
making reduce the ability for engagement in heuristic thinking, to explore alter-
native pathways, and to anticipate the possible consequences of peacebuilding 
programmes. Uncertainty regarding peacebuilding consequences cannot be tack-
led by formality, because consequences are dislocated across a broad network of 
social fields, which are difficult to capture within routine and formalized proce-
dures. The emergence of unanticipated consequences is facilitated by a number of 
factors, including: faulty assumptions, the 'template' logic of problem-solving, the 
tendency for the universal application and decontextualization of policy tools 
and mechanisms, inaccurate information and flawed situational and analytical 
knowledge. The processes of adaptation, learning, and change are often very 
slow and are often not part of peacebuilding practices. Consequences are also in-
fluenced by the common flawed assumption generally shared by international 
actors that liberal peacebuilding, which produced intended outcomes in the past, 
will have the same outcome in all post-conflict contexts. When transferred to a 
different post-conflict society, best practices and lessons learnt from other con-
texts, might not work as intended and expected.  
 
Last but not least, the spectrum of consequences also emerges as a result of the 
absence of coordination between different international peacebuilding organiza-
tions. Among different peacebuilding organizations there are tendencies for 
domination, hierarchical supremacy, and diverse interests, which reduce honest 
knowledge-sharing regarding the consequences of peacebuilding. The battle for 
coordination and consent between field-based operations, their headquarters and 
other international community stakeholders, consumes a considerable portion of 
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strategic thinking and planning time available to international peacebuilders. 
Such frictions reduce the ability of field-based peacebuilders to anticipate and 
prevent the consequences of their actions. The complex hierarchy of peacebuild-
ing decision-making erodes the possibility for key decision-makers to listen and 
act upon the early warning signs communicated by field-based peacebuilders. 
For example, in Bosnia IFOR/SFOR was unwilling to assist IPTF by providing 
security for the return of refugees, which resulted in the permanent entrapment 
of hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs outside their home communities. 
This also had a negative spill-over effect onto the composition of electorates and 
community representation, leading to the dominance of nationalist parties, and 
delayed reconciliation. Equally, in Kosovo, KFOR acted independently of UN-
MIK's authority, as did the EU and OSCE in their semi-independent operation as 
UNMIK pillars. In Timor-Leste, UNTAET was not in control of INTERFET.  
 
Responsibility for consequences  
 
The third dimension examined in this thesis is the question of responsibility. In 
particular, two aspects were discussed: how responsibility is conceived and treat-
ed within current practices, and how it should be dealt with normatively. Cur-
rent peacebuilding organizations reject taking responsibility for the spectrum of 
consequences arising from their purposive action and show little concern for 
their wrongdoings and the mess they leave behind in post-conflict societies. This 
is evident from the absence of appropriate mechanisms to address the responsi-
bility for taking wrong decisions and actions, for failing to uphold their obliga-
tions, and for causing social harm. Nevertheless, the dislocated nature of conse-
quences (in time, place, and scope of authority) complicates imputing the right 
proportion of responsibility to the responsible agent. Accordingly, the typological 
framework introduced in this thesis acknowledges the differentiated and gradu-
ated conception of responsibility - in the form of attributability, answerability, 
and accountability - to provide a more nuanced and reality adequate assignment 
of responsibility. However, the analysis of three case studies illustrates that at-
tributability and answerability aspects have not been addressed sufficiently in 
practice. In this regard, the identification of the spectrum of consequences was 
not registered properly, and graduated responsibility was not assigned to the re-
sponsible agents. This reflects a complete disregard for the outcomes of their 
conduct and the careless engagement of the international community when at-
tempting to build peace.  
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Regarding current practices, contemporary peacebuilding missions operate with-
out appropriate responsibility safeguards. This is partially affected by the politics 
of unaccountable international governance evident from the diplomatic privileg-
es and immunity, which protect actors from legal and political responsibility, and 
from the indirect political power they exercise over internal and external forces. 
This is exacerbated by the ineffective system of national balance among the UN 
staff members in sending troops to peace operations and the prevalence of the 
clientistic politics of donor countries. In the current reality, there is no adequate 
approach to allocate responsibility for the spectrum of consequences, whether 
intended or unintended, anticipated or unanticipated, avoided or unprevented. 
Internal disciplinary mechanisms, frequent changes of personnel in charge of po-
litical decisions, and the loosely-defined and partially implemented codes of 
conduct render internal accountability in peacebuilding organizations a techno-
cratic necessity rather than a genuine attempt to ensure the responsible behav-
iour of agents. The absence of legal and institutional mechanisms to hold interna-
tional actors responsible can be explained as arising from the desire of power-
holders to avoid mirroring the ethos of democratic responsibility prevalent in 
their own home country and to preserve the political and practical supremacy 
over the local subjugated agents. This partially explains the international unwill-
ingness and ineffectiveness when dealing with allegations of human rights viola-
tions by international civilian and military personnel in post-conflict settings. 
Above all, it shows the prevalence of the tendency to uphold authority while 
avoiding responsibility, which speaks itself for the moral maturity and agential 
character of international governance.   
 
Although it is very difficult, if not impossible, to trace personal responsibility 
there is a strong case for pursuing collective institutional responsibility for the 
spectrum of consequences that occurred. In this regard, the evidence across three 
case studies suggests that multiple local and international actors are responsible 
for the spectrum of consequences arising from their actions and non-actions. 
Across all three case studies examined in this thesis, there is clear evidence that 
the primary responsibility for the individual consequences, whether in the form 
of answerability and accountability falls with the national stakeholders and their 
critical agency. However, the international community also shares responsibility 
for enabling and facilitating the occurrence, development, and escalation of the 
spectrum of consequences. Across three case studies matching concrete conse-
 222 
quences with particular responsible agents shows that the international peace-
building organizations should be subject to attributability and answerability as-
pect of responsibility. In relation to the initial decisions taken and actions imple-
mented, there is a strong case to explore aspects of responsibility for the spec-
trum of consequences. However in this thesis, the exploration of assigning re-
sponsibility has only focused on cases of unintended, unanticipated, and unpre-
vented consequences.  
 
While it is unrealistic to expect that international peacebuilding missions will ret-
rospectively accept to be held accountable for the consequences of their actions, 
at the very least problematizing the issue of responsibility for consequences 
could serve to redirect the future conception of peacebuilding practices – moving 
from „authority-without-responsibility‟ to „authority-with-responsibility‟. Devel-
oping answerability and attributability mechanisms to avoid repeating past mis-
takes is better than blindly ignoring the past. This suggests that there is a case to 
redefine the current nature and extent of responsibility, to reduce normative enti-
tlements and to reshape the legitimacy of international peacebuilders, as well as 
to critically review the extent to which such missions function in accordance with 
democratic standards. From the perspective of moral and consequentialist logic, 
the legitimacy and authority of the UN should be conditional on their willingness 
to accept responsibility for the spectrum of consequences produced by their pur-
posive decisions and actions. In particular, the failure to prevent consequences 
despite possessing the necessary authority, capacity, resources, and knowledge 
presents a strong case and moral imperative to allocate the responsibility. Hence, 
in terms of normative necessity and consequentialist logic, the allocation of dif-
ferentiated responsibility for the spectrum of consequences would serve as a cru-
cial element to reframe the politics of agency and encourage actions, which are 
well-thought-out and avoid the emergence of negative side effects.  
 
Beyond liberal peacebuilding 
The analysis presented in this thesis provides substantive material to draw a 
number of observations regarding peacebuilding in general. The evidence pre-
sented here illustrates that liberal peacebuilding in the broader sense is not capa-
ble of building a sustainable peace and dealing with its consequences for a num-
ber of reasons including: peacebuilding's inherent pathologies related to norma-
tive and organizational inconsistencies; the linear and universalist repertoire of 
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peacebuilding toolkits and rulebooks; undemocratic methods of operation; an 
orientation towards problem-solving; and a detachment from local needs, cul-
ture, and knowledge. Seen from the perspective of complex systems, current 
practices of building peace in post-conflict societies can be referred to as linear 
peacebuilding, whereby the desired outcomes are projected and predicted, and 
the implementation tends to follow logical frameworks and action plans, with 
evaluation being projected in a suitable fashion. In practice, liberal peacebuilding 
is projected prior to an intervention by agents who are detached from the place 
and context of engagement, thereby operating with insufficient knowledge re-
garding cultural sensitivity and local dynamics. Liberal peacebuilding disregards 
the contingent and contextual nature of events, but rather applies technocratic 
considerations and anticipates practices based on comparison, embedded as-
sumptions, the logic of 'template thinking', and projecting expectation. Driven by 
the fallacy of efficiency and professionalism, adapting this projected linearity to 
local circumstances is seen as an organizational and competitive weakness. How-
ever, liberal peacebuilding does not leave space for preventive measures nor is it 
suitable in precautionary terms. 
 
As discussed in this thesis, local agency has profoundly shaped the intentions 
and actions of liberal peacebuilding, contributing thus to the emergence of unin-
tended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences. Local resistance and co-
option of liberal peace in its positive and negative graduation has been constantly 
ignored and supressed by international organizations. In the quest of avoiding 
the creation of harmful and negative consequences, peacebuilding organizations 
should create more space for local agency through enabling bottom up processes 
to take currency, where external actors would take more facilitative and support-
ive role. This would enable creating more sustainable peace, ingrained in local 
culture, needs, and practices.  
 
In this regard, future consideration of peacebuilding and its application in prac-
tice unavoidably needs to engage with a number of precautionary dimensions 
examined in this thesis. In this regard, thinking on peacebuilding should make 
space for the potential negative and harmful consequences while further elabo-
rating on questions of intentionality, anticipation, and prevention. There is a 
strong case to raise awareness of the consequences arising from the absence of 
anticipation and to propagate contingent reflections on how certain aspects of 
social activity can be planned, anticipated, and prevented through reflexive and 
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empathic agency, as well as attributably relevant to particular context, place, and 
time. In view of this, tendencies to unquestionably believe in our ability to fore-
see the future results of our actions could itself have unintended consequences. 
Future approaches to peacebuilding may not always reach the intended out-
comes, or anticipate and prevent certain consequences, but it may help to reduce 
the potential for negative unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented conse-
quences.  
 
Moreover, thinking about peacebuilding should accept the persistence of uncer-
tainty, the multiplicity of futures, the contingency of agency, the evaluative and 
incomplete nature of power, and the necessity for reflexive flexibility and the 
need to adjust policy-making process and institutional arrangements. Greater at-
tention should be paid to the cultural sensitivity and non-linearity of peacebuild-
ing programmes, the contextual suitability of the methods applied, and the stra-
tegic thought process that is invoked. A culture of precautionary reasoning 
should be installed throughout the lifecycle of peacebuilding programmes. Con-
sideration of the potential consequences and side effects, should be incorporated 
before, during, and after a peacebuilding programme is implemented. If the spec-
trum of consequences is only encountered during the stage of programme evalu-
ation, it could be too late. Peacebuilding consequences are deeply contextual and 
standardising the lessons learnt may not be an effective tool for sharing 
knowledge. 
 
Finally, an understanding of the complexities of the uncertain consequences pro-
duced by any peacebuilding actions can lead to improving ethical practices and 
can increase the likelihood of delivering on the declared intentions. However, ac-
cepting and legitimizing uncertainty provides a perennial escape route for deci-
sion-makers to explain why their best intentions failed to deliver. Equally, con-
sidering the risk of producing unintended consequences could mobilize the abil-
ity of peacebuilding actors and organizations to anticipate, prevent and, when 
necessary, change or reverse the course of actions to avoid producing unintended 
consequences arising from their purposive actions. Under the conditions of the 
perceived risk of consequences and liability, peacebuilding agents and organiza-
tions can incentivize evaluating the outcomes and reflexively engaging in their 
peacebuilding activities - while preserving the emancipatory potential, freedom, 
equality, plurality, and co-existence with difference.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has contributed to broadening our understanding of the long-term 
impact of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies and the various types of conse-
quences which are not intended, anticipated, or prevented, which delayed and 
undermined the prospects for sustainable peace. The critical impact assessment 
of peacebuilding has shown that good intentions do not flow seamlessly into 
good actions, and even less seamlessly into good outcomes. The rocky road to 
sustainable peace is dark, and full of bends, twists and turns. Current cultures 
and practices of peacebuilding enshrined in Western ontologies and patronizing 
attitudes towards the local subjects and driven by self-interest are careless about 
the consequences of their actions and shun responsibility for any harmful conse-
quences. Liberal peacebuilding is prone to delay the building of peace. Peace is 
delayed by the very acts that try to bring peace. Liberal intentions are not trans-
lated into liberal effects. The liberal peace „will to peace‟ remains immanently in-
complete. This thesis has provided the first systematic critique on the subject of 
the intentionality, consequences and responsibility related to peacebuilding and 
has tried to articulate a new local critical perspective on peacebuilding. Although 
it has revealed the negative impacts, this thesis also serves as a cry to improve 
human agency. It is a call for change. It is a call to be careful with peacebuilding, 
because it affects human lives and changes social structures. Surveying the mess 
created by past attempts to build peace, it is difficult to save liberal peacebuild-
ing. New and less harmful alternative approaches to peacebuilding need to be 
developed to enshrine the right and responsibility to advance the cause of peace.  
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